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STATE OF UTAH

vs.

No. 3453

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendant. J

UNION PORTLAND CEMENT
COMPANY, a corporatiou,
Pmintitt,

vs.

No. 3452

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendant.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE RESPECTIVE APPLICATIONS OF PLAINTIFFS HEREm FOR
WRITS OF PROHIBITION.

Submitted by,

DICKSON, ELLIS, LUCAS & ADAMSON,
:l:s Amicus Curiae.

-1.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
THE OGDEN PORTLAND CEMENT
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

No. 3453

Defendant.

UNION PORTLAND CEJMENT
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.

No. 3452

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendant.

BRIE·F IN OPPOSITION TO THE RESPECTIVE APPLICA·
TIONS OF PLAINTIFFS HEREIN FOR
WRITS OF PROHIBITION.

This is an application by plaintiffs addressed to
the original jurisdiction of this court for writs of
prohibition directed to the Public Utilities Commission
of this State. This court issued its alternative writs
of prohibition in the premises and the matter now
comes before the court on the return thereof and the
defendant's return thereto. The two causes are substantitally identical in their facts, and are identical
in principle, and therefore will be considered, discussed
and disposed of as one cause.
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For convenience and brevity, the plaintiffs will
hereinafter be referred to as the "Cement Company,"
and the defendant as the "Commission," and the Utah
Power & Light Company as the "Power Company."
The Commission filed a motion to quash the alternative writ. That motion operates as a demurrer and
admits the truth of the facts set forth in the alternative
writ and in the verified petition or affidavit whereon
the same issued. The Commission also filed a verified
return. The Cement Company has raised no issue
of fact on such return, but on the face of the record
seeks an absolute permanent writ. This is in the
nature of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and
the averments of the return are admitted to establish
the facts therein set forth. (State vs. McQuillin, 262
Mo. 256, 171 S. W. 72.) The face of this record discloses the following:
Statement of the Case.

The Public Utilities Act of this State, enacted February 27, 1917, took effect upon its approval on March 8,
1917. On April 8, 1918, the Commission issued its
Tariff Circular No. 3 calling upon all public utilities,
including the Power Company, to file with the Commission before June 1, 1918, their rate schedules in
the form prescribed therein. On October 23, 1918,
by its Supplement No. 1 to Tariff Circular No. 3, the
Co~mission ordered the utilities, including said Power
Company, to file with the Commission copies of .all
contracts and agreements "not included in its published
schedules." In response thereto the Power Company
filed with the Commission its schedules, and, also, its
contracts and agreements, something over fifty in
number, "not included in its published schedules."
The Commission examined the contracts so filed by the
Power Company, and found that on their face they
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were different from the schedule rates, and were on
their face prima f,acie preferential and discriminatory.
Thereafter and on September 27, 1919, the Commission,
of its own motion, issued an order directed to, not
only the Rower Comprany, but also about seventy-five
holders of special contracts, reciting "that for the
purpose of making a full and complete investigation
and inquiry into the provisions of such contracts,
and each of them, and into all matters pertaining
thereunto," the Power Company and the individual
contract holders were "notified and cited to appear
before the Commission," at a time fixed, "then and
there to justify the continuing in effect of such special
contracts, and the rates, charges, facilities and privileges granted thereunder, and to show the reasonableness and equity of such rates, charges, facilities and
privileges, and further to show that they are not
in contravention of the provisions" of the Utilties Act
relative to preferences. Among such contracts were
those of the Cement Companies, here involved, which
contracts appeared upon their face to have been made
prior to the passing of the Public Utilities Act. The
Cement Company appeared before the Commission
and objected to the jurisdiction of the Commission "to
hear and determine the things set out in its order."
The Commission overruled such objections, and was
proceeding with the investigation and hearing, when the
alternative writs of prohibition were issued in these
causes. In its return the Commission admits its
intention to proceed with the investigation and outlines
its intention as to its future action in the premises
by saying:
"that unless there be some reason in
the nature of a special and adequate consideration for such special contracts and the service
contemplated thereby given by the holders of
such contracts to the utility and not given by
the general public when contracting for like

service, and for which an adequate return has
not been furnished to the utility to the holders
of such contracts, defendant proposes, if the
same be found discriminatory and in contravention of the law, to apply to said contracts the
same rates applied to the public for like service,
to the end that for the sam~ class of service all
rates and charges shall be uniform and the
same."
The Cement Company asserts that the Commission
has no jurisdiction to proceed with the investigation
proposed because: (1) Its contract is protected from
abrogation or impairment by the appropriate provisions of the Constitutions of the United States and
of this State; and (2) the Utilities Act provides that
nothing contained in said Act should or shall be construed "to prevent the carrying out of contracts for
free or reduced rate passenger transportation or other
public utility service heretofore made, founded upon
adequate consideration and lawful when made."
The questions raised and argued before the court on
the return of the alternative writ are of the gravest
public importance, and while, in proceedings like
this, formal intervention by others is not usual, under
the circumstances here presented, counsel representing
other interests were very properly permitted to appear
and file briefs as amicus curiae (State vs. Rost, 49 La.
Ann. 1451, 22 So. 421).
The question of the jurisdiction of this court to issue the writs
of prohibition sought herein is presented.

This application is addressed to the original jurisdiction of this court conferred upon it by Section 4 of
Article 8 of the State Constitution. The court is confronted at the outset with the question as to whether
it has jurisdiction to issue the writs of prohibition
prayed for herein. This question is presented by the
Commission's motion to quash. But whether it is or
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not, the court will investigate and determine this question of its own motion.
The source and right of this court to assume jurisdiction of the subject-matter-the issuance of a writ
of prohibition in the exercise of original jurisdictionmust be found in the provision of the Constitution
referred to. A question of constitutional original jurisdiction is involved. That being true, the court will, of
its own motion, investigate its jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the cause, whether the issue is raised
by the parties or not, because constitutional jurisdiction of the nature here involved should rest on something stronger than a mere failure of parties to raise
the issue, and to hold otherwise would be, or at least
might be, to here assume and usurp original jurisdiction in matters other than as authorized by the Constitution. Furthermore, the issuance of a writ of prohibition is an extraordinary proceeding and a power that
will only be cautiously assumed and used, and therefore
it is highly proper for the court to take the precaution
and responsibility upon itself to investigate the entire
11ubject, lest it exercise so mandatory a prerogative
without complete justification. These principles have
been enunciated by other courts in prohibition proceedings.
State vs. District Court, 46 Okla. 654, 149
Pac. 140;
State vs. Taylor, 54 Wash. 150, 102 Pac.
1029;
State vs. Stutsrnan, 24 N. D. 68, 139
N. W. 83;
State vs. Ewert (S. D.), 156 N. W. 90.
This is but in line with the principle that an absolute
want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter cannot be
waived, and that neither a failure to object to the
jurisdiction of a court, nor consent to its exercise,
when the court would otherwise have none, will confer
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it, the doctrine of waiver having no application in
such a case.

Davidson vs. Mun.sey, 27 Utah, 87, 74
Pac. 431;
15 Cor. Jur. 844;
17 Stand. Encyc. Pro. 900.
Thus it is said in 17 Stand. Encyc. Pro., 900 that:
"Since jurisdiction of the subject-matter can·
not be conferred by consent or waiver, it is not
only the power but it is the duty of the court
to inquire whether the facts give jurisdiction
over the subject-matter even though the question
is not raised by the parties, and even if both
parties assert jurisdiction."
And in 15 Cor. Jur., 852, it is said:
"Courts are bound to take notice of the limits
of their authority, and accordingly a court may
of its own motion, even though the question is
not raised by the pleadings or is not suggested
by counsel, recognize the want of jurisdiction,
and it is its duty to act accordingly by staying
proceedings, dismissing the action, or otherwise noticing the defect, at any stage of the
proceedings."
This court has the power, under its original jurisdiction, to
issue a writ of prohibition to restrain the Commission from
exercising jurisdiction or power which it does not possess
in the premises, because the function which the Commission is attempting to exercise at this time is judicial and
not legislative in character. There is a clear line of demarcation and differentiation between the functions of
the Commission, which are judicial, or quasi judicial, and
those which are legislative.

The jurisdiction and authority of this court to issue
writs of prohibition depends upon the constitutional
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organic law under which this court functions (21 Stan.
Encyc. Pro., 814).
Section 4 of Article VIII of the State Constitution
provides that this court "shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of" prohibition. That provision
of the Constitution fixes the jurisdiction of this court;
and the jurisdiction of this court as so fixed cannot
be abridged or limited by the Legislature. (State vs.
Durand, 36 Utah, 93, 104 Pac. 260). Hence nothing
contained in, or omitted from, the Public Utilities Act
can abridge or limit the jurisdiction of this court in
the premises, whatever force or effect as a matter
of persuasive policy or procedure that Act, or any
other legislative enactment, may have as respects the
exercise by this court of a discretion in allowing or
refusing the writ, a question which we shall hereafter
discuss. On the other hand, it is equally obvious
that except as otherwise provided in the Constitution,
this court has appellate jurisdiction only.
On the argument of this cause before the court it
was contended that the writ of prohibition mentioned
in the Constitution was the writ of prohibition only
as known to the common law, and that it did not
extend to embrace the restraint of ministerial acts or
functions as the writ existed under the laws of the
Territory of Utah with functions as therein defined, and
as applied by the courts of the Territory when the
Constitution was adopted. This question was discussed
by this court in State vs. Durand, 36 Utah 93, 104
Pac. 260, but the court there found it unnecessary to
determine the question. Other decisions of this court
bearing upon the determination of that question are:

Godbe vs. Salt Lake City, 1 Utah 68;
Shepperd vs. Court, 1 Utah 340;

Ducheneau vs. House, 4 Utah 363, 10 Pac.
938;
People vs. Spiers, 4 Utah 385, 10 Pac. 609.
On the whole the weight of the argument as well
as the weight of authority would seem to require a holding that the writ mentioned in the Constitution was the
writ of prohibition only as known to the common
law, particularly as the decision in Williams vs. Lewis,
6 Ida. 184, 54 Pac. 619, referred to by this court in
State vs. Dur,and, supra, has been overruled in Coats
vs. Harris, 75 Pac. 246, 9 Ida. 426. The authorities
from other states bearing upon this question because
of their constitutional provisions and legislative enactments being similar to ours, are:

Maurer vs. Mitchell, 53 Cal. 289;
Camron vs. Kenfield, 57 Cal. 550;
Farmers Union vs. Thresher, 62 Cal. 407;
Hobart vs. Pillson, 66 Cal. 210;
Winsor vs. Commissioners, 24 Wash. 540,
64 Pac. 780;
State vs. Taylor, 54 Wash. 150, 102 Pac.
1029;
State vs. District Court, 22 Mont. 220, 56
Pac. 219;
State vs. Hogan, 24 Mont. 379, 62 Pac.
493;
Co,ats vs. Harris, 9 Idaho 426, 75 Pac.
246;
O'Brien vs. Trousdale (Nev.), 167 Pac.
1007;
State vs. Ewert (S. D.), 156 N. W. 90.
It is equally unnecessary for the court to determine
that question in this case. Whatever the functions
of the Commission may be in a given instance, and as
respects a given subject-matter, whether judicial or
quasi judicial on the one hand, or legislative on the
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other, they are not ministerial, certainly not as respects
the matters covered by this application with which the
Commission is dealing or attempting to deal. And our
territorial legislation (Laws of Utah, 1884, p. 326;
Comp. Laws 1888, Sec. 3743) went no further than
extending the operation of the writ to include ministerial functions.
The distinction between ministerial and judicial and
other official acts seems to be that where the law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such
precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment, tne act is ministerial, but
where the act to be done involves the exercise of discretion
or judgment in determining whether the duty exists, it
is not to be deemed merely ministerial.
The term "ministerial" is generic rather than specific,
and includes acts which are ministerial only and involve
no judgment or discretion, and those which are qu.asi
judicial; a purely ministerial act being one which a
person performs on a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal
authority, with regard to his own judgment on the
propriety of the act. (State vs. Stutsman (N. D.), 139
N. W. 83, 88.) A purely "ministerial duty" is one as
to which nothing is left to discretion. (City of Biddleford vs. Yates, 72 Atl. 335, 337, 104 Me. 506.) So in
State vs. Parker (S. D.), 166 N. W. 309, it is said:
"A ministerial act or duty is one which is
to be performed under a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, and without regard
to or exercise of the judgment of the one doing
it upon the propriety of the act being done."
Many other authorities defining a ministerial act
or duty are cited in the appropriate volume of Words
and Phrases, but it is unnecessary to refer to or discuss
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them because this court in Garff vs. Smith, 31 Utah,
102, 86 Pac. 772, says at pages 107 and 108:
"We are of the opinion that the character of
the acts performed by appellant are quasi judicial
in their nature, and not ministerial. It has well
been said that:
'Official duty is ministerial when it is
absolute, certain, and imperative, involving
merely the execution of a set task, and when
the law which imposes it prescribes and
defines the time, mode and occasion of its
performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion.
Official action is ministerial when it is the
result of performing a certain and specific
duty arising from fixed and designated
facts.' (People vs. Bartels et al., 138 Ill.
322, 27 N. E. 1091.)
"It has also been defined as follows:
'A ministerial act is one which a public
officer is required to perform upon a given
state of facts in a prescribed manner in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority
and without regard to his own judgment
or opinion concerning the propriety or
impropriety of the act to be performed.'
(State ex rel. vs. Meier, 143 Mo. 439, 45
S. W. 306.) To the same effect are also
the following: Grider vs. Tally, 77 Ala. 422,
54 Am. Rep. 65; Throop. Pup. Officers, Sec
tion 535; 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 376.''
We shall hereafter discuss the nature of the Utilities
Commission. Whatever its character, it is a body of
limited jurisdiction, and, of course, as we shall hereafter
see, it is not the exclusive or final judge of its jurisdiction or the limitations thereon. In Collier on Public
Service Corporations, Sec. 176, p. 416, it is well said:
"To say that a commission is a tribunal of conferred powers is to say also that if it transcends
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those powers it acts without jurisdiction. It is a
truism to declare that it is not the sole judge of
when its so transcends."
As we shall hereafter see, the Commission, even when
exercising legislative functions, may exercise or attempt
to exercise incidental judicial or quasi judicial power.
Accordingly, where such a Commission is exercising
judicial or quasi judicial functions, or attempting so to
do, in excess of its jurisdiction, a proper case is presented where the court may, in the exercise of its discretion, stay the proceedings and keep the Commission
within the limits and bounds of law by the issuance of a
writ of prohibition. To hold otherwise would be to vest
in the Commission an omnipotent and tyrannical power
contrary to every principle of a free government. Accordingly in a proper case this court may restrain the
Commission from exercising power which it does not
possess.
State vs. Clendening, 93 Ohio St. 264,
112 N. E. 1029;
Allen vs. Railway Commission, (Cal.), 175
Pac.446;
A., T. & S. F. Ry. vs. Commission, (Okl.),
170 Pac. 1156;
Quinby vs. Commission, 223 N. Y. 244,
119 N. E. 433;
In re Pennsylvania Gas Co., 225 N. Y. 397,
122 N. E. 260;
In re Pennsylvania Gas Co., 169 N. Y. S.
820;
Fleming vs. Commissioners, 31 W.Va. 608,
8 S. E. 267;
State vs. Stutsman, 24 N. D. 68, 139 N. W.
83;
Superintendent vs. Taylor, 105 Ky. 387,
49 S. W. 38;
Harriman vs. Commissioners, 53 Me. 83;
Connecticut Ry. vs. Commissioners, 127
Mass 50, 34 Am. Rep. 538;
Day vs. Board of Aldermen, 102 Mass. 310;
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Speed vs. Detroit, 98 Mich. 360, 57 N. W.
406;

State vs. Young, 29 Minn. 474, 9 N. W.
737;

State vs. Goodier, 195 Mo. 551, 93 S. W.
928.
Thus the rule is stated in 21 Stand. Encyc. Pro. 913,
that:
"A writ of prohibition will issue to prevent a
commission from proceeding with a matter beyond its jurisdiction."
So in 32 Cyc. 601, it is said:
"A public board acting in a quasi judicial character becomes an inferior tribunal amenable to the
writ whenever it exceeds its authority or exercises
an authority which it does not possess."
So, also, in 32 Cyc. 602, it is said:
"Prohibition will not lie to restrain a public
officer from performing purely ministerial duties,
or from performing judicial acts within his jurisdiction. But any abuse or usurpation of judicial
power on the part of a public officer acting in a
judicial or quasi judicial character will be restrained by prohibition."
On the other hand, our Constitution (Sec. 1, A.rt. V)
divides the powers of our State government into three
distinct departments, the legislative, the executive, and
the judicial. Those are co~ordinate branches of the
government. It is of course well settled that a writ of
prohibition will not run against the Legislature, and,
:furthermore, as stated in 32 Cyc. 601:
"The writ will not lie against a public board
having the power to legislate for the purpose of

arresting the progress of any legislation pending
therein."
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Spring Valley Water Works vs. Satn Francisco, 52 Cal. 111;
Spring Valley Water Works vs. Bartlet,
63 Cal. 245;
Commissioners vs. State, 151 Ala. 561,
44 So. 465;
McWhorter vs. Dorr, 57 W. Va. 608, 50
S. E. 838;
Patton vs. Stephens, 77 Ky. (14 Bush.)
324;
Smith vs. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 29 L. Ed.
601.
It has been urged in this case that this court has no
jurisdiction to issue the writ prayed for in this case, and
that the issuance of the same would be an invasion by
judicial writ of another and independent branch of the
State government, and an attempt to control legislative and administrative power and authority. But this
contention begs the question upon which the jurisdiction
of this court in the premises must turn.
The jurisdiction of this court to issue a writ of prohibition directed to the Commission depends in a general
way upon the nature or character of the tribunal which
the Commission constitutes; and that having been
determined, the nature of the act here and now about to
be done by the Commission determines the jurisdictional
propriety of the issuance of the writ of prohibition
sought. For if the court finds that the Commission is
exercising or attempting to exercise judicial or quasijudicial power without cause, without grounds, without
right, without authority, and without jurisdiction, and
there is no other adequate remedy or relief from its
usurped power when executed, then the court has the
jurisdiction and can and should issue the writ. So we
pass to a discussion of these questions whereon the
jurisdiction of the court depends in this particular case.
The Commission is a mere creature of statute, and has
no judicial power as such, except as incidental quasi-
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judicial power is to be exercised by it in conjunction
with, or as a preliminary to, the operation of its legislative and administrative functions. It is elementary
law that a commission of this character is purely a
creature of statute and as such possesses only such
authority and powers as have been conferred upon it by
express grant or arise therefrom by implication as
necessary and incidental to the full exercise of the
powers granted. Whatever power the Commission has
must be found and contained within the act. It cannot
be inferred or assumed. The power of the Commission
fixed by express provision of the statute, cannot be
expanded by construction or implication from considerations of mere policy or convenience. The Commission
possesses naked statutory power. Any reasonable doubt
of the grant of a particular power to a Commission, is
held to deny its having been conferred. The power of
the Commi,ssion is not to be taken by implication, but
must be given by language which admits of no other
reasonable construction.

United Railways Co. vs. Commission, 270
Mo. 429, 192 S. W. 958;
Municipal Gas Co. vs. Commission, 224 N.
Y. 156, 129 N. E. 132;
Cincinnativs. Utilities Com'n, (Ohio), 117
N. E. 381;
21 Stand. Encyc. Pro. 908, 909;
Commission vs. Telephone Ass'n, 282 Ill.
336, 118 N. E. 760;
Commission vs. Illinois C. Ry., 27 4 Ill. 36,
113 N. E. 36;
N. Y. Rys. Co. vs. Commission, 223 N. Y.
373, 119 N. E. 848;
Kelly vs. Public Serv. Com'n, 157 N. Y. S.
703;
Pennsylvania Ry. vs. Towers, 126 Md. 59,
94 Atl. 330;
2 Elliott on Railroads, Sec. 675, 683;
32 Cyc. 47, 48;
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Collier Pub. Serv. Corp., Sec. 171;
Gulf Etc. Ry. vs. Commission, 94 Miss. 124,
49 So. 118;

Commission vs. Ry. Co., 17 Or. 65, 19 Pac.
702;

Siler vs. L. & N. Ry., 213 U. S. 175, 53 L.
Ed. 753;

People vs. Wilcox, 200 N. Y. 423, 94 N. E.
212;

State vs. L. & N. Ry., (Fla.), 49 So. 39;
Libby vs. Cana,dian P. Ry., 82 Vt. 316, 75
Atl. 593;

People vs. N. Y., L. E. & W. Ry., 104 N. Y.
58, 9 N. E. 856;
K. C. 0. B. & B. E. Ry. vs. R. R. Coms.,
73 Kan. 168, 84 Pac. 755;
State vs. R. R. Com'n, 47 Wash. 627, 92
Pac. 457;
State vs. F. E. & M. Ry., 23 Neb. 17, 36
N. W. 305;
United Rys. Co. vs. Com's, 123 Md. 561,
91 Atl. 552;
State vs. C., M. & St. P. Ry., 16 S. D. 507,
94 N. W. 406;
U. S. vs. L. & N. Ry., 236 U. S. 318, 59
L. Ed. 598;
I. C. C. vs. D. L. & W. Ry., 216 U. S. 538,
54 L. Ed. 608;
I. C. C. vs. L. & N. Ry., 227 U. S. 88, 57
L. Ed. 43;
F. E. C. Ry. vs. U. S., 234 U. S. 167, 58
L. Ed. 1267;
Jones vs. So. Ry., 76 S.C. 67, 56 S. E. 666;
Bonham vs. R. R. Com'n, 26 S. C. 363, 2 S.
E. 127;
Richards vs. So. Ry., 97 S. C. 77, 81 S. E.
314;
Gulf, Etc., Ry. vs. State, 56 T. C. A. 353,
120 s. w. 1028;
G. & W. Ry. vs. G. El. Ry., (Tex.), 123 S.
w. 1140;
Blake vs. Concord, Etc., Ry., 73 N. H. 597,
65 Atl. 202;
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T. & P. Ry. vs. R. R. Com'n, 137 La. 1059,
69 So. 837;

State vs. Tel. Co., 65 Fla. 270, 61 So. 506;
State vs. A. C. L. Ry., 60 Fla. 465, 54 So.
394;

State vs. Termina,l Co., 71 Fla. 295, 71 So.
474;

State vs. A. C. L. Ry., 51 Fla. 578, 40 So.
875;
23 A. & E. Encyc. L. (2 Ed.) 653;
R. R. Com'n vs. L. & N. Ry., 57 Fla. 526,
49 So. 39;
N. C. & St. L. Ry. vs. State, 137 Ala. 439,
34 So. 401;
Chester vs. Ry., 41 Conn. 348;
R. R. Com. vs. 0. R. & N. Co., 17 Ore. 65,
19 Pac. 702;
I. C. C. vs. N. P. Ry., 216 U. S. 538, 54 L.
Ed. 608;
State vs. Yazoo, Etc., Ry., 57 Miss. 679,
40 So. 263;
Merrill vs. Boston, Etc., Ry., 63 N. H. 259;
Eastern Ry. vs. Concord Ry., 47 N. H. 108;
Neal vs. Portland, 85 Me. 62, 27 Atl. 994;
Collier Pub. Serv. Corp. Co., Sec. 176, 171;
Water Co. vs. Pub. Serv. Com., 83 Wash.
130, 145 Pac. 215;
Power Co. vs. Commission, 272 Mo. 645,
199 s. w. 909;
Ry. Co. vs. Commission, (Okl.), 170 Pac.
1156;
Ry. Co. vs. Commission, (Mo.), 210 S. W.
386.
This same principle has been applied to the Industrial
Commisison of this State.

Commission vs. Evans, (Utah), 174 Pac.
825.
Section 1 of Article VIII of our State Constitution
provides that :

17
"The judicial power of the State shall be vested
in the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment,
in a supreme court, in district courts, in justice
of the peace, and in such other courts inferior to
the supreme court as may be established by law."
Section 1, Article V, of our State Constitution provides
that:
"The powers of government of the State of
Utah shall be divided into distinct departments,
the legislative, the executive and the judicial; and
no person charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments
shall exercise any functions appertaining to either
of the othevs, except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted."
By virtue of those constitutional provisions, it is clear
that authority of a strictly judicial nature, that is
judicial power to hear and determine controversies and
to make binding orders and judgments respecting them,
may not be vested in, or exercised by, executive or
legislative boards or commissions. This is elementary.
(12 Cor. Jur. 902.) This principle is applied to Public
Utility Acts and Commissions.

C,. M. & St. P. Ry. vs. Commission, 94
Wash. 27 4, 162 Pac. 523.
This principle is undoubtedly what the court had in
mind when in Commission vs. Evan.s, (Utah), 17 4 Pac.
825, it said :
"It is universally held by the courts, and there
is no escape from the conclusion, that boards or
bodies like the commission possess only administrative and ministerial functions, and are not
clothed with judicial powers, and therefore cannot exercise such powers.
"Whatever the jurisdiction or power that may
be conferred upon such a commission, such juris-
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diction and powers are, nevertheless, special and
limited, and, as before stated, are merely administrative and ministerial as c-ontradistinguished
from judicial."
This principle is what this court had in mind when, in
Salt Lake City vs. Utah Light & Traction Co., (Utah),
173 Pac. 556, it said that the Utilities Commission:

"* * * is merely an arm of the Legislature,
through whom that body acts in matters of this
kind."
Hence it is clear that the Public Utilities Commission
is not a court and does not exercise any strictly judicial
power. It has no such judicial power, and could not constitutionally be given any such power. It does not exercise any strictly judicial function.

A., T. & S. F. Ry. vs. Commission, (Mo.),
192 s. w. 460;
Lusk vs. Atkinson, 268 Mo. 109, 186 S. W.
703;
Venner vs. N. Y. C., Etc., Ry., 164 N. Y.
s. 626;
Mississippi Ry. Com'n vs. Ill. Cent. Ry., 203
U.S. 335, 51 L. Ed. 209;
L. & N. Ry. vs. Garrett, 231 U. S. 295, 58
L. Ed. 229;
Prentis vs. A. C. L. Ry., 211 U. S. 210,
53 L. Ed. 150;
Ry. Co. vs. Redmond, 189 Fed. 683;
Commission vs. N. Ala. Ry., 182 Ala. 357,
62 So. 749;
Telegraph Co. vs. Railroad Com'n, 74 Miss.
80;
W. N. Y. & P. Ry. vs. Refining Co., 137
Fed. 343;
Commission vs. Cincinnati, Etc., Ry., 64
Fed. 981;
Bridge Co. vs. L. & N. Ry., 37 Fed. 610.
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So, also, while the Commission is an arm of the Legislature, administering, in some instances, legislative functions, it is not the Legislature.

A., T. & S. F. Ry. vs. Commission, (Mo.),
192 s. w. 460;
State vs. Canning Co., 164 Wis. 228, 157
N. W. 777;
State vs. Northern Ry., 100 Minn. 445,
111 N. W. 289;
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. vs. Commission,
94 Wash. 274, 162 Pac. 522.

The true nature of the Utilities Commission is well
expressed in the language of the following authorities.
In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. vs. Public Service Commission (Mo.), 192 S. W. 460, the court says, at page
!162:

"The Public Service Commission is not a Legislature (Sta,te vs. Canning Co., 164 Wis. 228, 157
N. W. 777; State vs. Northern Ry., 100 Minn.
445, 111 N. W. 289, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 250) ;
nor a court (Lusk vs. Atkinson, 186 S. W. 703).
It is ,simply a committee created by the Legislature to make findings of fact and orders based on
such findings, which, if reasonable and within the
power of the Commission, may be enforced by the
action of the courts."
The court says again at page 462:
"We have not overlooked the sections of the
statutes cited by the learned counsel of the Public Service Commission, nor the view expressed
on its behalf; but none of these touch the fundamental proposition which circumscribe the power
and duty of the Public Service Commission as the
mere administrative agency of the Legislature,
without power to enact a,ny law, and, a fortiori,
without power to prescribe ,and regula.te or make
an order which the Legislature would have no
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constitutional pCYWer to enact into the form of
law."
In Lusk vs. Atkinson, 268 Mo. 109, 186 S. W. 703, the
court says at page 7 04 :

"The design of the act was to create an administrative agency of the lawmaking power. The
board of commissioners thus established was not
intended to be vested with the essential functions
and powers of a court of law and equity; for
under the express provisions of the Constitution
of Missouri the Legislature could establish courts
only in the classes of cases, and in the manner
and to the extent provided by that instrument,
and the board does not fall under the head of
any of the courts described in the Constitution.
Const. Mo. art. 6 Sec. 1, 28, 31; State ex rel vs.
Fort, 210 Mo. 512, 109 S. W. 737; State ex rel
Haughey vs. Ryan, 182 Mo. loc. cit. 355, 81 S. W.
435; State ex rel. vs. Woodson, 161 Mo. loc. cit.
453, 61 s. w. 252.
Since the Legislature has no power to create
a court not falling within the classes specified in
the Constitution nor in any other manner than
therein empowered so to do, it follows that the
Public Service Commission is only a representative agency established by the Legislature, whose
powers and duties are specifically set forth, none
of which include the prerogatives of a court; for
neither the Legislature nor any of its delegated
agencies could exercise these under our Constitution, and, if the act had been passed for that
purpose, it would be void. The findings and
orders which the Public Service Commission is
empowered to make, though bearing some resemblance to some of the judicial actions of a
court of law and equity, are yet merely incidents
of the work of investigation and determination
of facts and questions developed upon that body
by the Legislature, and do not imply on its part
the possession of any of the essential attributes
or machinery of constitutional courts in this
State. The Public Service Commission has no
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power to expound authoritatively any pritnciple
of law or equity, and has no machinery for enforcing its orders.
In Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. vs. Dougherty, 39 S. D.
147, 163 N. W. 715, the court says at pages 719 and
720:
"Here the state has seen fit to create an administrative body or commission, and charge it
with the duty and authority to take certain steps
when in the judgment of such board 'it shall
appear that any common carrier fails in any
respect to comply with the terms of its charter
or the laws of the state.' Laws 1911, c. 207,
sec. 2. This board is not given authority to
enforce its own orders or judgments, but can only
apply to the proper courts for a decision and
judgment upon the matters involved. It is a
strictly administrative body. Southern Ind. R. R.
Co. vs. R. R. Commissioner, 172 Ind. 113, 87 N.
E. 966; State ex rel. R. R. Commissioners vs.
Wilmington & W. R. Co., 122 N. C. 877, 29 S. E.
334; R. R. Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 6
Sup. Ct. 334, 388, 1191, 29 L. Ed. 636; State ex
rel. Taylor vs. No. Pac. Ry. Co., 76 Kan. 467, 92
Pac. 606.
Any order made by such board in compliance
with statutory notice and procedure constitutes
an exercise of administrative authority only, and
not of judicial power. Nor can such order be
enforced except through the order or judgment
of a duly constituted judicial tribunal having
jurisdiction to hear and determine the matters
involved, and in which the corporation is given
the right to be heard"
In Bessette vs. Goddard, 87 Vt. 77, 88 Atl. 1, the court
says at page 3 :
"At a special term in December of that year,
the case of Sabre vs. Rutland R. R. Co., 86 Vt.
347, 85 Atl. 693, was heard, and decided in
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January. In that case it became and was necessary to decide whether the Public Service Commission is a legal body and, if so, to define its
nature and character as such. The court met
that necessity and decided that it is a legal body
and defined it as being an administrative body,
clothed, in some respects with functions of a
judicial nature (quasi-judicial functions the court
said they might be called), authorized in the
exercise of the police power to make rules and
regulations required for the public safety and
convenience, and to determine facts on which
existing laws shall opemte; that in a sense it has
auxiliary or subordinate delegable legislative
powers; and that, though it is not a court in a
strict sense, yet, like many administrative bodies,
it may exercise quasi judicial functions and is a
governmental agency provided for the administration in respect to certain specific matters of
what, in a broad, though true, sense, may be
called the police power. This practically puts
the Commission where the federal Supreme Court
puts the Interstate Commerce Commission, between which and our Commission there is much
similarity in purpose and function."

In Railroad Commission of Alabama vs. Northern
Alabama R. Co., 182 Ala. 357, 62 So. 749, it is said:
"Indeed, the power of the Legislature to
create a railroad or corporation commission, and
through them to exercise its power of regulation over railroads, has been repeatedly sustained, subject to the limitations that they cannot be invested with strictly legislative or judicial
powers, and that their power and proceedings
must be within constitutional restrictions relating
to due process of law, and equal protection of
the laws, and that a state cannot authorize a
railroad commission to regulate interstate commerce.
So a railroad commission legally constituted is
an administrative body, and not legislative, or a
court, although they do in some cases exercise
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some functions of a judicial character; nor are
their decisions judgment in the ordinary sense
of the term. 33 Cyc. 45, and cases cited in note."
In State ex rel. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. vs.
Public Service Commission of Washington, 94 Wash.
274, 162 Pac. 522, it is said at page 525:
"On the general proposition that the Legislature cannot delegate the power to make purely
substantive law, there can be no difference of
opinion. We shall therefore consume no space
in discussing the several authorities cited as
announcing and sustaining that principle. Nor
can there be any difference of opinion as to the
soundness of the correlative proposition that the
Legislature can delegate the power to determine
the facts or state of things upon which the law
makes its own operation depend. Locke's Appeal,
72 Pa. 491, 13 Am. Rep. 716; Carstens vs. De
Sellem, 82 Wash. 643, 144 Pac. 934; Cawsey vs.
Brickey, 82 Wash. 653, 144 Pac. 938. The difficulty lies, not in determining the governing principle, but in its application to concrete cases.
The constitutio'IULl division of all governmental
powers into legislative, executive, and judicial is
abstract and general. Their complete separation in actual practice is impossible. The many
complex relations created by modern society and
business have produced many situations which
can be adequately met only by vesting in the
same administrative officers or bodies powers
inherently partaking, to some extent, of any two
or all of these three functions.
"The intricate, complex, and technical nature
of the business of common carriers in their relation to the pubic makes this peculiarly true of
legislation looking to the regulation of such
business. The power of regulation of such carriers is inherent in the State. In this State that
power may be exercised either directly by the
Legislature or through the medium of a Commission. State Constitution, art. 12, Sec. 18.
Though the Legislature must itself determine a
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standard for regulation by which the Commission must be guided, that standard need not be,
and in the nature of the case, cannot be, detailed
and specific. It may be couched in general
terms as that the rules and orders of the Commission shall be just, fair, and reasonable.
"We have repeatedly held that the Legislature
may constitutionally confer on the Commission
judicial powers as a mediatory tribunal, since
the constitutional division of governmental
powers into the three separate departments applies only in a limited sense, and does not restrict one set of officers to one department
exclusively. State ex rel. Oregon R. & N. Co.
vs. R. R. Commission, 52 Wash. 17, 100 Pac.
179; State ex rel R. R. Commission vs. Oregon
R. & N. Co., 68 Wash. 160, 168, 123 Pac. 3;
State ex rel. R. R. Commission vs. Great Northern Ry. Co., 68 Wash. 257, 262, 264, 123 Pac. 8.
It is therefore clear that, before this court can
hold that any attempt of the Legislature to confer on the Commission a given power is void
as an unconstitutional delegation of either legislative or judicial power, it must clearly appear
that the power in question is purely legislative
or judicwl, and not merely incidental to some of
the administrative powers for the exercise of
which the Commission was created."
In Interstate Commerce Commission vs. Cincinnati
No. & T. P. R. R. Co., 76 Fed. 183, it is said at page
184:
"The interstate commerce commission is not
invested, and cannot be invested, under the constitution, with either legislative power or purely
judicial power. Its functions are necessarily
restricted to the performance of administrative
duties, with such quasi-judicial powers as are
incidental and necessary to the proper performance of those duties."
In Interstate Commerce Commission vs. Cinmnnati
No. & T. P. R. R. Co., 64 Fed. 981, it is said at page
982:
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"It has been held that the interstate commerce commission is not a court. It is an administrative body (see Commission vs. Brimson,
154 U. S. 447, 474, 489, 14 Sup. Ct. 1125), lawfully created, and lawfully exercising powers
which are quasi judicial, as are the powers
exercised by the commissioner of patents, and,
in many respects, by the heads of the various
departments of the executive branch of the
government."

In Western New York & P. R. R. Co. vs. Penn. Refining Co., 137 Fed. 343, it is said at page 349:

"The Commission, ,although clothed with quasi
judicial functions, is ~an administrative body in
contradistinction to a judicial tribunal."
In Bridge Co. vs. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 37 Fed.
567, it is said at page 610:
"In respect to the question presented by the
first, counsel for respondent takes the position
that the interstate commerce law confers judicial
powers upon the Commission; that such judicial
powers are exercised in its proceedings; that its
orders are judgments of a court not lawfully
created, since its members are not appointed and
commissioned in accordance with Article 3, Sec.
1, of the Constitution, inasmuch as they hold

office only for designated periods, and not 'during good behavior,' which latter 'constitutional
tenure of office judges must possess before they
can become invested with any portion of the
judicial powers of the union,' and that the proceedings before, and the order or judgment of,
the Commission are and were consequently void.
In respect to the second question it is claimed
by counsel for respondent that, aside from the
judicial character and power attempted to be
conferred upon said Commission, the interstate
commerce law imposes upon this court nonjudicial powers which it cannot properly exercise, inasmuch as it is limited and restricted by
the sixteenth section of the act to the mere en-
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forcement of the commissioner's orders, if found
to be lawful, with no authority to go into the
merits of the controversy between the parties,
and make its own adjudication thereon; but if
not so limited and restricted to the mere enforcement of an order made by another body, and
the proceeding in this court can be regarded
and treated as an original and independent suit
to determine the rights of the parties, that the
court has no jurisdiction of the case, because
the parties complainant and defendant are both
corporations of the State of Kentucky. In support of their position that judicial powers are
conferred upon and exercised by the Commission,
counsel refers to various provisions contained
in sections 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, of the
act, which, together with the rules of practice
adopted, show, as they insist, that a proceeding
before the commission, like the one in question,
involves and embodies features and ear-marks
of judicial procedure and action in the following
particulars, viz.: First, a petition, corresponding
with the petition or bill in equity, is filed;
second, notice is issued for and service thereof
made upon, the defendant or party complained
of, conforming to, and corresponding with, the
process of subpoena in courts of the United
States, requiring such defendant to satisfy the
complainant, or to appear and answer the same;
third, the filing of defendant's answer, as in
equity, which makes up or forms the issue or
issues; fourth, the issuance of subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses, or for the taking
of depositions, upon the issues made up by the
answer; fifth, the assignment of a time and
place for the hearing, when and where the
parties appear in person or by attorney, witnesses are sworn and examined, and arguments
are made orally or by brief; sixth, when the
conclusion is reached, a written report, corresponding in all respects to an opinion, is delivered,
filed, and published; seventh, the order of the
Commission is recorded by its secretary, as decrees in equity are recorded by clerks of court;
and, eighth, a copy of such order, under the seal
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of the Commission, issues to the defendant,
requiring obedience thereto. This mode of procedure cwrtainly conforms in many respects to
the regular practice of courts, arnd is no doubt
authorized by the law; but does it involve the
performance of judicial acts, and the exercise
of judicial powers, by the Commission, as
claimed? It is well settled that congress, in
ordaining and establishing 'inferior courts,' and
prescribing their jurisdiction, must confer upon
the judges appointed to administer them the
constitutional tenure of office,-that of holding
'during good behavior,'-before they can become
invested with any portion of the judicial power
of the government; and if the act to regulate
interstate commerce does in fact establish an
inferior court, the commissiOners appointed
thereunder for certain fixed periods are clearly
not such judges as can be invested with any
portion of the judicial power of the United
States, and their decision in matters affecting
personal or property rights could have no force
or validity. But does the interstate commerce
law undertake either to create an 'inferior court'
or to invest the Commission appointed thereunder with judicial functions? We tMnk not.
While the Commission possesses and exercises
certain powers ,and functions resembling those
conferred upon and exercised by regular courts,
it is W!anting in several essential constituents of
a court. Its action or conclusion upon matters
of complaint brought before it for investigation,
and which the act designates as the 'recommendation,' 'report,' 'order,' or 'requirement' of
the board is neither final nor conclusive; nor is
the commission invested with any authority to
enforce its decision or award. Without reviewing
in detail the provisions of the law, we are clearly
of the opinion that the commission is invested
with only adimnistrative powers of supervision
and investigation, which fall far short of making
the board a court, or its action judicial, in the
proper sense of the term. The commission
hears, investigates, and reports upon complaints
made before it, involving alleged violations of or
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omission of duty under the act; but subsequent
judicial proceedings are contemplated wnd provided for, as the remedy for the enforcement,
either by itself or the party interested, of its
order or report in all cases where the party complained of or against whom its decision is rendered does not yield voluntary obedience thereto.
By the fourteenth and sixteenth sections of the
act it is provided that the report or findings made
by the commission 'should thereafter, in all
judicial proceedings, be deemed prima facie evidence as to each and every fact found.'
"The comjmssion is charged with the duty of investigating and reporting upon complaints, and
the facts found or reported by it are only given
the force and weight of prima facie evidence in all
such judicial proceedings as may thereafter be
required or had for the enforcement of its recommendation or order. The functions of the commission are those of referees or special commissioners, appointed to make preliminary investigation of and report upon matters for subsequent
judicial examination and determination. In respect to interstate commerce matters covered by
the law, the commission may be regarded as the
general referee of each and every circuit court of
the United States, upon which the jurisdiction is
conferred of enforcing the rights, duties, and
obligations recognized and imposed by the act.
It is neither a federal court under the constitution, nor does it exercise judicial powers, nor do
its conclusions possess the efficacy of judicial proceedings. This federal commi,ssion has assigned to
it the duties and performs for the United States,
in respect to that interstate commerce committee
by the constitution to the exclusive care and jurisdiction of congress, the same functions which
State commissioners exercise in respect to local
or purely internal commerce, over which the
States appointing them have exclusive control.
Their validity in their respective spheres of operation stands upon the same footing. The validity
of State commissioners invested with powers as
ample and large as those conferred upon the
federal commissioners, has not been successfully
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questioned, when limited to that local or internal
commerce over which the States have exclusive
jurisdiction; and no valid reason is seen for
doubting or questioning the authority of congress,
under its sovereign and exclusive power to regulate commerce among the several States, to create
like commissions for the purpose of supervising,
investigating, and reporting upon matters or complaints connected with or growing out of interstate commerce. What one sovereign may do in
respect to matters within its exclusive control, the
other may certainly do in respect to matters over
which it has exclusive authority."

It is perfectly obvious, therefore, that the Commission,
in a given case, may exercise, or at least may attempt to
exercise, functions of a judicial or quasi-judicial power,
which would render it amenable to the original jurisdiction of this court relative to the issuance of a writ
of prohibition. The only remaining question, then, on
this phase of the matter, is whether or not the facts of
this case show an exercise, or an attempted exercise, of
judicial or quasi-judicial power in the premises by the
Commission.
And it must be constantly remembered, on this bmnch
of the case, that the jurisdiction .of this court is not
limited to or by the jurisdiction of the Commission, and
that the jurisdictional power of this court to entertain
an application for a writ of prohibition is dependent only
on the nature of the act which the Commission is undertaking, and not on the question whether such act is
either within or without the jurisdiction of the Commission, when it is claimed, in good faith, that the act is in
excess of the jurisdiction of the Commission.
In this case the Commission, according to the express
language of its order, is making an "investigation and
inquiry" into the provisions of the contracts with a view
to determining whether the rates therein named are
reasonable and equitable. There can be absolutely no
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question but that such action on the part of the Commission involves the exercise of judicial power and
judicial functions in contradistinction to legislative functions. The establishment of a rate is the making of a
rule for the future, and therefore is an act legislative,
not judicial, in kind. (Prentis vs. Atlantic Coast Line
Co., 211 U. S. 210, 53 L. Ed. 150; Bluefield vs. Water
Works Co., (W.Va.), 94 S. E. 121; Randall Gas Co. vs.
Glass Co., (W. Va.), 88 S. E. 840; Spring Valley Water
Works vs. San Francisco, 52 Cal. 111). On the other
hand, it is equally well settled that an inquiry as to
whether or not existing rates are reasonable or not, is a
iudicial act or function. (Interstate Commerce Commission vs. C. N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 167 U. S. 479, 42 L. Ed.
243). Hence, if the Commission is usurping jurisdiction
in respect to the determination of the reasonableness of
existing contract rates, it is exercising or attempting to
exercise a judicial function, rendering it amenable, in
that respect, to the original jurisdiction of this court
to issue a writ of prohibition.
So, also, an attempted determination by the Commission as to whether or not contract rates are unjustly
discriminatory or preferential, and therefore in violation
of the act, is nothing more or less than determining
whether the existing contract rate has been legally established, or whether the same is or is not reasonable, and
hence is the exercise of a judicial function. (Chicago,
Etc., Ry. Co. vs. Railroad Com'n of Indiana, 38 Ind. A.
439, 78 N. E. 338). The determination of the existence
or non-existence of discrimination as respects existing
contracts, is clearly a judicial function, because it involves the exercise of judgment and discretion and
affects the rights of property of the citizens, and involves
an exposition and application of the statute, and is a
declaration of what the law is rather than what it shall
be, and it is a determination of the rights and duties of
parties under existing law with relation to existing facts.
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In re Revisor of Statutes, 141 Wis. 592, 124
N. W. 670;
People vs. Salsbury, 134 Mich. 537, 96 N.
w. 936;
Board, Etc. vs. Briede, 117 La. 183, 41 So.
487;
Gulnac vs. Board, Etc., 74 N. J. L. 543,
64 Atl. 998.
That which distinguishes a "judicial" from a "legislative" act is that the one is a determination of what
the law is in relation to some existing thing already
done or happened, while the other is a predetermination
of what the law shall be for the regulation of future
cases falling under its provision. (Tyson vs. Washington
County, 110 N. W. 634, 636, 78 Neb. 211.)
Hence, if the Commission is usurping jurisdiction in
that respect, it is amenable to a writ of prohibition, as
that is a judicial function. (Garff vs. Smith, 31 Utah
102, 86 Pac. 772.)
An attempt by the Commission to determine whether
the contract in question was "lawful when made," is the
exercise of a strictly judicial power. This is too plain
for discussion. Hence, if the Commission is usurping
jurisdiction in that respect it is amenable to a writ of
prohibition.
An attempt by the Commission to determine whether
the contract in question was "founded upon an adequate
consideration," is likewise clearly the exercise of a
judicial function. It involves an interpretation and exposition of that clause of the act. It would involve an
adjudication of legal rights. It would involve the
exercise of judgment. It would involve a determination
of the legality of the contract under the statute. It
would undertake to determine a question of right or
obligation or of property. There can be absolutely no
question but that such a determination would be the
exercise of a judicial function or power.
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People vs. Apfelbaum, 251 Ill. 18, 95 N. E.
995;
In re Revisor of Statutes, 141 Wis. 592, 124
N. W. 670;
Garff vs. Smith, 31 Utah 102, 86 Pac. 772;
Newell vs. Franklin (R. I.), 7 4 Atl. 1009;
In re Commissioners, 22 Okl. 435, 98 Pac.
557;
Tyson vs. County, 78 Neb. 211, 110 N. W.
634;
Board vs. Briede, 117 La. 183, 41 So. 487;
Metz vs. Maddox, 105 N.Y. S. 702;
Biddleford vs. Yeates, 104 Me. 506, 72 Atl.
235;
.
People vs. Salsbury, 134 Mich. 537, 96 N.
w. 936.
Hence, it is clear that as respects those functions or
an attempt to exercise them, this court has the jurisdiction to inquire into the authority and power of the
Commission to exercise such function, and to restrain
by writ of prohibition the usurpation of power in those
respects.
We pass therefore from the question of the existence
of the jurisdiction or power of this court to issue the
writ, to the question of whether or not, under the facts
of this case, the court, in its discretion, should allow
or refuse to allow the writ.
Even assuming that this court has jurisdiction to issue the
writ, and even assuming that the commission is exceeding
its jurisdiction in the premises, nevertheless a writ of
prohibition ought not to issue because the Cement Company has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law by writ of review or certiorari to
this court to supervise and review whatever action Commission may take in the premises.

Section 4834 of the Compiled Laws of Utah of 1917,
provides that:
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"Within thirty days after the application for
a rehearing is denied, or, if the application is
granted, then within thirty days after the rendition of the decision on rehearing, the applicant
may apply to the supreme court of this state
for a writ of certiorari or review (hereinafter
referred to as a writ of review) for the purpose
of having the lawfulness of the original order
or decision or the order or decision on rehearing
inquired into and determined. Such writ shall
be made returnable not later than thirty days
after the date of the issuance thereof, and
shall direct the Commission to certify its record
in the case to the court. On the return day,
the cause shall be heard by the supreme court,
unless for a good reason shown the same be
continued. No new or additional evidence may
be introduced in the supreme court, but the
cause shall be heard on the record of the commission as certified to by it. The review shall
not be extended further than to determine
whether the commission has regularly pursued
its authority, including a determination of
whether the order or decision under review violates any right of the petitioner under the Constitution of the United States or of the State
of Utah. The findings and conclusions of the
Commissions on questions of fact shall be final
and shall not be subject to review. Such questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and
the findings and conclusions of the Commission
on reasonableness and discrimination. The Commission and each party to the action or proceeding before the Commission shall have the right
to appear in the review proceedings. Upon the
hearing the supreme court shall enter judgment
either affirming or setting aside the order or
decision of the Commission. The provisions of
the code of civil procedure of this State relating
to writs of review shall, so far as applicable
and not in conflict with the provisions of this
title, apply to proceedings instituted in the
supreme court under the provisions of this sec-
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tion. No court of this State (except the supreme
court to the extent herein spectfied) shall have
jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul
any order or decision of the Commission, or to
suspend or delay the execution or opera,tion
thereof, or to enjoin, rest~ain, or interfere with
the Commission in the performance .of its official
duties; provided, that the writ of mandamus
shall lie from the supreme court to the Commission in all proper cases."
It is seen, therefore, that the statute provides that
this court may review any order the Commission may
make by writ of certiorari, and on such review may
determine "the lawfulness" of the order, and may determine "whether the Commission has regularly pursued
its authority" and may determine whether the order
violates any constitutional right of a party. The statute
has been so construed by this court in Salt Lake City
vs. Umh Light & Tmction Co., 173 Pac. 556. It was
absolutely essential that the act provide for a review
by this court of any judicial questions involved in the
proceeding before the Commission, and "the right to
a judicial review must be substantial, adequate, and
safely available." (Wa,dley, S. R. Co. vs. Georgia,, 235
U. S. 651, 59 L. Ed. 405.)
It is sometimes held that the method provided by
the Utilities Act for reviewing an order of the Commission is exclusive.

Chicago vs. O'Connell, 278 Ill. 591, 116
N. E. 210;
.
Ga,tes vs. Commission, 86 Ore. 442, 168
Pac. 939;
N. Y. vs. Commission, 171 N. Y. S. 830.
In any event it is well settled law that a writ of prohibition is a high prerogative writ. It is not a writ
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of right granted ex debito justitiae, but one of sound
judicial discretion under the circumstances of each
particular case, to be used with great caution to further
justice when no ordinary remedies are applicable.
The Utilities Act (Section 4834, C. L. 1917) expressly
provides for a review by this court on a writ of certiorari of the lawfulness of any order or decision the
Utilities Commission might make in the premises. And
of course it is elementary that a writ of prohibition
is an extraordinary remedy to be resorted to only in
cases of extreme necessity, and that the writ will not
issue where the plaintiff has any other adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. In this connection,
it has been held in innumerable cases that a right
of review presents such an adequate remedy, and that
inconvenience and expense involved in a hearing before the inferior tribunal is not a sufficient ground
for granting the writ. And moreover, it is well settled
that the fact that more time must be consumed in the
pursuit of another remedy than prohibition, does not,
in itself, make such other remedy inadequate.
Where there is an adequate remedy by certiorari,
the court will exercise its discretion and refuse a writ
of prohibition.

Ducheneau vs. Ireland, 5 Ut. 108;
People vs. Hills, 5 Ut. 410, 16 Pac. 405;
State vs. Court, 27 Ut. 336;
Board, etc., vs. Maughan, 35 Ut. 516, 101
Pac. 581;
Campbell vs. Durand, 39 Ut. 118;
Carrigan vs. Bowman, 40 Ut. 91; 119 Pac.
1037;
32 Cyc. 613-617 ;
Hudson vs. Preston, 134 Ga. 222, 67 S. E.
800;
State vs. McQuillin, 262 Mo. 256, 171
s. w. 72;
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Heaton vs. Hooper, 134 Ga. 577, 68 S. E.
297;
In re Price, 155 U. S. 396, 39 L. Ed. 198;
People vs. Bostlemann, 144 N. Y. S. 148;
Crittendon vs. Booneville (Miss.), 45 So.
723) ;
Parks vs. Ryan (N.Mex.) 173 Pac. 858;
Ex Parte Okla., 220 U. S. 191, 55 L. Ed.
431;
People vs. Foley, 172 N. Y. S., 279;
Whitaker vs. Manson, 84 S. C. 91, 65 S. E.
952;
Olden vs. Paxton, 27 Ida. 597, 150 Pac.
40·
City 'vs. Court (Cal.), 152 Pac. 731;
State vs. Court (Nev.), 149 Pac. 178;
Silver Mines vs. Court, 33 Nev. 97, 110
Pac. 503;
Lewis vs. Hogg, 22 Wash. 646, 62 Pac.
143;
Cann vs. Moore, 23 Wash. 115, 62 Pac.
441;
Calumet Co. vs. DeFrance, 29 Colo. 309,
68 Pac. 367;
Hill vs. Court, 21 Cal. Appeals 424, 131
Pac. 1061;
Hayes vs. Oceanside, 6 Cal. Appeal 520, 92
Pac. 492;
State vs. Court, 46 Okla. 654, 149 Pac.
140;
2 Spelling ex rel., Sec. 1716, 1728;
C. & N. W. Ry. vs. Dougherty, 163 N. W.
715;
State vs. Bowerman, 40 Mo. Appeals, 576;
People vs. Clute, 42 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
157;
The trouble and expense involved in a hearing before
inferior court or tribunal is not ground for granting
writ of prohibition, where there is a remedy by appeal
from an adverse judgment. (Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.
vs. Dougherty, 163 N. W. 715; Carran vs. Court, 30
Wash. 700, 71 Pac. 648; Olden vs. Paxton, 27 Ida, 597,
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150 Pac. 40; Carrigan vs. Bowman, 40 Ut. 91, 119 Pac.
1037.)
In Carrigan vs. Bowman, 40 Ut. 91, 119 Pac. 1037,
this court in denying a writ of prohibition, says:

"The necessary delay and expense of an
appeal ordinarily furnish no sufficient reasons
for holding that the remedy by appeal is not
adequate or speedy. To hold otherwise is to
hold that all appeals are not adequate or speedy,
for all involve some delay and expense."
In Olden vs. Paxton, 27 Ida. 597, 150 Pac. 40, the
court says:
"In view of the congested condition of the
calendar of this court, it becomes absolutely
necessary; in order to expedite the business of
the court, that, in granting writs of prohibition,
mandamus, and review, we adhere strictly to
the law governing these writs, and, in the exercise of the court's discretion in matters of
this kind, we cannot take into consideration the
annoyance, expense, or delay in determining
whether or not these extraordinary writs should
issue. The number of applications for the issuance of extraordinary writs is increasing so
rapidly that it is apparent to our minds a strict
observance of the law, as applied by the greater
weight of authority in the issuance of such writs,
should be adopted by this court, and such a
writ should not issue where the aggrieved party
has another adequate remedy."
The remedy by certiorari provided for in the act is
certainly plain. Under the authorities, it must be
regarded as sufficiently speedy. Therefore, the only
question is whether or not it is adequate. It is an
ample remedy if the parties' rights are fully protected. It is an adequate remedy, unless the case presents features indicative of some jeopardy to the parties'
rights. It is an adequate remedy if the questions
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which the party desires to litigate and determine in
this proceeding can be reviewed on the certiorari. On
the other hand the remedy is inadequate if the rights
of the parties in interest will be jeopardized by remitting them to the remedy by certiorari. It is an
adequate remedy unless it will result an injury for
which no other adequate remedy exists. It is an inadequate remedy unless it affords to the party every
right to which he would be entitled in this proceeding.
It is an inadequate remedy if it will result in an irreparable damage. The parties are entitled to a judicial review of the questions of law which the Commission must be deemed to have decided in making
any order. (Wadley S. R. Co. vs. Gq,., 235 U. S. 651,
59 L. Ed. 405; People vs. Commission, 166 N. Y. S.
825.) If a certiorari affords such a review, it is
adequate, otherwise, it is not.
It would certainly seem that a certiorari would afford
an adequate remedy in the premises. The jurisdiction
of the Public Utilities Commission is by the very terms
of the act confined to the regulation and control of
property devoted to a public use by the Utility corporations confined in the act. The Commission's jurisdiction is confined by the statute to the control of
the Utilities mentioned, and it has no jurisdiction over
the Cement Company (Commission vs. Telephone Ass'n.,
282 Ill. 336, 118 N. E. 760). Even if the Commission
had power to interfere with this contract, how could
such power be exercised? The Power Company is
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. The
Cement Company is not. It is beyond the authority
of the Commission to issue any order directed to the
Cement Company requiring it to do or refrain from
doing anything. All the Commission could do would
be to make an order directed to the Power Company
to terminate the contract. In obedience to that order,
the Power Company could proceed in one of two

39
ways, either by bringing an action seeking the cancellation of the contract, or by serving notice on the
Cement Company that electricity would no longer be
furnished under the contract rate, but that all hereafter
furnished and accepted by the Cement Company would
be charged for at the increased tariff or schedule
rate. It probably wouid pursue the latter course. The
Cement Company would then have the right to bring
an action to test the validity of the contract, or rather
the efficacy of the attempted termination thereof.
Chapter 1 of Utilities Act creates the Commission
and Chapter 2 defines the Public Utilities subject to
the jurisdiction and regulation of the Commission and
the provisions of the act. The Cement Company is
not embmced within the Utilities subject to the act
or over which the Commission is given jurisdiction.
The Commission has no power to regulate or control the
business or contracts of the Cement Company or any
part or portion thereof.
It was competent for the legislature to withhold
from the Commission such power or jurisdiction as its
wisdom or choice determined. (Gas Co. vs. Commission,
224 N. Y. 156, 120 N. E. 132.) It withheld from the
Commission jurisdiction over the Cement Company,
and hence it could not enforce any order made by
it directed to the Cement Company.
The Cement Company is not under the jurisdiction
of the Commission. It is not embraced within the
Public Utilities defined in the act. It is beyond the
authority of the Commission to issue any orders
directed to the Cement Company requiring it to do
or refrain from doing anything. All the Commission
can do would be to make an order directed to the
Power Company to terminate the contract or to no
longer furnish service under the contract rate, leaving it optional to the Cement Company to take the
service or not as it might see fit.
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It follows that the Commission could not make
any order which would be binding upon or res adjudicata as to the Cement Company, and the Cement
Company would be at perfect liberty, not only to test
the order by a certiorari under the act, but also to
test its validity and restrain its enforcement in any
other appropriate action or proceeding in law or in
equity in either the State or the Federal courts.
The Commission could not make any binding determination of the validity of the contract concluding
the Cement Corrt'pany.
People vs. Peoria, etc., Ry., 273 Ill. 440,
113 N. E. 68;

Hanlon vs. Eshleman, 169 Cal. 200, 146
Pac. 656;
Commission vs. Tel. Ass'n., 282 Ill. 336,
118 N. E. 760;
A. T. & S. F. Ry. vs. Commission, 173 Cal.
577, 160 Pac. 828.
As the Commission would have no jurisdiction to
apply the Act to persons or corporations not subject
to or within the regulatory control of the Commission,
the evidence certified in the record could be examined
and reviewed in detail to determine the question of
the Commission's jurisdiction. The Commission would
have no final or conclusive power to determine any
question of either fact or law whereon its jurisdiction
depended. The question is a judicial one for the
court. Hence purported findings of fact whereby the
Commission determines itself clothed with jurisdiction
are reviewable by the court upon all the evidence and
would be sustained only when justified by both the
ultimate and evidenciary facts.

Commission vs. Evans (Utah), 174 Pac.
825;
Allen vs. Commission (Cal.), 175 Pac.
466;
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Miller vs. Commission (Cal.), 178 Pac.
960;
Donlon Bros. vs. Commission (Cal.), 159
Pac. 715;
Coal Co. vs. Commission, 123 N. E. 28;
Thede Bros. vs. Commission, 285 Ill. 483,
121 N. E. 172;
In re Amsinck's Estate, 169 N. Y. S. 336;
School Dist. vs. Commission (Cal.), 168
Pac. 392;
Petersen vs. Industrial Board, 281 Ill. 326,
117 N. E. 1033;
Holbrook vs. Hotel Co., 200 Mich. 597, 166
N. W. 876;
Construction Co. vs. Allen (Ky.), 201
s. w. 567;
Retmier vs. Cruse (Ind.), 119 N. E. 32;
Steel Co. vs. Lambert (Ind.), 118 N. E.
162·
Hospital vs. Board, 282 Ill. 316, 118 N. E.
766·
Rayne~ vs. Company (Ind.), 119 N. E.
809;
Manufacturing Co. vs. Board, 283 Ill. 468,
119 N. E. 615.
In Commission vs. Evans (Utah), 174 Pac. 825, the
court holds and says :

"Where, however, as here, the right of the
Commission to proceed under the act is challenged at the very threshold of the proceeding
to allow compensation upon the ground that the
injury is not one provided for by the act----nay,
more, that it is one which is expressly excluded
therefromr-the question is quite different.
Where such a condition exists we find nothing
in the act which prevents the right of any
employer from assailing the decision of the
Commission respecting ultimate liability.
In
other words, we find nothing in the act which
authorizes the Commission to deplete the insurance fund by devoting it to claims not covered
by the act or to require employers or insurance
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carriers to pay any such claims. Nor do we
find anything in the act which authorizes the
Commission to determine without right of review the question of ultimate liability under the
act. To do that clearly is a judicial question, and
when it arises, as in this case, the right to an adjudication by the courts cannot be denied. While,
as is well said by the Supreme Court of Ohio in
State ex rel. vs. Creamer, supra, 'the authority
to ascertain facts, and to apply the law to the
facts when ascertained, pertains as well to other
departments of government as to the judiciary,'
yet it is also said in the same case, 'but the
ultimate question of actual liability cannot be
removed from the courts.'
That statement,
it seems to us, expresses the real distinction
between judicial and mere administrative or
ministerial functions. While no doubt the Commission may, under certain circumstances, hear
evidence and may determine the facts and apply
the law to them when found, yet when its
right to proceed under the act at all events is
challengedr-that is, when, as stated by the
Supreme Court of Ohio, the 'ultimate question
of actual liability' under the act is involvedthen a judicial question is presented which cannot be withdrawn from the courts, and recourse
to them must be permitted in some form."
In Allen vs. Railroad Commission (Cal.), 175 Pac.
466, it is held that under the Public Utilities Act of
1915 (St. 1915, p. 161), Sec. 67, authorizing the Supreme
Court to review orders or decisions of the Railroad
Commission by a writ of certiorari or review, and
providing that the review shall not extend further
than to determine whether the Commission has legally
pursued its authority, including a determination of
whether the order or decision violates any constitutional
right of the petitioner, and that the findings and conclusions of the Commission on questions of fact shall
be final, and not subject to review, the findings and
conclusions which are not subject to review are those

43
on questions of fact within the jurisdiction of the
Commission, and the question of mixed law and fact,
as to whether or not a corporation is a public utility,
so as to give the Commission jurisdiction over it, is
The Supreme Court may restrain the
reviewable.
Railroad Commission from exercising powers which
it does not possess, or annul its decree when such unwarranted powers have been exercised. The court says
at pages 468 and 469:
"This review is held under Section 67 of the
Public Utilities Act of 1915. It is plain, and
indeed it has in effect been decided, that the
declaration in that section that 'findings and conclusions of the Commission on questions of fact
shall be final and shall not be subject to review'
has to do with the Commission's determinations
upon questions of fact within its jurisdiction.
When the question, ever one of mixed law and
fact, goes, as here, to the jurisdiction itself,
when the whole controversy revolves around the
inquiry as to whether or not the corporation
is a public utility, to say that the determination of
the Commission upon this matter is final and
conclusive, and is not subject to review, is the
equivalent of denying to a petitioner a hearing
upon a right carefully preserved to him by the
language of Section 67 itself-a hearing and a
determination of whether the order and decision
under review 'violates any right of the petitioner
under the Constitution of the United States or of
the State of California.' So it will be found that
in such petitions as P,acific Telephone Co. vs.
Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 137 Pac. 1119, 50
L. R. A. (N. S.) 652, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 822;
Del Mar Water Co. vs. Eshleman, 167 Cal. 666,
140 Pac. 591, 948; Title, etc., Co. vs. Railroad
Commission, 168 Cal. 295, 142 Pac. 878, Ann.
Cas. 1916A, 738; Marin W,ater, etc., Co. vs.
Railroad Commission, 171 Cal. 706, 154 Pac.
864, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 114; Atchison Ry. Co.
vs. Railroad Commission, 173 Cal. 577, 160 Pac.
828; Western Association, etc., vs. Railroad Com-
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mwswn, 173 Cal. 802, 162 Pac. 391-this court
has uniformly and without a dissenting voice investigated every complaint where the petitioners
upon reasonable grounds asserted that the Commission had either exceeded its jurisdiction or
refWJed to exercise the jurisdiction which in
law it possessed. In the last-cited case the Commission, believing it did not have jurisdiction
to entertain the application of the petitioner,
refused to do so, and this court, reviewing its
powers, held that it did possess this jurisdiction
and issued mandate to the Commission to exercise it. The converse of this proposition must
be equally plain. If this court by mandate may
compel the Commission to exercise powers which
it does possess, upon the other hand it may
restrain the Commission from exercising powers
which it does not possess, or annul its decree

when such unwarranted powers have been exercised."
Where the jurisdiction of the Commission depends
upon questions of fact and law of a justiciable character, or a question attempted to be determined by the
Commission involves the exercise of judicial functions
even incidentally, the courts must be free and untrammeled in their review of the question, and a statute
cannot constitutionally make the Commission's determination of the facts inclusive on the courts.

C. M. & St. P. Ry. vs. Minnesota, 134
U. S. 418, 33 L. Ed. 970;

Prentis vs. A. C. L. Ry., 211 U. S. 210,
53 L. Ed. 150 ;

Commission vs. Fla. E. C. Ry., 72 Fla. 379,

s. 171;
195 s. w. 7 41.
73

Columbia Co. vs. Atkinson, 271 Mo. 28,
Both this court and the district court are constitutional courts, and as is held and said in Public Service
Company vs. Commission, 88 N. J. Law 603, 96 Atl.
1013:
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"The legislature cannot impair the jurisdiction
of a constitutional court, either by preventing its
exercise or creating a co-ordinate authority."
To the same effect is the decision of this court in

State vs. Durand, 36 Ut. 93, 104 Pac. 760.
The propriety of the courts issuing a writ of prohibition at this time is to be tested by the nature of the
proceeding in its present status, as determined by the
.order already made, and not by an anticipated decision,
which it is assumed or said that the Commission will
make.
N. Y. vs. Commission, 171 N.Y. S. 830;
A., T. & S. F. Ry. vs. State, 47 Okla. 645,
150 Pac. 108;

Romberger vs. Water Valley, 63 Miss. 218.
At this time the Commission is merely proceeding to
investigate the provisions, rates and character of the
contra_cts. The Cement Company does not state in its
application any facts showing that it has been or will
be injured by such investigation, much less that it has
been or will be irreparably injured. The Commission
certainly has jurisdiction over the Power Company, as a
Public Utility, to inquire into its affairs, and the Commission might through an ex parte hearing to which only
the Power Company was a party, acquire all the information its desires, either in this proceeding or in the
general Rate Increase Case, No. 248, pending before
the Commission. The Commission might act upon such
information without the Cement Company having had a
chance to present its side of the matter under investigation. It is seldom that a writ of prohibition runs to
prevent a party's being given a hearing to which he has
a right, both moral and legal, and which has been
afforded him. Certainly the Cement Company cannot
have been injured by the Commissions affording it an
opportunity to be heard.
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But the Cement Company seeks the writ on the theory
that the Commission may or will hereafter make an
order abrogating or impairing its contract in violation
of its constitutional or statutory rights. It will be time
enough for this court to examine into the validity of such
an order and restrain its enforcement, when it is made.
It may be that the decision Df the Commission would be
favorable to the Cement Company, in which event it
would have no cause for complaint. If, on the other
hand, it should be adverse and the adjudication void for
the want of jurisdiction, the enforcement of the order
might be prevented and the order declared void and
annulled under a writ of review. (Hill vs. Superior
Court, 21 Cal. App. 424, 131 Pac. 1061.)
A writ of prohibition will not be awarded on the
theory that the Commission will in the future make an
order beyond it8 jurisdiction or that it is void because
unconstitutional or contrary to the statute. The court,
on this application, will not undertake to anticipate what
order the Commission will make, because if the Commission makes an error, it can be rectified by this court
on a writ of review or by some other court in an
appropriate proceeding. The likelihood of the Cement
Company being injured or not being injured depends
necessarily upon the facts as established by the evidence
offered before the Commission. This court cannot
assume that the Commission will not act fairly and impartially, and cannot assume or determine in advance
what the Commission will do. It must be presumed that
the Commission will perform its duty and not violate
the safeguards of the constitution or disobey the mandate
Df the statute. The fallacy of this application consists
in the assumption that the Cement Company is threatened with a wrong. It cannot be assumed that the
Commission will not recognize and give due effect to any
contractual rights which the Cement Company may have.
It would be premature and unnecessary to decide the
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merits of the Cement Company's contractual rights in
the premises before action by the Commission. The
court only deals with the record as at present made, and
will not, on this application, anticipate the ruling of the
Commission or correct imaginary errors in its future
rulings, and thereby take over unto itself at this time,
jurisdiction of the cause on the merits as an intermediate step arresting the evolution of the proceeding
before the Commission. A writ of prohibition will not
issue on any such theory or for any such purpose.

State vs. McQuillin, 262 Mo. 256, 171 S. W.
72;
School Dist. vs. Sims, 186 S. W. 4;
People vs. Smith, 184 N. Y. 96, 76 N. E.
925;
State vs. Homer, 164 Mo. App. 334, 145
s. w. 497;
Dalton Co. vs. Comm., 213 Fed. 888;
Trenton Co. vs. Trenton, 227 Fed. 502.
In Trenton & M. C. T. Corp. vs. Inhabitants of Trenton, 227 Fed. Rep. 502, it is held that: Where the question whether an increase in rate by a street railroad
company is just and reasonable is pending before a
State board vested by the Legislature with power to
determine the same, a federal court will not, before the
State board has passed upon the question, or has had an
opportunity to do so, interfere by injunction to restrain
action by such board because the right to so increase the
rates is based on ordinances claimed to constitute contracts which the State cannot constitutionally impair.
At pages 505-506 the court says:
"If the plaintiffs, in fact, have contracts which
are beyond the power of either the municipality or
the State to change or impair, the act of the board
in temporarily depriving them of the benefit
thereof did not infringe their constitutional rights
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to any greater extent than like rights are infringed, without violating constitutional provisions, when a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon ex parte application, restrains the exercise of
them pendente lite in order to preserve the status
quo, pending a hearing and decision. The board
did not attempt to determine whether any contract rights existed, or what they were, or
whether they were beyond the right of the
municipality or State to abrogate or change them.
It merely held the whole matter in abeyance until
there could be an investigation and a determina,..
tion could be reached. The plaintiffs cannot
assume that the board's decision will not recognize and give due effect to any contractual rights
which they have. Under these circumstances it
would, in our fudgment, be improper for this
court to attempt to adfudicate these questions,
before the board which the Legislature of New
Jersey has clothed with the legislative power over
rates and whose jurisdiction has already been invoked, has done so, or had an opportunity to do
so. In this respect this case cannot be distinguished from Prentis vs. Atlantic Coast Line Co.,
211 U. S. 210, 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. 150. It
was urged there, as here, that the plaintiffs had
contracts with the State, which could not be
changed except under certain conditio:p.s, which
did not exist in that case. The court, after
remarking that if the State had bound itself by
contract not to cut down the rates as contemplated,
there would seem to be no reason why the suit
should not then be entertained in the federal
court, said:
" 'But it would be premature and is unnecessary
to decide whether the State has done so or not.
No rate is irrevocably fixed by the State until the
matter has been laid before the body having the
last word. It may be that that body will adhere
to the old rate or will establish one that will not
be open to the charge of violating the contracts
alleged. * * * On the question of contract,
as on that of confiscation, it is reasonable and
proper that the evidence should be laid, in the first
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instance, before the body having the last legislative word.' "
The court should not, at this time on this application,
pass on the constitutional question raised. As is said
by this court in Carrigan vs. Bowman, 40 Ut. 91, 119
Pac. 1037, at page 94:

"Where the validity of a statute or ordinance
is involved, we think the general and better rule
obtains that a writ of prohibition will not be
granted in advance of the trial or determination in
the inferior court, where the question is presented,
when a plain remedy by appeal is afforded, though
it may be that the higher court will, when the
question is presented to it, determine that the
statute or ordinance is invalid, and the inferior
court without jurisdiction, unless it is made to
appear that to require the applicant to pursue the
remedy by appeal or writ of review will deprive
him, or seriously embarrass him in the exercise
of some present right. (Notes to cases in the
case of State vs. Superior Court, 111 Am. St.
Rep. 964.) We may here say, as was well said by
the court in the case of State vs. Rost, 49 La. Ann.
1451, 22 South 421, that:
" 'Ordinarily we exercise supervisory jurisdiction by writs of certiorari and prohibition only in
unappealable cases, leaving errors comm.itted in
appealable cases, or questions affecting the validity of the statute upon which the prosecution is
based, to be corrected or decided in due course on
appeal. * * * Cases may arise where the
court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, and in
furtherance of the ends of justice, will exert the
control and supervision of inferior courts' by prohibition, 'even in cases where an ultimate appeal
lies. But they must be cases of peculiar circumstances or extreme urgency or necessity, which
take them out of the general rule referred to. We
do not deem the instant case to be of that character.' "
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The same principle applies where there is an adequate
remedy by certiorari (State vs. Rost, 49 La. Ann. 1451,
22 s. 421).
In Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. vs. Winnett (C. C. A.
8 Cir.), 162 Fed. 242, the court in refusing to interfere
by injunction to control in advance proceedings before
a State Railway Commission, says at page 248:

"It is argued that if the Railway Commission
is permitted to fix the rate and to fix the time
within the limits of the law when the same shall
go into effect, and shall mail copies of the schedule
or schedules of rates so fixed, appellant would be
without remedy in a federal court of equity, for
the reason that the law fixes the time when the
rates shall go into effect, and that after notice
has been mailed there would be nothing to enjoin,
as the court has no power to restrain the passing
of time. We will first consider the objections
that stand in the way of granting such relief
on the present bill, and then consider whether or
not appellant would have a remedy in a federal
court of equity after notice of the fixing of the
rate had been mailed to it.
"The first objection against granting the relief
claimed is that prior to the fixing of the rate this

court is bound by a conclusive presumption that
the Railway Commission will act fustly, fairly, and
within the limits of its power."
In State vs. McQuillin, 262 Mo. 256, 171 S. W. 72, it is
said at page 75:
"We need not pursue that line of thought because the record we are dealing with is no such
record. In this case we are, in effect, asked to
anticipate the ruling of the judge on the sufficiency of the bill, or on the facts, correct im.aginary
errors in his future rulings, and take over jurisdiction to ourselves, not only on the sufficiency of
the bill, but on the merits as an intermediate step
arresting the evolution of a case pending below.
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That we ought not to do this is, we think, well
within the doctrine and reasoning of a line of
cases. State ex rel. vs. McQuillin, 256 Mo. loc. cit.
702 et seq., 156 S. W. 713; State ex rel. vs. McQuillin (not yet officially reported), 168 S. W.
924. Says Bond, J., speaking acceptably for us all
in the latter case:
"'We must assume that the said court will conduct the proceedings before it according to correct
principles of law and equity, and, if the hearing
should disclose no matter for which relief could
be given, it will be denied, or vice versa.' "
While the court, on this application, should not and
will not go into the merits of the case, it may be remarked in passing that there would seem to be, at this
late date, little substance in the question presented as to
the constitutional power of the legislature to abrogate
or impair service contracts made with Public Utilities.
Both the Constitution of the United States (Art. 1,
Sec. 10), and that of the State of Utah (Art. 1, Sec. 18),
inhibit legislation impairing the obligation of a contract.
The Power Company is, and from its organization
was, a public service corporation. The power to regulate
and control the rates of public service corporations is
within the legitimate exercise of the police power of the
State. This power may be exercised by the legislature
itself directly 'by enacting a law fixing rates, or the
legislature may delegate the power to fix rates to a
properly constituted commission. The State has not and
could not surrender or bargain away its police power.
No citizen, and no number of citizens, can by contract
estop the State from, or prevent it from, legitimately
·exercising Tts police power. A statute enacted within
the scope of the police power of the State is constitutional and valid notwithstanding any effect it may have
on previous contracts. In short, all contracts, whether
made by the State itself, by municipal corporations, or
by private corporations or individuals are subject to
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being impaired or abrogated by subsequent statutes
enacted in the exercise of the police power, and do not,
by reason of the contract, or due process of law, or
equal protection, or just compensation clauses of the
constitutions, State and Federal, enjoy any immunity
from such legislation. The rule is that contracts upon
subjects that are within the police power of the State,
even though valid when made, must be taken to have
been entered into with knowledge of the infirmities of
its subject matter and in view of the continuing power
of the State to control the rates to be charged by public
service corporations within its jurisdiction. In like
manner, all rates fixed by contract between public service
corporations and third persons are subject to be terminated by rates subsequently established by the State in
the exercise of its police powers. Accordingly, it must
be and is recognized that it was and is within the constitutional power of the State, acting through the legislature, or a properly constituted commission with duly
delegated authority, to bring about the abrogation,
cancellation or termination of the contracts in question.
These propositions have been determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States in two recent
decisions rendered in Union Dry Goods Co. vs. Georgia
Public Service Corporation, 248 U. S. 372, 63 L. Ed. 309,
and Producers Transportation Company vs. Railroad
Commission of California, 64 L. Ed. 166, decided January 5, 1920, and reported in the advance sheets of
February 1, 1920. They are also established by the
following authorities:

St. Clair vs. Railway, 259 Pa. St. 462, 103
Atl. 287;
Leiper vs. Baltimore Ry., 262 Pa. St. 328,
105 Atl. 551;
Limoneira Co. vs. Commission, 174 Cal.
232, 162 Pac. 1033;
12 Cor. Jur., 991, 992, 1036, 1064;
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Lumber Co. vs. Water Co., 92 Wash. 330,
159 Pac. 133 ;

Dry Goods Co. vs. P. S. Co., 142 Ga. 141,
83 S. E. 946;

Minneapolis Ry. vs. Menasha Co., 159 Wis.
130,150 N. W.411;

Hite vs. Cincinnati Ry., (Ill.), 119 N. E.
904;

Gas Co. vs. Pub. Ser. Corp., 73 W.Va. 571,
80S. E. 931;

Power Co. vs. Bloomquist, 26 Ida. 222, 141
Pac. 1083;

State vs. Pub. Ser. Corp., (Mo.), 204 S. W.
497;

Bolt Co. vs. PoWier Co., (Mo.), 204 S. W.
1074;

Dry Goods Co. vs. Pub. Ser. Corp., (Ga.),
89 S. E. 779;

Portland Ry. vs. Commission, 229 U.S. 397,
57 L. Ed. 1248;

Elec. Co. vs. CommYission, 238 U. S. 174,
59 L. Ed. 1254;

L. & N. Ry. vs. Motley, 219 U. S. 467,
55 L. Ed. 297;

Chicago Ry. vs. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 18,
42 L. Ed. 948;

Piano Co. vs. Utilities Co., (Ill.), 123 N.
E. 631;

Yeatman vs. Power Co., 126 Md. 513, 95
Atl. 158;

Woodburn vs. Commission, 82 Or. 114, 161
Pac. 391;

Shrader vs. Traction Co., (W. Va.), 99 S.
E. 207;

Salt Lake City vs. Traction Co., (Utah),
173 Pac. 556;

Dry Goods Co. vs. Pub. Ser. Comm., (U.
S.), 63 L. Ed. 116;

St. Clair vs. Elec. Ry. Co., 259 Pa. St. 462,
103 Atl. 287;

L. & N. Ry. vs. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298,
58 L. Ed. 229.
The Cement Company also asserts the validity of its
contract as being "founded upon an adequate consider-
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ation." The jurisdiction of the Commission to interfere
with the contract depends upon the existence or nonexistence of that fact. Hence the Commission has the
right to inquire into that fact as an incident to its
regulation of the utility, although its determination in
that respect, being jurisdictional, will be subject to complete review in the court. Thus, in 21 Stand. Encyc.
Pro. 806, it is said :
"Where jurisdiction depends upon contested
facts which the inferior tribunal is competent to
determine, prohibition will not be granted, even
though the court errs in its determination. Like
other extraordinary remedies, prohibition is to be
resorted to only in cases of extreme necessity, and
never in a case which presents a mere abstract or
hypothetical question, nor where the excess of
jurisdiction complained of cannot result in injury
to the relator."
It was held that under the provisions of Const., Art.
12, Sec. 22, and the Public Utilities Act (St. Extra
Sess. 1911, p. 18), giving the Railroad Commission jurisdiction to regulate a public utility by fixing rates, the
Commission has power, subject to review by the court,
to determine the validity of asserted rights or property
which affect the exercise of its jurisdiction. The court
says at page 1037:

"A large part of the briefs of learned counsel
for petitioner is devoted to discussion of a claim
that the Railroad Commission was without jurisdiction to determine any question as to the
validity of petitioner's asserted rights of property
in regard to the waters claimed by them in good
faith. In view of the provisions of our Constitution and the Public Utilities Act, and our decisions thereunder, we do not see how it can be
doubted that the Railroad Commission had the
power to determine for the purpose of the exercise
of its jurisdiction to regulate a public utility by
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the fixing of rates, subject to such power of review as is possessed by this court, all questions of
fact essential to the proper exercise of that jurisdiction. And, of course, as said in Palermo Land
& Water Co. vs. Railroad Commission, 160 Pac.
228, 'Wherever a court or board is authorized to
act upon the existence of a certain state of facts,
it has jurisdiction to determine the existence or
non-existence of the requisite facts,' and 'its juris-

diction cannot be affected by the circumstance
that these facts are denied.' "
The issuance of the writ is in the court's discretion.
There is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in ordinary
course of law by certiorari.
As thus construed the statute imposes no hardship
upon or barrier to the speedy determination of plaintiffs' rights in the premises. The remedy given by this
statute is more summary and is calculat·ed to lead to
better and quicker results because of the peculiar
powers and functfons of the Commission, than resort to
a court in the first instance.
Not only is the right given to the Cement Company
to apply for relief in the first instance to the Commission, a form having quasi-legislative and quasijudicial powers, but if aggrieved by the entry of any
final order of the Commission affecting it, it may apply
to this court for suspension of such final order, and
for a full hearing upon the merits of its case as prescribed by the act, and as interpreted and construed by
this court in Salt Lake City vs. Traction Co., supra.
The Commission was created by the Legislature to
perform very important functions in the community,
namely, to regulate the great public service corporations
of the State in the conduct of their business, and compel
those corporations adequately to discharge their duties to
the public and not to exact therefor excessive charges.
It was assumed, perhaps, by the Legislature that the
members of the Commissions would acquire special
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knowledge of the matters intrusted to them by experience
and study, and that when the plan of their creation was
fully developed they would prove efficient instrumentalities for dealing with the complex problems presented by
the activ1ties of these great corporations. It was not intended that the courts should interfere with the Commissions or review their determinations further than is
necessary to keep them within the law and protect the
constitutional rights of the corporations over which they
were given control.
Argument is unnecessary to support the conclusion
that primary interference of the courts with the administrative functions of a commission, like our Public
Utility Commission, is incompatible with the proper
exercise of governmental powers.
The Utilities Act (Sec. 4834, Com. Laws 1917) inhibits interference by the court with the proceedings of
the Commission. That provision cannot limit the jurisdiction of this court. But that provision does declare a
legislative policy, which should have persuasive force
in impelling this court to deny the writ independently
of all questions as to the jurisdiction of the Commission
or a usurpation of jurisdiction by the Commission, as
there is an adequate remedy otherwise in the ordinary
course of law.
The CoPimission should not be interfered with by a
writ of prohibition at this time.
If such procedure could be tolerated, all advantage in
vesting power in Public Utility Commissions to control
these public service corporations would be lost; and such
corporations could readily tie the hands of the Public
Service Commissions by suits in equity, wherein the
legal machinery of the courts could be clogged by injunctions, stays, and appeals, and all the other dilatory
and technical procedure. And so we find that this
Section 74, written into our Public Utilities Law as
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originally passed, and continued without change until
the present time, wisely provided that the Commission
should not be so interfered with.
The Legislature intended, by this provision, to abolish
the delays and technicalities which in the ordinary course
of judicial proceedings seem inevitably associated with
the practice of the law. The court should therefore,
whenever called upon, act according to the spirit of this
statute, as well as to its letter.
It is not necessary that the court should, at this time,
pass upon or define the limits of the Commission's jurisdiction in the premises. That question would involve an
exhau~tive study of a large portion of the act. It should
not be passed upon without full hearing upon notice to
all the other contract holders whose interests might be
adversely affected by the decision.
It is submitted that even assuming th(l)t this court has
jurisdiction to issue the writ, and even assuming that the
Commission is exceeding its jurisdiction in the premises,
nevertheless a writ of prohibition ought not to issue because the Cement Company has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by writ of
review or certiorari to this court to supervise and
review whatever action Commission may take in the
premises.
The matter of these contracts should not be brought
before this court piece-meal. It can best be dealt with
when all the contracts and some definite order of the
Commission is before the courts.
Some questions on the merits which should not be passed on at
this time lest other interested parties be adversely affected
by the establishment of a precedent without a full hearing
on their individual contracts and cases.
It is, of course, elementary law that on an application
of this character the court will not determine the merits
of the main controversy (Hirsch vs. Twyford, 40 Okla.

58
220, 139 Pac. 313; State vs. Muench, 225 Mo. 210, 124
S. W. 1124). The record here shows that there are
over fifty other contract holders who are vitally interested in the main questions revolving around the
construction of the State and the Constitution. The
record shows that their interests involve millions of
dollars. The Power Company is interested adversely
to its customers. Accordingly the Power Company has
filed in this cause a brief on the merits seeking to
make this proceeding, on this one application on two
out of over fifty contracts, a dragnet by means of
which all the controverted and litigated questions involved on all the contracts may be here and now summarily determined. This proceeding has a proper but
limited purpose, and it cannot be enlarged so as to
bring within its scope the matters urged by the Power
Company bearing on the future possible action of
the Commission. The Power Company seeks to "knock
out" all of the rest of its customers without a hearing
by a side-stroke on prohibition. It is but an endeavor
to put the Commission in leading strings when it comes
to pass on these contracts after all the evidence is
in. It is but an effort to preclude or handicap all the
rest of the contract holders in the presentation of their
cases to the Commission and to this court. A great
public injury would follow a summary and almost
ex parte determination by this court of the questions
the court is invited by the Power Company to pass
upon. The court should purposely and carefully, and
no doubt will, avoid so undesirable result when it can,
in the exercise of its discretion, dispose of this application on the ground of the adequacy of another remedy,
without discussing the jurisdiction of the Commission
or the immunity of these contracts from interference
under the phraseology of our statute. Such a discussion or determination under the circumstances would
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be apt to create a precedent which would be more
likely to defeat than promote the ends of justice.
The Power Company, in its brief, says much of its
being a public utility and representing the public interest and getting a fair return on its investment.
It will be time enough to advance these considerations
when the questions of padded figures, watered stock,
extravagant management, etc., have been investigated
and passed upon.
And there are two sides to this controversy. The
record here shows that the contract holders embrace
metal mines, coal mines, irrigation companies, interurban railways, steam railways, municipalities, smelting companies, canal companies, elevator companies,
etc., each and all of which are as much a public use
and benefit of, in and to the community and state
as is the Power Company.
Mining is the paramount industry of this State. It
promotes the public interest and develops the resources
of the State. It is a public use and benefit. (Highland
Boy G. M. Co. vs. Strickley, 28 Utah 215, 78 Pac. 296;
Ketchum Coal Co. vs. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 50 Utah
395, 168 Pac. 86; Montmaire Co. vs. Columbus Rexall
Co., 174 Pac. 172.) So also is irrigation (Nash vs.
Clark, 27 Utah 158, 75 Pac. 371; Salt Lake City vs.
Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 126, 121 Pac. 593; Gunnison
lrr. Co. vs. Canal Co., 174 Pac. 852). So are railroads,
both steam and electrical. (Ogden Ry. Co. vs. Ogden,
7 Utah 207, 26 Pac. 288; Stockdale vs. R. G. W. Ry.,
28 Utah 201, 77 Pac. 849.)
The mining companies
contributed to the wealth and prosperity of this State
long before such companies as the Power Company were
thought of. All the Power Companies in the State
could cease operations with but a fraction of that
detriment to the welfare of the State which would be
occasioned by a serious restriction of the mining industry.
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Thus in the case of Ohio and Colorado Smelting &
Refining Co. vs. Public Utilities Commission of Colorado (No. 9458), just decided by the Supreme Court
of Colorado, and not yet reported, in a proceeding
identical with this where the Colorado Commission
undertook to abrogate the contract entered into prior
to the passage of the Utilities Act of that State, the
court, in reversing the order of the Commission and
dismissing the case, well says :
"It is not the purpose of the Public Utilities
Law to make the State the insurer of unlawful,
unwise or unnecessary investments by public
utilities corporations, and in the absence of the
required certificate of necessity, and certainly in
the absence of clear proof to the contrary, we
must presume that such extensions were at least
unnecessary.
"The equities of the case are not with the
Power Company. The Smelting Company is
as much affected in fact with the public interest
as is the Power Company. It performs a public service in the treatment of ores from mines
from various parts of the State. Without smelters and mills to perform this service for the
public, the mining industry of the State must
of necessity seriously suffer. Besides the Smelter
Company, in this case, is of vast public interest
to the community in which it is located.
It
furnished a payroll of about $300,000 per annum,
to which that of the Power Company in the
locality is compamtively insignificant.
"The testimony discloses that there has been
about $1,000,000 invested in the plant of the
Smelter Company, including replacements. Its
losses for the year 1908 were $32,198.97. The
plant lost an average of $70,000 for eleven years.
In 1917 there was a profit of $185,795.52. In
1916 the profit was $82,072.32, allowing nothing
for salaries or depreciation. It was unable at
the time of the hearing to operate at a profit
and was continuing only in the hope that it
might make a profit some time in the future.
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"To pay the rate fixed by the Commission will
either compel it to cease operations or increase
the price of treatment to its customers. It is
a competitor of the Leadville smelter. Such is
the testimony in these particulars.
"It cannot be said that to sustain one public
utility at the expense of another is in the ir~r
terest of the public welfare, and if we are to
rely upon the showing here, this must be the
result, if the order of the Commission is to be
sustained.
"Yet the interest of the public weal is the only
theory upon which the Commission can exercise
the power to abrogate the contract between the
parties.
"I may repeat toot this power is so grave, with
such possibilities of being erroneously exercised,
through want of proper understanding of the
facts and of the principle upon which it is based,
tlw.,t it should be denied or greatly curtailed by
amendment to the statute.
"The Commission in this case made no
investigation of its own, and determined the
matter wholly upon the testimony of the contending parties. In such a case the burden is
upon the petitioner clearly, which it has not
sustained.
"The sufficiency of the rate prescribed to produce a fair profit upon the value of the property
employed in the business is to be strongly presumed. The burden of showing its confiscatory
character rests, therefore, upon the complaining
company. Lincoln Gas Co. vs. Lincoln, 223 U. S.
349. The presumption must be correspondingly
stronger wfLere the rate rests upon a contract
between the parties, understandingly entered
into."
So this court in Mining Co. vs. Strickley, 28 Utah
215, 78 Pac. 296, well says at pages 233 to 235:
"The same reasons that hold that manufacturing is necessary to the public welfare in New

62

Hampshire and other New England States can
be urged in behalf of mining in Utah and other
Western States. The mining industry in this
State, and in others similarly situated, not only
produces a home market for the products of
the farm, and furnishes thousands of men with
ste1ady employment at liberal and remunerati-ve
wages, but also produces wealth which has enabled other industries to be created and to flourish, which, without the stimulus thus furnished,
would languish.
In Dayton Mining Co. vs.
Seawell, supra, Mr. Chief Justice Hawley, speaking for the court, aptly portrays some of the
conditions and disadvantages under which the
mining industry is prosecuted in this intermountain region, as well as some of the benefits
derived therefrom, as follows: 'The mining and
milling interests give employment to many men,
and the benefits derived from this business are
distributed as much ,and sometimes more among
the laboring classes than with the owners of the
mines ,and mills. The mines are fixed by the
laws of nature, and are often found in places
almost inaccessible. For the purpose of successfully constructing and carrying on the business of mining, smelting, or other reduction of
ores, it is necessary to erect hoisting works, to
build mills, to construct smelting furnaces, to
secure ample grounds for dumping waste, rock,
and earth; and a road to and from the mine
is always indispensable. The sites necessary for
these purposes are often confined to certain
fixed localities.' We have in this State, in
addition to the extensive deposits of gold, silver,
lead, and copper ores, large areas of lands containing coal in almost limitless quantities, and
we depend almost exclusively upon the coal
mines for the fuel used in our manufacturing
establishments and for domestic purposes. Now,
it is of vital import,ance to the people that the
coal, as well ,as the other hidden resources of
the State, be opened up and developed, and that
the mining industry in general, which has been
the source of so much wealth to the people of
this and other Western Staets, be conducted on
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the same extensive soale in the future that has
characterized its opemtions in the past. Therefore the public policy of the State, as .exemplified by the act of the Legislature under consideration, is to encourage the people to open up
and exploit the mines with which the State
abounds, and thereby not only give to the State
the wealth which will enable other industries
to be created, but furnish thousands of laborers
with remunerative employment.
"It being conceded, and this court having held,
that the construction and operation of irrigating ditches in this State is a public use (Nash vs.
Clark, supra), it follows that the construction
of roads and tramways for the development
of the mining industry is a public use, as the
same line of reasoning that applies in support
of the doctrine in the one case holds good in
the other. Otherwise a party owning a few
acres of farming land, or only a few square rods
for that matter, could invoke the law of eminent
domain, and by condemnation proceedings acquire a right of way across his neighbor's land
for an irrigation ditch to convey water to his
small holdings; whereas the owners of mines
and of works for the reduction of ores, the operations of which furnish thousands of men in this
State with employment at good wages, and to
which the general prosperity of the State is
largely due, would be denied the right to invoke
this same rule of law in order to acquire, when
necessary to the successful operation of their
business, rights of way for the transportation
of ores from the mines to the mills and smelters,
and for the construction of tunnels for drainage and other purposes. And parties holding
the title to ground necessary and suitable for
these purposes ,which, in many cases, except
for such purposes, might be entirely worthless,
would be clothed with power to demand and
compel payment of an unconscionable price for
their lands before parting with the title, or
they could refuse, absolutely, to grant the easement required on any terms, and thereby in
some cases cripple mining enterprises, or destroy
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them altogether. Such a policy would not only
be inconsistent and unreasonable, but would
greatly retard the development of one of the
gre,atest natural resources of the State."
These other contract holders were, and are, mainly
interested, not in the procedural questions, but in
the questions going to the merits of the validity of
their individual contracts, and it was and is utterly
impossible to properly or fully present the issues
on the merits before this court on an application for.
a writ of prohibition.
Mo:r;eover, obviously, proceedings upon such a writ are inappropriate to determine
the merits of the controversy involved. That is not
the function or office of such a writ. Yet they are
constantly confronted with the possibility that the
court might in passing upon such a writ, either necessarily or unnecessarily, intentionally or inadvertently,
go beyond the mere decision of the questions involved
in allowing or refusing a permanent writ of prohibition, or in short, beyond the mere jurisdictional questions, and by construing the statute, decide or undertake to decide questions affecting the merits of the
controversy prejudicially to the interests of other
contract holders, without their being afforded an
opportunity to be heard fully, and to be heard fully
with respect to the facts of their individual cases,
independently of other individual contract cases.
Furthermore, there are some objections and matters
going even to the jurisdiction of the Commission to
make an order affecting some of the contracts, which
objections and matters are not presented upon the
face of the contracts, nor at present upon the face
of the record before the Commission, and which can
only be properly and appropriately interposed and
presented upon the introduction of available evidence
whereon to predicate the same.
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What is now asked is that the status quo of the
interested parties be preserved until the questions here
presented and other important questions presented can
be fully briefed, discussed and receive from this court
that attentive considemtion which they demand.
Let us illustrate the magnitude and the gravity of
some of the questions involved. We can only do this
by replying to some of the suggestions and arguments
of the Power Company. We have not yet seen the
brief of the Attorney General on behalf of the Commission, nor the supplemental brief of the Cement
Company. But the following is a brief cursory analysis
of some of the arguments that may or will be made by
or on behalf of some of the individual contract holders.
Even if the Commission has the power to abrogate this contract
it has absolutely no power to compel the consumer to accept
service from the Power Company for the remaining term .
of the contract at an increased rate.

As we have seen, the State, in the exercise of its police
power, can control public utility corporations, and as an
incident of such control can regulate the rate of such
corporations, even though such regulation invalidates
pre-existing contracts.
A serious constitutional question would be involved
should the Commission attempt, as suggested and urged
by the Power Company, to change the rate in the contract and then further attempt to enforce performance
by the consumer of the impaired contract for the balance
of the contract term at the new rate prescribed by the
Commission.
The Legislature, acting directly, or through this Commission, can prescribe the particular rate at which the
Power Company shall render a given service, and can
forbid the Power Company from rendering the given
service at a less rate. When it does so, all contracts for
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the given service at a rate less or different from that
fixed by the Legislature would thereby be rendered unlawful, and would go down and be cancelled, abrogated,
and terminated as illegal and void. In such a case the
contract would be at an end.
A valid reduction of the rate for the service specified
in the contract would relieve the Power Company from
the obligation to perform that contract for its remaining
term; controversy, a valid increase in rate for the service
specified in the contract would discharge the consumer
from the obligation of further performance of the
contract.
An increase of the rate by the Commission, if valid,
would render the performance of the contract unlawful.
It is a general principle, that when a contract is lawful
when made, and a law afterwards renders performance
of it unlawful, neither party to the contract shall be
prejudiced but the contract is to be treated as at an end.
It is discharged. In short, where the performance of an
executory agreement, which was lawful in its inception,
is made unlawful by subsequent enactment, the agreement is thereby dissolved, and the parties are discharged
from its obligation.
2 Elliott on Contracts, Sec. 685, p. 40;
13 Cor. Jur., 646;
Heart vs. Brewing Co., 121 Tenn. 69, 113
s. w. 364;
2 Parsons Contracts, p. 674;
2 Hammond on Contracts, Sec. 210, pp. 345,
346;
Clark on Contracts, 681;
Lawson on Contracts, Sees. 423, 424;
Mississippi Ry. vs. Green Heisk, (Tenn.),
592;
Odlin vs. Ins. Co., 2 Wash. C. C. 312, Fed.
Cas. 10433;
''
Gray vs. Sinns, 3 Wash. C. C. 276, Fed.
Cas. 5729;
Sauner vs. Ins. Co., 41 Mo. A. 480;
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Corrigan vs. Chica,go, 144 Ill. 537, 33 N. E.
746;

Hooper vs. Muller, 158 Mich. 395, 123 N.

w. 24;

Stratford vs. Brewing Co., 94 Wash. 125,
162 Pac. 31;

Burgett vs. Loeb, 43 Ind. App. 657, 88 N.
E. 346;

Amerioan Exchange vs. Blunt, 102 Me. 128,
66 Atl. 212;

Jameson vs. Gas Co., 128 Ind. 555, 28 N.
E. 76;

Presbyterian Church vs. New York, 5 Cow.
538;

U. S. vs. Dietrich, 128 Fed. 671;
Advertiser Co. vs. State, 193 Ala. 418, 69
So. 501;
Greil Co. vs. Madsen, 179 Ala. 444, 60 So.
876;

Lawrence vs. White, 131 Ga. 840, 63 S. E.
631;

Fought vs. Brewing Co., 193 Ill. A. 572;
Wood vs. Bldg. Assoc., 126 Ia. 464, 102 N.

w.

410;

Exchange vs. Blunt, 102 Me. 128, 66 Atl.
312;

/

Smith vs. Stroughton, 185 Mass. 329, 70
N. E. 195;

Baylies vs. Mueller, 158 Mich. 395, 123 N.

w.

24;

Cordes vs. Miller, 39 Mich. 581, 33 Am.
R. 430;

Rosenberger vs. Wells, 258 Mo. 112, 167

s. w. 433;
167 s. w: 429;

Rosenberger vs. Express Co., 258 Mo. 97,
Electric Co. vs. Utility Com., 87 N. J. L.
128, 93 Atl. 707; Affd., 88 N. J. L. 603,
96 Atl. 1013;

People vs. Ins. Co. 91 N.Y. 174;
Monacha vs. St. Ry. Co. 247, Pa. St. 242,
93 Atl. 344;
Irrigation Co. vs. Watkins, (Tex.), 183 S.

w.

431;
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Blins vs. Supply Co., (Tex.), 105 S. W.
543;

Cowley vs. Ry. Co., 68 Wash. 558, 123 Pac.
998;

Hite vs. Ry. Co., (III.), 119 N. E. 904;
Bunch vs. Short, (W.Va.), 90S. E. 810;
Speliohoulus vs. Schick, 129 Wis. 556, 109
N. W. 568.

Both the State and Federal constitutions inhibit the
taking of one's property without due process of law and
inhibit the denial of the equal protection of the law.
And it is fundamental that the requirement of due
process of law applies administrative and executive
action by which one may be deprived of his property ae
well and just the same as it does to judicial action.

Caldwell vs. Pierson, (S. D.), 159 N. W.
124;

Watson on Const., pp. 1449-1458;
Fallbrook Co. vs. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112,
41 L. Ed. 369;

G. W. Ry. vs. Minnesota, 238 U. S. 340.
Neither the Legislature, the Commission, nor the
'{;l;··~ to
Power Company could compel the
continue to accept power under the contract at an in:creased rate. If the increased rate were in excess of

&lnier'

what it would cost the Copj ~-'U.ir'dt'i"t to produce the
power, then this would be clear, not only for the reasons
hereinafter stated, but for the additional reason that
such increased rate in excess of productive cost would
be unreasonable and confiscatory, and therefore unconstitutional. The Legislature may not, under the guise of
the police power impose on property burdens so excessive as to work a confiscation thereof. Such an
excessive rate would work a confiscation of the customer's steam plant, and take its property by depleting
its treasury.
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But suppose the increased rate was not in excess of,
or was less than, what it would cost the consumer to
produce the power, what then? Nevertheless the consumer could not be compelled to accept power under the
contract at the increased rate, but could elect to treat
the contract as terminated, and generate its own power.
While the police power of the State is very broad and
far-reaching, it has its limitations. To be valid under

that power, a statute must oove a direct connection with
the preservation of the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare.
12 Corpus Juris, 929, 930;
Lawton vs. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. Ed.
385;
Nolen VB. Riechman, 225 Fed. 812;
Block VB. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 Pac.
22.
Police power is the power inherent in a government to
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote
order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of
society. But the police power is not the power to disregard fundamental principles of free government and
private property rights. To extend the exercise of the
power beyond the point of necessity, would make the
interference unlawful. It has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditions affecting the
community at large and collectively with a view of bringing about the "greatest good of the greatest number."
It is founded largely on the maxim, Sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, and also to some extent on that
other maxim of public policy, Salus populi suprema lex.
The rule is that:
"In order that a statute or ordinance may be
sustained as an exercise of the police power, the
courts must be able to see that the enactment has
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for its object the prevention of some offense or
manifest evil or the preservation of the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare, that
there is some clear, real and substantial connection
between the assumed purpose of the enactment
and the actual provisions thereof, and that the
latter do in some plain, appreciable, and appropriate manner tend toward the accomplishment of the
object for which the power is exercised. The
mere restriction of liberty or of property rights
cannot of itself be denominated 'public welfare,'
and treated as a legitimate object of the police
power. The legislature may not, under the guise
of the police power, impose on property burdens so
excessive as to work a confiscation thereof. Nor
may such power be used in any other way as a
cloak for the invasion of personal rights or private
property, neither may it be exercised for private
purposes, nor for the exclusive benefit of particular individuals or classes."
12 Cor. Jur., 929, 930, 931.
In the language of State vs. Gilman, 33 W. Va. 146,
10 S. E. 283:

"If, therefore, a statute purp.orting to have been
enacted to protect the public health, the public
morals or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable
invasion of rights secured by the fundamental
law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and
thereby give effect to the Constitution." 123
U. S. 661 (31 L. Ed. 210).
And in the language of Commonwealth vs. Campbell,
133 Ky. 50, 117 S. W. 383:
"Man in his natural state has a right to do
whatever he chooses and has the power to do.
When he becomes a member of organized society
under governmental regulation, he surrenders, of
necessity, all of his natural right the exercise of

71
which is, or may be, injurious to his fellow citizens. This is the price that he pays for governmental protection, but it is not within the competency of a free government to invade the sanctity of the absolute rights of the citizen any
further than the direct protection of society requires. Therefore the question of what a man will
drink, or eat, or own, provided the rights of others
are not invaded, is one which addresses itself alone
to the will of the citizen. It is not within the
competency of government to invade the privacy
of a citizen's life and to regulate his conduct in
matters in which he alone is concerned, or to prohibit him any liberty the exercise of which will not
directly injure society."
No law commanding that to be done which does not
promote the health, safety or welfare of society can b~
sustained. (Ex. p. Whitwell, 98 Cal. 73, 32 Pac. 870.)
The health, safety and welfare of society would be the
same whether the consumer purchased its electricity
from the Power Company or generated the same itself.
Hence, an attempt to compel the consumer to take electricity from the Power Company, would be void, as it
would not have the slightest connection with or relation
to the health, safety or welfare of the public.
The legislature can, within the legitimate exercise of
the police power, abrogate or terminate a contract, or
render its future performance unlawful, but it cannot
make a new contract for the parties to which they, or one
of them, has never assented, and compel its performance.
Liberty of contract has its limitations, but liberty .of
refraining from contracting is untrammeled. One party
cannot be bound to the contract and the other not. If
the Power Company has the right to refuse performance,
the consumer will have the same right.
The consumer entered into a contract with the Power
Company, which contract was fair and reasonable and
valid in all respects. It agreed to take the power but
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only at the rate named. It is under no obligation to take
the power at any other rate. It never assumed any such
obligation. 'l'he legislature can destroy the contract
under the police power but it cannot infringe upon the
consumer's inherent, fundamental, inalienable and indivisible right to refuse to perform an obligation, contractural in its nature, which it has never voluntarily
assumed. No legislative restriction can be imposed upon
the exercise of that right of refusal. In the language of
Judge Cooley on Torts (lst Ed.), page 278:
"It is part of every man's civH rights that he be
left at liberty to refuse business relations with any
person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests
upon reason, or is the result of whim, caprice,
prejudice, or malice."
It would seem to be only necessary to state this proposition to enable one of ordinary intelligence, endowed
with a reasonable share of moral sense, to perceive the
monstrous injustice of thus placing the large investments
of the consumer, made under the stimulus of the inducement held out by its right of contract, at the absolute
mercy of an irresponsible public utility sentiment, or of
public cupidity. It would seem to offer a large premium
for the perpetration of a wrong.
The consumer could not be compelled to take the power
at an increased rate, to which it never assented, and
with respect to which it never contracted. To even attempt to make it do so would be a palpable mockery of
either administrative or remedial justice. It would work
a fraud on the consumer. It would outrage every idea
of common justice and common sense. It would be unconscionable. None but the over-heated conscience
of a greedy utility corporation could sanction such ,a
suggestion. The first principles of common honesty
between man and man would prevent it. The eternal
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principles of right would forbid it. From the mere assertion of such a thing the mind recoils in disgust. Even in
these arbitrary times, such an act must be recognized as
pure tyranny and the first born child of anarchy. Such
a principle would absolutely paralyze some of the industries holding contracts with the utility company. The
contract must either stand as it is made or it must fall.
You cannot make fish of one party and flesh of the other.
The consumer cannot be ambushed in any such manner.
Equity and good conscience forbid it. The consumer is
willing to stand up for the justice of its bond and all
that is therein found nominated. More than that no
power on earth can demand under "a government of
laws, and not of men." More than that would be nothing
but injustice, oppression and robbery. It is inconceivable that such a thing should even be attempted
much less that it should be allowed to be done.
The guaranty of due process of law is a guaranty
against any abuse of government power under the plea of
public policy (Fruend Police Power, Sec. 21, p. 16). The
public interest is at once the measure and limit of the
police power as its is its source. The public interest
absolutely demands that the consumer and particularly a
consumer such as a mining company, which is itself a
public use and benefit, shall obtain its power at the lowest cost. It follows that if the consumer can generate its
own power for less than the Power Company can supply
it, the consumer not only should but must be given the
right so to do.
But further than this, if the consumer in good faith
and upon oath and under the advice of competent
engineers, believes that it can generate its power for less
than the Power Company can supply it, then at least the
public interest, as well as the constitutional right to
freedom of contract, dictates and demands that the consumer be allowed the privilege and right of attempting
so to do.
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The mmmg industry is of vital importance to the
people of the State and is the paramount industry of the
State, as we have seen, and as this court has recognized.
(Mining Company vs. Strickley, 28 Utah 215, 78 Pac.
296.) Neither the Utilities Act, nor the police power of
the State, ever contemplated that the Commission
should be clothed with the authority to demand and
compel the mining interest to pay an unconscionable
price for its power, or with the authority, by making
compulsory new contracts against the will of the mining
company, to thereby, in some cases, cripple mining enterprises or destroy them altogether. Such an authority
and such a policy would not only be inconsistent and
unreasonable, but would be unconstitutional and would
greatly retard the development of that, the greatest of
the natural resources of the State.
But whatever the power of the legislature in this
respect, the Commission has no such power as respects
a non-utility consumer.
Even if the Commission had the power to interfere
with this contract, how could such power be exercised?
The Power Company is subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission. The consumer is not. It is beyond
the authority of the Commission to issue any order
directed to the consumer requiring it to do or refrain
from doing anything. All the Commission could do
would be to make an order directed to the Power Company to terminate the contract. In obedience to that
order, the Power Company could proceed in one of two
ways, either by bringing an action seeking the cancellation of the contract, or by serving notice on the consumer that electricity would no longer be furnished
under the contract rate, but that all hereafter furnished
and accepted by the consumer would be charged for at
the increased tariff or schedule rate. It probably would
pursue the latter course. The consumer would then
have the right to bring an action to test the validity
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of the contract, or rather the efficacy of the attempted
termination thereof.
Chapter 1 of Utilities Act creates the Commission
and Chapter 2 defines the Public Utilites subject to
the jurisdiction and regulation of the Commission
and the provisions of the act. The consumer is not
embraced within the utilities subject to the act or
over which the Commission is given jurisdiction. The
Commission has no power to regulate, dictate or control
the business or contracts of the consumer or any part
or portion thereof.
It was competent for the legislature to withhold
from the Commission such power or jurisdiction as its
wisdom or choice determined. (Gas Co. vs. Commission, 224 N. Y. 156, i20 N. E. 132.) It 'Yithheld .from
• • JUriS
• •d•t•
i.J,'I(I~J•tL•
e omm1sswn
1c 10n over the
eopper
GllliJpmcy",
the
and hence it could not enforce any order made by it
directed to the eoillier 'eornpauy.
The consumer is not under the jurisdiction of the
Commission. It is not embraced within the public
utilities defined in the act. It is beyond the authority
of the Commission to issue any orders directed to the
consumer requiring it to do or refrain from doing
anything. All the Commission can do would be to
make an order directed to the Power Company to
terminate the contract or to no longer furnish service
under the contract rate, leaving it optional to the
consumer to take the service or not as it might see
fit.
In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Railroad Commission, 173 Cal. 577, 160 Pac. 828, it is held that the
function of the Railroad Commission, like that of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, is to regulate public
utilities and to compel the enforcement of their duty
to the public, and not to compel them to carry out
their contract obligations to intl.ividuals. The court
says at page 830:
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"Even if it granted that the burdens of the
agreement rest on the petitioner, the railroad
commission is not a body charged with the
enforcement of private contracts. See Hanlon vs.
Eshleman, 169 Cal. 200, 146 Pac. 656. Its function like that of the Interstate Commerce Commission, is to reguW.,te public utilities, and to
compel the enforcement of their duties to the
public.
(Southern Pacific Co. vs. Interstate
Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 433, 31 Sup.
Ct. 288, 55 L. Ed. 283) ; not to compel them to
carry out their contract obligations to individuals."
It is not the function of the Commission to undertake to enforce contracts.

Colorado Springs vs. Hotel Co. (Colo.),
P. U. R. 1917-D, p. 272;
Fowler vs. Electric Co. (Okla.), P. U. R.
1916-F, p. 560;
Newman vs. Railway Co. (Wis.), P. U. R.
1916-F, p. 455.
The Commission's jurisdiction is confined by the
statute to the control of the utilities and it has no
jurisdiction over the consumer. (Commission vs. Telephone Assn., 282 Ill. 336, 118 N. E. 760.)
If the contract violates the statute, the purpose of
the act is fully accomplished by terminating, abrogating
and canceling the contract, without attempting to make
a new contract for the parties.
In United States vs. Dietrich, 126 Fed. 671, the court
holds and says, at pages 67 4-675 :

"The purpose of the statute is then accomplished by terminating the contract or agreement
in so far as it remains exec-utory, but without
extinguishing or avoiding, even if that were
permissible, the rights of either party acquired
by its lawful performance, or by its breach,
up to that time. It is well established by the
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English courts and by the courts of this country,
Federal and State, that where performance of
a contract or agreement, lawful in its inception,
becomes unlawful by reason of any subsequent
event, the contract or agreement is thereby dissolved or terminated, in so far as it remains
executory, and both parties are excused from its
further performance. Sheppard's Touchstone,
373; 1 Chitty on Contracts (11th Ed.)
1076; 2 Parsons Contracts, 674; Cla,rk
on Contracts, 507; Bishop on Contracts,
Sec.
594;
Abbott's
Merchant
Shipping
(13th Ed.) 754; Melville vs. De Wolf, 4 El. & Bl.
844, 850; Reid vs. Hoskins, Id. 979, 984; Newby
vs. Sharpe, 8th Ch. Div. 39; Englesea vs. Rugeley, 6 Q. B. 180; Brick Presbyterian Church vs.
New York, 5 Cow. 538; Mississippi, etc., Co. vs.
Green, 9 Heisk. 588, 592; Knoxville vs. Bird,
12 Lea, 121, 49 Am. Rep. 326; Cordes vs. Miller,
39 Mich. 581, 33 Am. Rep. 430; Brown vs.
Dillahunty, 4 Smedes & M. 713, 723, 43 Am. Dec.
499; Bradford vs. Jenkins, 41 Miss. 328, 335;
Irion vs. Hume, 50 Miss. 419, 427; Macon, etc.,
Co. vs. Gibson, 85 Ga. 1, 17, 11 S. E. 442, 21
Am. St. Rep. 135; Odlin vs. Ins. Co., 18 Fed. Cas.
p. 583 (No. 10,433); Tait vs. Ins. Co., 23 Fed.,
Cas. p. 620 (No. 13,726); Hangner vs. Abbott,
6 Wall. 532, 535, 18 L. Ed. 939; New York Life
Ins. Co. vs. Stathann, 93 U. S. 24, 23 L. Ed. 789;
Ins. Co. vs. Davis, 95 U. S. 425, 24 L. Ed. 453;
Jones vs. Judd, 4 N. Y. 411; Heine vs. Meyer,
61 N.Y. 171, 176; Bennett vs. Woolfolk, 15 Ga.
213."
The making of this contract subject to the police
power of the State may have been a recognition of
the power of the State to terminate it and abrogate
it; but it was not a recognition of any power in
the State by legislative enactment to transmute the
making of the contract into an assent to an entirely
new and different contract. There is no power lodged
in the Commission to make a new contract for the
parties and to require the consumer to perform the
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new contract. There is no authority that recognizes
the existence of such a power in any legislature, court
or Commission.
As we have seen, the determination of the validity
of the contract, as dependent upon its being "founded
upon an adequate consideration" within the meaning
of that language as employed in the act, is the exercise
of a judicial function. If such consideration is found
to be inadequate within the meaning of the act, the
proper tribunal can exercise the judicial power to
cancel and terminate it as a court in equity might
do under proper circumstances. But while a judicial
tribunal can construe contracts and determine their
validity and in proper cases abrogate them, it is beyond the power of any judicial tribunal or judicial
function to create new liabilities of the parties. (Hughes
Company vs. Pulley, 47 Utah 544, 155 Pac. 337; Smith
vs. Bowman, 32 Utah 43, 88 Pac. 687; Blythe-Fargo
Co. vs. Free, 46 Utah 233, 148 Pac. 430.)
The contract is not in apparent conflict with, nor discriminatory as respects, any valid schedule rates, and the Commission has no power to abrogate this contract until the proper
procedure prescribed by the act for raising rates has been
followed. Schedules forty-two and forty-three are not and
never have been applicable to this contract.

Much is said by the Commission in the record in
this case and by the Power Company with reference
to "standard schedules" of the Power Company. The
consumers will unequivocally contend that there never
have been and are not now any lawful standard schedules
applicable to these contracts or any of them.
The order to show cause recites that these contracts
are prima facie not in accordance with the filed tariffs
of the Power Company.
It also recites that the contracts are prima facie
discriminatory and preferential as the rates are not
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extended to the public generally by the Power Company in its schedules.
The Commission has never held any hearing to determine whether the contracts are in point of fact
unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory. Rates may
vary where conditions are different. A mere difference in rates does not show an unlawful preference
or discrimination in the absence of validly promulgated
applicable tariff schedules. It has never been shown
that the contract rate is in itself unreasonable. The
reasonableness of the rates named in schedules 42 and
43, has never been passed upon.
As a consumer of
this electric power, it must be, and it has been, conceded that, in point of fact, tW the Utah Copper
Company, to illustrate, stands, and would have to
be justly placed, in a class by itself. The principle
of reasonable classification as a basis for rate differences is well settled. Separate classifications are
commonly made and recognized. Unless the circumstances of two or more contracts are substantially,
similar there is no discrimination. Differentials in
favor of large consumers, "off peak" hour consumers,
consumers whose service cost the utility less, long
hour consumers, constant as against intermittent consumers, consumers in a position to supply their own
needs, etc., are allowable and common. The Commission has never gone into those questions, and the
consumer has never been heard upon them. And:
"That to condemn without a hearing is repugnant to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment needs nothing but statement.
Every man is entitled to his day in court before his rights can be finally disposed of, and
he cannot be divested of this right by any act
of the legislature. Due process of law requires
an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of
the case, in which proceeding the citizen has
a right and an opportunity to be heard and to
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defend, protect, and enforce his rights, by es~
tablishing any fact which, under the law, W)•tlcl
be a protection to him or to his property."
12 Cor. Jur. 1234.
Moreover many of these contracts carried special
considerations other than the rate agreed on, and hence
could not be said to be discriminatory upon their face
even as compared with a published schedule.

Timber Co. vs. Ry.
109 Pac. 320;
Timber Co. vs. Ry.
109 Pac. 1020;
Lghting Co. vs. New
581.
In Sultan Ry. & Timber Co. vs.
Co., 58 Wash. 604, 109 Pac. 320,
says:

Co., 58 Wash. 604,
Co., 58 Wash. 604,
York, 162 N. Y. S.
Great Northern Ry.
the court holds and

'"The acts of the legislature of this State
establishing a railroad commission, and providing for the regulation of freights and fares, will
be found in St. 1905, p. 145, St. 1907, p. 536
and St. 1909, p. 191. The acts are too long
even to epitomize here, but it will be found
upon examination that they do not in terms prohibit a railway company, except in certain
specified cases, from changing or altering its
tariff rates at any time it deems the reason
sufficient, nor from entering into a contract
with an individual shipper to carry particular
goods at a fixed rate for a given time or to
the amount of a given quantity. The prohibition
is against discrimination against the hauling
of one man's goods at a more favorable rate
than it will haul another's, and against extortionate and unreasonable charges, but it does not
purport to prohibit the railway company from
giving a shipper a binding asurance that tariff
rates on a given commodity will not be changed
before the end of a fixed period, or before a
given commodity has been shipped. The effect
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of the statute in this respect is similar to that
of the Interstate Commerce Act, concerning
which the Supreme Court of the United States
in Cin., N. 0. & Texas & Pac. Ry. vs. Interstate Commerce Comn., 162 U. S. 184, 16 Sup.
Ct. 700, 40 L. Ed. 935, said: 'Subject to the two
leading prohibitions that their charges shall
not be unjust or unreasonable, and that they shall
not unjustly discriminate, so as to give undue
preference or disadvantage to persons or traffic
similarly circumstanced, the act to regulate
commerce leaves common carriers as they were
at the common law, free to make special contracts looking to the increase of their business,
to classify their traffic, to adjust and aportion
their rates so as to meet the necessities of commerce, and generally to manage their important
interests upon the same principles which are
regarded as sound, and adopted in other trades
and pursuits.' It is true that in a certain sense
there are three parties to contracts of this
nature-the carrier, the shipper, and the State.
The interest of the first two is at once apparent;
that of the latter consists in seeing that the
contract is not discriminatory, or oppressive
on the shipper, or so far improvident on the
part of the carrier as to impoverish it, and thus
prevent it from performing its functions as a
carrier. But, subject to these requirements, we
see no reason why the railway company may not
now contract for the carriage of freights as
freely as it was wont to do before the passage
of the Commission acts. The record fails to
show that the contract in question is in any manner discriminatory or extortionate, or that it
is unduly oppressive on the carrier. As we
have said elsewhere, the record is silent on these
matters, other than it was shown that the company had established a public rate betW:een these
points conside'l'ably higher than the contract
rate. But this is not sufficient to justify the
court in setting aside the contract rate on the
ground of its i'YII:.Ldequacy. While in an action
between the carrier and a member of the gen-
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eral public over the reasonableness of a freight
charge it would be some evidence of the justness
of the charge, conclusive perhaps in the absence
of any other showing, to show that the rate
exacted was the published rate and the rat~
charged every one for a similar service, it i~
not evidence wlhen the purpose is to set aside
a rate created by contract.
As between the
carrier and the other party to the contract, the
carrier must establish its claim of inv,alidity by
direct evidence of the fact.
"It is unnecessary in this proceeding that we
consider the effect of the contract on rates
to be charged to other shippers desiring to
ship between the same points. Since the railway
company is forbidden to discriminate in its
charges between shippers, it could not, of
course, charge other shippers a greater rate
for a like or similar service. But this does
not necessarily mean that the rate charged
must be the contmct rate. It will be remembered the respondent as an inducement to the
contract surrendered a right, and it may be
that the value of the surrendered right can be
taken into considemtion in fixing the public
rate, but this question we expressly refuse to
decide."
And on rehearing ( 109 Pac. 1020) it is held that:
1. The rule that a contract by a carrier to transport
goods for less than the published rate is illegal, has
no application where there is a consideration for
the contract, in addition to and independent of the
freight rate agreed upon, so that the rate is not
necessarily discriminatory.
2. Laws 1905, c. 81, Laws 1907, c. 226, and Laws
1909, c. 93, which establish a railroad commission
and provide for the regulation of freights and fares,
will not be construed to have a retroactive effect, so
as to affect previously existing valid contracts, in
the absence of some indication that such was the
legislative intent.
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The court says at page 1021 :
"A petition for a hearing en bane has been
filed in this case, in which the appellant earnestly insists that our former opinion ( 109 Pac.
320) is in direct conflict with the decision of the
Supreme Court of the Untied States in the case
of Armour Packing Co. vs. United States, 209
U. S. 56, 28 Sup. Ct. 428, 52 L. Ed. 681. It
seems to us, however, that this case is readily
distinguishable from the case cited on two
grounds : First, because there was here a consideration for the contract, in addition to and independent of the freight rate agreed upon, so
that the rate is not necessarily discriminatory:
and, second, beoause the contract was entered
into before the passage of the railroad commission act and the amendments thereto, and
there is nothing in the latter acts tendt"ng to
show that the legislature intended to abrogate
previously existing valid contracts, conceding
that it had the constitutional power to do so."
Instead of assuming that the lower contract
were unreasonable and discriminatory, it should
assumed that the lower rates were the proper
and that the higher schedule rates were prima
unreasonable and invalid.

rates
have
ones
facie

N. N. & M. V. Ry. vs. Brick Co., 109 Ky.
408; 59 s . w. 332;
Martin vs. Ry. Co. (Iowa), P. U. R.
1917B 883.

Certainly there was, and is, and could be no discrimination on the face of these contracts, unless
schedules 42 and 43 were and are applicable to them.
The saving clause in the statute, even if it does not
deprive the Commission of the power to abrogate them,
at least established and continued their prima facie
validity until the rates therein were lawfully raised and
the contracts lawfully abrogated. The Power Company
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recognizes this position and has been acting upon it by
billing at the contract rates for over two and a half
years since the act was passed. The Commission recognizes it by having sat by for over a year and permitted
the Power Company to operate and bill its consumers
under these contracts.
This Court recognizes this in the decision in the
Traction Company case, 173 Pac. 556. Other courts have
so held.
In Manitoc vs. Traction Co., 145 Wis. 158, 129 N. W.
925, the court holds and says:
"It is contended that this law has superseded
the contract involved in this suit and that therefore the contract no longer has any binding force
or effect. We do not think so. The statute
worked no change in existing rates. It simply
provided that all rates should be reasonable, and
left to the Railroad Commission the power to
determine the fact as to whether or not a given
rate was reasonable. When that determination
was reached the law became operative upon the
particular rate called in question, and the rate
arrived at then became the lawful rate and continued so until set aside in the manner provided
by the law. The Railroad Commission has made
no determination in the case before us ; at least,
if it has, it is no part of the record. Until that
determination is made, the contract is in force.
When it is made, the contract is superseded, if
the rate is changed."

In State ex rel. Raymond Light & Water Co. vs. Public
Service Commission of Washington, et al, 83 Wash. 130,
145 Pac. 215, it is held:
Public Service Commission act (Laws of 1911, p. 538),
which prohibits the granting of unreasonable preference
or making discriminations between persons or corporations by water companies, section 34 of which provides
that nothing in the act shall prevent any water com-
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pany from furnishing its product under any contract
in force at the date of the act at the rate fixed in such
contract, but that the Commission may, in its discretion,
order such contract to be terminated, does not, in the
exercise of the police power of the State, declare void
or voidable a contract by which a water company agreed
to furnish water free to certain mills for the period of
49 years, and the Commission's only power with reference to such contract is to direct the water company to
terminate it by proper proceedings, if it finds that the
contract prevents the company from rendering proper
service.
Even if the Commission had jurisdiction to declare
such contract void, it could not do so before giving the
parties thereto an opportunity to be heard.
Where the public service commission ordered a waterworks company to terminate a contract by which it had
agreed to furnish water to certain mills free for 49
years, after a hearing of which the mill companies had
no notice, and later the mill companies intervened and
showed that the contract was executed in consideration
of the transfer by the mills to the water company of the
water plant, though there was no reservation of the
right to use the water in the deed of transfer, it was not
abuse of the Commission's discretion to set aside the
former order directing the termination of the contract.
The ceurt says at page 216, 217 and 218:
"The lower court apparently based its judgment upon the conclusion that the contracts entered into between the water company and the
mill companies in the year 1904 were avoided
by the act of 1911 (Laws of 1911, p. 538, relating to the public service commission), because
these contracts were contracts for free water to
these companies for a period of 49 years, and
for the further reason that the deed by which
the waterworks of the mill companies was transferred to the water company did not contain a
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reservation of water, but transferred the whole
rights of the mill companies to the water company, and that the public service com:q1ission, in
making the first order, had jurisdiction of the
parties and authority to cancel these contracts
for free water.
The respondent in a voluminous brief, in answer to voluminous briefs filed by the appellants, states that there are but three questions
in the case, as follows: First, had the public
service commission jurisdiction over the persons
of the mill companies in making the original
order terminating the contracts between the mill
companies and the water company; second, had
the commission jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the contracts between the interveners
mill companies and the respondent water company ; and, third, had the commission the legal
right to terminate these contracts in the exercise
of its police power?
"It is argued by the respondent that the public
service commission had jurisdiction to terminate
these contracts in the exercise of the police
power of the State. If the contracts were contracts which the State in the exercise of its
police power, had a right to terminate, and which
the State had declared void, as were the contracts
in the case of Cowley vs. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.,
68 Wash. 558, 123 Pac. 998, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.)
559, or in the case of State ex rel. Webster vs.
Superior Court, 67 Wash. 37, 120 Pac. 861, Ann.
Cas. 1913D, 78, or in Louisville & Nash. Rd. Co.
vs. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 31 Sup. Ct. 265, 55 L.
Ed. 297, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 671, we would have
no doubt of the right of the water company or
of the public commission to terminate these contracts. But it seems to us that the contracts
involved in this case do not partake of the nature
of the contracts in these cases. Conceding that
there was no reservation of any part of the water
on the part of the mill companies when the transfer of the water system was made to the water
company, and that simple contracts were entered
into by which the water company agreed to fur-
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nish water to these mill companies for a period
of 49 years, we are still satisfied that the Commission act in question does not make these contracts, or contracts .of this character, either void
or voidable, because at section 34 of the Commission act (Laws of 1911, p. 561) the act provides:
"'Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent any gas company, electrical company or
water company from continuing to furnish its
product or the use of its lines, equipment or
service under any contract or contracts in force
at the date this act takes effect, or upon the
taking effect of any schedule or schedules of rates
subsequently filed with the Commission, as herein
provided, at the rates fixed in such contract or
contracts: Provided, that the Commission shall
have power, in its discretion, to direct by order
that such contract or contracts shall be terminated by such company as and when directed by
such order. * " * * '
"The act in prior sections provides that water
companies shall not make or grant any undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to any
person or corporation, that there shall be no discrimination between patrons, and then provides,
as quoted above, that nothing in this act shall
prevent any water company from continuing to
furnish its product or service under any con,.
tract in force a,t the date this act takes effect. It
seems plain, therefore, tha,t it was the intention
of the act that contracts of the character of these
were not declared illegal, or even voidable, because they are expressly excepted. It is trut!
the section then provides that the Commission
shall have power, in its discretion, to direct by
order that such contract or contracts shall be
terminated by the company party thereto, and
that thereupon such contract or contracts shall
be terminated as and when directed by such
order. This simply means that, if a contract
has been entered into, it is within the power
of the public service commission, in its discretion,
to order that such contracts shall be terminated
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by the company in the manner directed by the
public service commission. It was intended, no
doubt, that, when a contract of the character of
these in question is detrimental to the services
of the company furnishing water, the public
service commission, if it finds this to be a fact,
may direct the termination of such contract. It
would be for the parties to the contract to terminate it. If it was a void contract, it might
be terminated without damages. If it was valid
and binding contract, before it could be terminated, damages would necessarily be assessed. It
could not be reasonably contended that if a public
service corporation, furnishing water to a city,
had acquired by purchase the right to take a
certain portion of a stream for the purpose of
furnishing water to its patrons, and it should
eventuate that the whole stream was necessary,
the public service commission would have the
power to require the owner of the stream to deliver it to the public service corporation without
compensation. The public service commission
could only direct that the public service corporation should acquire the stream by proper and
legal methods. And so, in this ca,se, these were
valid contra,cts when entered into, upon valid and
good considerations. The Commission act, as
above stated, exempts these contracts from the
operation of the statute, except that the public
service commission, in the exercise of its discretion, may require the companies, or the parties
to the contracts, to terminate them. By reas.on
of this exception in the statute, we are satisfied
that these contracts are neither void nor voidable.
They were valid and binding obligations which
the statute does not attempt to avoid, but expressly exempts.
"Upon the question of jurisdiction, we are
satisfied that the public service commission had
jurisdiction to determine the questions presented
upon the original application between the citizens of Raymond and the water company. It
had a right, no doubt, to inquire into the quantity
and quality of the water furnished to the citi-
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zens and the facilities for furnishing water. It
was authorized to inquire into the reasonableness
of the rates, and for that purpose to inquire
whether water was being furnished free or otherwise. And, under its powers in this respect, it
might require the water company to desist from
furnishing free water. But we are satisfied that
the public service commission was not authorized
to set aside the contracts in question, first, because the statute does not give the public service
commission that authority; and, second, even if
the statute did give this authority, the beneficiaries under the contracts were clearly entitled
to a hearing upon that question. We think the
order of the public service commission first made
must be construed as directing the water company
to terminate the contracts, and did not in itself
terminate the contracts."
To the same effect is:

Portla;nd Ry. vs. Commission, 56 Ore. 468,
105 Pac. 709.
Each contract filed was in itself a schedule.

It must

be presumed that at the time the contracts and schedules

were filed they together furnished to the Power Company a fair return upon its investment. The contracts
must stand until they are abrogated for inadequacy of
consideration after a hearing by a competent tribunal.
So clear is this that it may be said that the Power
Company has admitted and the Commission has ruled
that Schedules 42 and 43 are inapplicable to these
contracts.
The contract rate was and continues to be the lawful
rate just as much as the schedule rate.
In the case of Ohio & Colorado Smelting & Refimng
Co. vs. Public Utilities Commission of Colorado (No.
9458), just decided and not yet reported, the Supreme
Court of Colorado, in reversing an order of the Commission of that State undertaking to abrogate a contract
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passed upon this very question, held that the burden of
showing the inadequacy was on the Power Company
and not on the consumer. And the court said:

"The sufficiency of the rate prescribed to produce a fair profit upon the value of the property
employed in the business is to be strongly presumed. The burden of showing its confiscatory
character rests, therefore, upon the complaining
company. Lincoln Gas Co. vs. Lincoln, 223 U. S.
349. The presumption must be correspondingly

stronger where the rate rests upon a contract
between the parties, understandingly entered
into."
The statute (Sec. 4784, Sub. 2, C. L. 1917) empowers the Commission to permit departures from filed
schedules.
That being true, it is indeed passing strange to find
the Commission, acting apparently on its own initiative,
calling upon the holders of pre-existing contracts, which
the law pronounces valid, to justify their continuance,
when no one has complained of them. Wherein lies the
fairness and impartiality of that line of procedure. We
fail to see it, and so did the Illinois Commission which
promptly announced that it was not their policy to inquire of their own initiative into contracts entered
into prior to the passage of the act creating the Commission.

Re Tampico Telephone Co. (Ill.), P. U. R.
1915-A, 24.
In the case of In re New York Steam Company,
Public Utilities Reports, 1918-B, p. 866, it is held that
a public utility cannot, by the filing of a new schedule,
abrogate rate contracts lawfully made, pursuant to a
former schedule, for a fixed term at specified rates and
for a minimum quantity of consumption, on the theory
that such contract rates would be discriminatory and
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unlawful under the new schedule; and a new schedule
is unjust, unreasonable and unlawful to the extent that
it fails to provide a separate classification for such prior
contracts.
Why is a consumer over whom the Commission has
no direct jurisdiction, called upon to justify a contract
which the law declares to be prima facie reasonable and
valid? Why not wait until the Power Company, or
some other consumer, files a protest or complaint as
required by the Act. There may be a reasonable explanation, but it has not occurred to us.
Now let us see how these schedules 42 and 43 came
to be filed and what their effect is:

Subdivision 2 of Section 4784, C. L. 1917, provides:
"Under such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe, every public utility other
than a common carrier shall file with the Commission within such time and in such form as the
Commission may designate, and shall print and
keep open to public inspection schedules showing
all rates, tolls, rentals, charges, and cl.assificar
tions collected or enforced, or to be collected or
enforced, together with all rules, regulations,
contracts, privileges, and facilities which in any
manner affect or relate to rates, tolls, rentals,
charges, classifications, or service. Nothing t"n
this section contained shall prevent the Commission from approving or fixing rates, tolls, rentals,
or cha.rges, from time to time, in excess of or less
than those shown by said schedule."

Section 4785, C. L. 1917, provides:
"Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no
change shall be made by any public utility in any
rate, fare, toll, rental, charge, or dassification,
or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating
to or affecting any rate, toll, fare, rental, charge,
classification, or service, or in any privilege or
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facility, except after thirty days' notice to the
Commission and to the public as herein provided.
Such notice shall be given by filing with the Commission and keeping open for public inspection
new schedules then in force, and the time when
the change or changes to be made in the schedule
or schedules then in force, and the time when
the change or changes will go into effect. The
Commission, for good cause shown, may allow
changes without requiring thirty days' notice
herein provided for, by an order specifying the
changes so to be made and the time when they
shall take effect, and the manner in which they
shall be filed and published. When any change
is proposed in any rate, fare, toll, rental charge,
or classification, or in any form of contract or
agreement, or in any rule, regulation, or contract
relating to or affecting any rate, toll, fare, rental,
charge, classification, or service, or in any privilege or facility, attention sha;ll be directed to such
change on the schedule filed with the Commission,
by some character to be designated by the Commission, immediately preceding or following the
item.''

Section 4830, C. L. 1917, provides:
"No public utility shall raise any rate, fare, toll,
rental, or charge or so alter any classification,
contra;ct, practice, rule, or regula,Uon as to result
in an increase in any rate, fare, toll, rental, or
charge, under any circumstances whatsoever, except upon a showing before the Commission and
a finding by the Commission that such increase
is justified.
"Whenever there shall be filed with the Commission any schedule stating an individual or
joint rate, fare, toll, rental, charge, classification,
contract, practice, rule, or regulation increasing
or resulting in an increase in any rate, fare, toll,
rental, or charge, the Commission shall have
power, and it is hereby given authority either
upon complaint or upon its own initiative without
complaint at once and if it so orders without
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answer or other formal pleadings by the interested public utility or utilities, but upon reasor~r
able notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning
the propriety of such rate, fare, toll, rental,
charge, classification, contract, practice, rule or
regulation, and, pending the hearing and the decision thereon, such rate, fg,re, toU, rental, charge,
classification, contract, practice, rule, or regulation shall not go into effect; provided, that the
period of suspension of such rate, fare, toll, rental,
charge, classification, contract, practice, rule, or
regulation shall not extend beyond 120 days
beyond the time when such rate, fare, toll, rental,
charge, classification, contract, practice, rule, or
regulation would otherwise go into effect unless
the Commission, in its discretion, extends the
period of suspension for a further period not
exceeding six months. On such hearing the
Commission shall establish the rates, fares, tolls,
rentals, charges, classifications, contra.cts, practices, rules, or regulations proposed, in whole or
in part or others in lieu thereof, which it shall
find to be just and reasonable. All such rates,
fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, contracts, practices, rules, or regulations not so suspended shall, on the expiration of thirty days
from the time of filing the same with the Commission, or of such lesser time as the Commission
may grant, go into effect and be the established
and effective rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges,
classifications, contracts, practices, rules, and
regulations, subject to the power of the Commission, after a hearing had on its own motion
or upon complaint as herein provided, to alter
or modify the same."
On April 8, 1918, over a year after the Act had been
in effect, the Commission issued its "Tariff Circular
No. 3," requiring the Utilities to file their tariff schedules by June 8, 1918. That Circular carried the express
mandate that:

"Whenever any change is made in any rate,
resulting in an advance of such rate, such change
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shall be denoted by the symbol 'A'
connection with rate changed, and on
page shall be shown a footnote giving
to such symbol and explaining its use,
denotes advance."

shown in
the same
reference
thus: 'A'

At that time the Power Company had not filed any
tariff schedule whatsoever. Over six months passed,
and still no schedules were filed.
On Oct. 23, 1918, the Commission issued its order
known as "Supplement No. 1 to Tariff Circular No. 3."
That order called attention to the statute (Sub. 2, Sec.
4784, C. L. 1917) as requiring the Utility Corporation to
file its "schedules" and also its "contracts" with the
Commission.
Thereafter and in November, 1918, the Power Company filed with the Commission those individual contracts and also schedules 42 and 43, together with its
"general rules and regulations."
No hearing was had by the Commission on either the
contracts or the schedules, or the rates therein named.
No finding whatsoever was made by the Commission
respecting them. No notice of the filing thereof was
given to anybody. The Commission simply received
them and directed its secretary to file them.
Schedules 42 and 43 did not carry any symbol "A,"
or any footnote or any other sign, word or syllable denoting any change in any rate therein embraced, much
less any advance in any such rate, or any rate whatsoever of the Power Company.
But those schedules did carry the statement that those
rates were only applicable to contracts subject to the
"Rules and Regulations of the Company" on file with
the Commission. Section 46 of those "Rules and Regulations of the Company" gave the consumer the option
of cancelling the contract .on thirty (30)' days notice
to the company.
This cancellation provision is not in the contracts
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between the consumers and the Power Company. The
contracts are for a definite period of years from their
dates.
It is perfectly obvious that those schedules do not
cover the contracts in question, and even if they do,
that such schedules were not designed or intended to
and could not operate to raise the rates in those contracts automatically or render the contracts illegal,
invalid, discriminatory or preferential.
It is needless to comment on the importance or seriousness of the matter now under consideration. It is
inconceivable that any court is going to hold that a
power company or a commission, by the mere filing of
a pre-existing schedule in force concurrently with the
contracts, could thereby ex parte and without a hearing
or notice, stick its hands in the pockets of the consumers
and deliberately rob them of millions of dollars for
the profit of the Power Company. That may be the
result these consumers are up against; but if so, it is
not common sense, common honesty, common justice or
common law, and having made the world safe for
democracy it would be high time something were done
to make democracy safe for the world. The assumption
is that by filing a piece of paper with the Commission,
the Power Company can voluntarily and arbitrarily
repudiate its solemn and binding obligations, and more
than that, can sandbag its patrons at will and autocratically filch from the pockets of its consumers for
its profit millions of dollars. The assumption is that
the public,-and these consumers are a part of the
public,-are at the untrammeled mercy of the Power
Company. It is no longer even a question of all the
traffic will bear, but is merely all that the Power Company desires, as the theory is that the Power Company
has- its consumers hog-tied by contracts which they
cannot break, but which the Power Company, by making
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love to the assistant& of the Commission, can ignore or
modify to suit itself.
Let us illustrate the gravity of these questions by an
illustration in dollars and cents.
The contract between the Utah Copper Company and
the Power Company calls for 31,000 horsepower at the
rate of $27.50 per horsepower per annum, equivalent
to a rate of payment of four and two hundred and eight
one-thousands mills ($0.004208) per kilowatt hour.
In the year 1918 these contracts were operated under.
If schedules 42 and 43 applied to them there was an
automatic increase of rate on all the contracts amounting
to $1,107,258.50.
In 1918 the Copper Company used 197,776,655 kilowatt
hours for which it paid the Power Company $958,925.73.
If schedule 42 and 43 applied to this contract, then there
was an automatic increase of that amount to $1, 635,596.94, or a difference of $676,671.21. The rate of in- '
crease on this 31,000 horsepower contract would have
been 43 per cent.
Those schedules were not and are not and could not
have been applicable to these contracts.
The result of giving those schedules any applicability
to these contracts is, on its face, so startling as to shock
the conscience of us all, and make us pause and inquire
whether the statute is so automatically sweeping as the
consequence must assume. A blanket horizontal increase
of over a million dollars a year, or the income on $10,000,000, or 25 per cent of the Power Company's investment, without the permission of the Commission, and
without determining the necessity for or reasonableness
of the increase, or any hearing being afforded interested
patrons, may sound like General Order 28 of the United
States Railroad Administration p:i'omulgated under the
war power in the hour of our national peril, but it does
not sound like the Public Utilities Act of Utah, and it
does not sound like the General Order of this Com-
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mission overthrowing such an increase as to the short
line railroads released from Federal control.
Those schedules and these contracts were filed with
this Commission in response to the order supplement
No. 1 to Tariff Circular No. 3. They were not filed as
new schedules initiating or inaugurating new rates.
They were shown to be the schedules in effect March 1,
1917, prior to the passage of the Act.
The Commission has no power to change the rates in this contract or in any way to interfere with this contract.

We have already discussed the constitutioanl power
of the Legislature to abrogate or impair pre-existing
contracts in the exercise of the police power. However,
it was clearly within the rights of the Legislature to
delegate to the Utilities Commission such power or
jurisdiction as its wisdom or choice dictated: and, conversely, it was clearly within the right of the Legislature
to withhold from the Commission such power or jurisdiction as its wisdom or choice determined. (Gas. Co.
vs. Commission, 224 N. Y. 156, 120 N. E. 132.)
It was within the exclusive province of the Legislature
to determine who, when, by whom, and to what extent
pre-existing contracts of public service corporations
should be brought within the operation of the Act.
Neither the Commission nor the courts are concerned
with the wisdom or policy of the statute. (Inter. Harvester Co. vs. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199.)
So we pass from the existence of the power to the
question whether it has been exercised in this State. We
inquire whether the Legislature has directly abrogated,
impaired or interfered with this contract. We inquire
whether the state has exercised its right to impair this
contract; and then we next inquire whether the Legislature has delegated to the Public Utilities Commission
the power to abrogate, impair or supersede this contract.
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Each and every one of these last enumerated inquiries
must be answered in the negative.
Chapter I of the Utilities Act creates the Commission.
Chapter II defines the utilities declar~d to be subject to
the jurisdiction and regulations of the Commission and
the provisions of the Act. Chapter III prescribes the
duties of Public Utilities.
Section 4783 requires all charges made by any Public
Utility to be just and reasonable.
Subdivision 2 of Section 4784 provides that:
"Under such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe, every public utility other
than a common carrier shall file with the Commission within such time and in such form as the
Commission may designate, and shall print and
keep open to public inspection schedules showing
all rates, tolls, rentals, charges, and classifications
collected or enforced, .or to be collected or enforced, together with aU rules, regulations, contmcts, privileges and facilities which in any
manner affect or relate to rates, tolls, rentals,
charges, classifications, or service. Nothing in
this section contained shall prevent the Commission from approving or fixing rates, tolls, rentals,
or charges, from time to time, in excess or less
than those shown by said schedule."
1t has to be noted that that section of the act differentiates by its express language between general
"schedules" showing all rates, etc., and separate "contracts" relating to rates. In short, that section upon its
face recognizes that there may be existing contracts
relating to rates not embraced within the general schedules of the utility.

Section 4785 provides that:
"Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no
change shall be made by any public utility in any
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rate, fare, toll, rental, charge, or classification,
or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating to
or affecting any rate, toll, fare, rental charge,
classification or service; or in any privilege or
facility, except after thirty days' notice to the
Commission and to the public as herein provided.
Such notice shall be given by filing with the
Commission and keeping open for public inspection new schedules stating plainly the change or
changes to be made in the schedule or schedules
then in force, and the time when the change or
changes will go into effect. The Commission, for
good cause shown, may allow changes without
requiring thirty days' notice herein provided for
by an order specifying the changes so to be made
and the time when they shall take effect, and the
manner in which they shall be filed and published.
When any change is proposed in any rate, fare,
toll, rental, charge or classification, or in any
form of contract or agreement, or in any rule,
regulation or contract relating to or affecting any
rate, toll, fare, rental, charge, classification, or
service, or in any privilege or facility, attention
shall be directed to such change on the schedule
filed with the Commission, by some character to
be designated by the Commission, immediately
preceding or following the item."

That section likewise specifically recognizes that there
may be existing contracts fixing rates aside from the
general schedules of the utility.
Subdivision 3 of Section 4787 is a compilation of Subdivision C of Section 5 of Article III of the original
act. In the original act that subdivision of that section
provided that:
"No comomn carrier subject to the provisiOns
of this Act shall, directly or indirectly, issue, give
or tender any free ticket, free pass or free reduced-rate transportation for passengers between
points within this State, except to its officers,
agents, employes, attorneys, physicians and surgeons, and members of their families; to minis-
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ters of religion, traveling secretaries of railroad
men's religious associations, or executive officers,
organizers or agents or railroads employes' mutual benefit associations giving the greater portion
of their time to the work of any such associations; inmates of hospitals or charitable or eleemosynary institutions, and persons exclusively engaged in charitable or eleemosynary work, and
persons and property engaged or employed in
educational work or scientific research or in
patriotic work, when permitted by the Commission ; to indigent, destitute and homeless persons and to such persons when transported by
charitable societies or hospitals, and the necessary
agents employed in such transportations; to inmates of the National homes or State homes for
disabled volunteer soldiers, and of soldiers' and
sailors' homes, including those about to enter and
those returning home after discharge, and boards
of managers of such homes; to necessary caretakers of livestock, poultry, milk or fruit; to
employes on sleeping cars, express cars and to
linemen of telegraph and telephone corporations;
to railway mail service employes, United States
internal revenue officers, post office inspectorljl!
customs officers and inspectors and immigration
inspectors when traveling in the course of their
official duty; to newsboys on trains, baggage
agents, witnesses attending any legal investigation in which the carrier is interested, persons
injured in accidents or wrecks and physicians and
nurses attending such persons; provided, that the
term 'employes,' as used in this section, shall
include furloughed, pensioned and superannuated
employes, persons who have become disabled or
infirm in the service of any such carrier, exemployes traveling for the purpose of entering
the service of any such carrier, and the remains
of persons dying while in the employment of any
such carrier; and the term 'families', as used in
this section, shall include the families of those
persons heretofore named in this proviso, and the
families of persons killed, and the widows during
widowhood, and minor children during minority,
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of persons who died while in the service of any
such carrier; and provided, further, that no free
ticket, free pass or free or reduced-rate transportation shall be issued, given or tendered to any
officer, agent or employe of a common carrier,
who is at the same time a shipper or receiver of
freight, unless such officer, agent or employe
devotes substantially his entire time to the service
of such carrier; and provided, further, that the
members of the Public Utilities Commission, their
officers and employes, shall be entitled, when in
the performance of their official duties, to free
transportation over the lines of all common carriers, and to free use of the lines of all telegraph
and telephone companies within this State.
"Nothing in this act contained shall be construed to prohibit the issue by express corporations of free or reduced-rate transportation for
express matter to their officers, agents, employes,
attorneys, physicians and surgeons, and members
of their families, or the interchange of free or
reduced-rate transportation for passengers or express matter between common carriers, their
officers, agents, employes, attorneys, physicians
and surgeons and members of their families,
where such common carriers are subject in whole
or in part to the jurisdiction of the Commission
or of the Interstate Commerce Commission;
provided, that such express matter be for the
personal use of the person to or for whom such
free or reduced-rate transportation is granted,
or of his family; nor to prohibit the issue of
passes or franks by telegraph or telephone corporations to their officers, agents, employes, attorneys, physicians and surgeons, and members
of their families, or the exchange of passes or
franks between such telephone and telegraph corporations, or between such corporations and such
common carriers, for their officers, agents, employes, attorneys, physicians and surgeons, and
members of their families; nor to prohibit free
or reduced rate service by other public utilities
to its officers, directors and employes; nor to
prevent the carrying out of contracts for free or
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red1wed rate passenger transportation or other
utility service heretofore made, founded upon
adequate consideration and lawful when made;
nor to prevent a common carrier from transporting, storing or handling, free or at reduced rates,
the household goods and personal effects of its
employes, or persons entering or leaving its
services, and of persons killed or dying while in
its service."
In short, the original act specifically provided that
"nothing in this act shall be construed * * * to prevent
the carrying out of contracts for free or reduced-rate
passenger transportation or other public utility service
heretofore made, founded upon an adequate consideration
and lawful when made."
It is to be noted that this provision of the act, as
incorporated in the original act, was not the mere tailend .of the preceding proviso; but was a separate and
distinct and independent patragraph by itself.
In the compilation of 1917, subdivision 3 of Section
4787, the language is the same, except that the words
"nothing in this act contained" have been changed to
read "nothing in this title contained." And the compilers, instead of giving this provision of the act a
separate paragraph, as was done in the original act,
continued it as a part of the preceding paragraph. However, upon the most elemental principles of statutory
construotion, it must be assumed that there was no
intention, by reason of these slight changes, in the
compilation, to effect any change in the original statute.
Section 4788 provides that:
"Except as in this section otherwise provided,
no public utility shall charge, demand, collect, or
receive a gre.ater or less or different compensation for any product or commodity furnished or
to be furnished, or for any service rendered or
to be rendered, than the rates, tolls, rentals and
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charges applicable to such products or commodity or service as specified in its schedules
on file and in effect at the time, nor shall any
such public utility refund or remit, directly or
indirectly, in any manner or by any device, any
portion of the rates, tolls, rentals and charges
so specified, nor extend to any corporation or
person any form of contrG!ct or agreement, or any
rule or regulation, or any facility or privilege
except such as are regularly and uniformly extended to all corporations and persons; provided,
that the Commission may by rule or order establish such exceptions from the operation of this
prohibition as it may consider just and reasonable
as to each public utility."
Section 4789 prohibits a utility from granting any
unreasonable preference, advantage or difference in
rates or service.
Chapter IV prescribes the authority of the Commission
over public utilities.
Section 4800 provides that:
"Whenever the Commission shall find after
hearing that the rates, fares, tolls, rentals,
charges or classifications, or any of them, demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any
public utility for any service or product or commodity, or in connection therewith, including
the rates or fares for excursion or commutation
tickets, or that the rules, regulations, practices
or contracts, or any of them, affecting such
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, or classifications, or any of them, are unjust, unreasonable,
discriminatory or preferential, or in anywise in
violation of any provisions of law, or that such
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, or classifications are insufficient, the Commission shall
determine the just, reasonable, or sufficient
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, practices, or contracts
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to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall
fix the same by order as hereinafter provided.
"The Commission shall have the power to investigate a single rate, fare, toll, rental, charge,
classification, rule, regulation, contract, or practice, or any number thereof, or the entire schedule or schedules of r,ates, fares, tolls, rentals,
charges, classifications, rules, regulations, cont'racts, and practices, or any number thereof, of
any public utility, and to establish, after hearing,
new rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, cont'racts, or practices,
or schedule or schedules, in lieu thereof."
Chapter V provides for the procedure before the
Commission.

Section 4829 provides that:
"Any public utility shall have the right to complain to the Commission on any of the grounds
upon which complaints are allowed to be filed
by other parties, including the fairness, reasonableness, or adequateness of any schedule, classification, rate, price, charge, fare, toll, rental,
rule, regulation, service, or facility of such public
utility, and the same procedure shall be adopted
and followed as in other cases except that the
complaint may be heard ex parte by the Commission or may be served upon any parties designated by the Commission."
It is to be noted that that sections omits the word
ucontracts."

Section 4830 provides that:
"No public utility shall raise any rate, fare,
toll, rental, or change or so alter any classification, contract, practice, rule, or regulation as to
result in an increase in any rate, fare, toll, rental,
or charge, under any circumstances whatsoever,
except upon a showing before the Commission
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and a finding by the Commission that such increase is justified.
"Whenever there shall be filed with the Commission any schedule stating an individual or
joint rate, fare, toll, rental, charge, classification, contract, practice, rule or regulation increasing or resulting in an increase in any rate,
fare, toll, rental or charge, the Commission shall
have power, and it is hereby given authority
either upon comnlaint or upon its own initiative
without complaint at once and if it so orders
without answer or other formal pleadings by
the interested public utility or utilities, but upon
reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the property of such rate, fare, toll,
rental, charge, classification, contract, practice,
rule, or regulation, and, pending the hearing and
the decision thereon, such r,ate, fare, toll, rental,
charge, classification, contract, practice, rule,
or regulation shall not go into effect;
provided, that the period of suspension of such
rate, fare, toll, rental, charge, classification,
contract, practice, rule, or regulation shall not
extend beyond 120 days beyond the time when
such rate, fare, toll, rental, charge, classification, contract, practice, rule, or regulation would
otherwise go into effect unless the Commission,
in its discretion, extends the period of suswnsion for a further period not exceeding six
months. On such hearing the Commission shall
establish the rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges,
classifications, contracts, practices, rules or regulations proposed, in whole or in part or others
in lieu thereof, which it shall find to be just and
reasonable. All such rates, fares, tolls, rentals,
charges, classifications, contracts, practices,
rules, or regulations not so suspended shall, on
the expiration of thirty days from the time of
filing the same with the Commission, or of such
lesser time as the Commission may grant, go
into effect and be the established and effective
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications,
contracts, practices, rules, and regulations, subject to the power of the Commission, after a
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hearing had on its own motion or upon complaint
as herein provided, to alter or modify the same."
It must be conceded that the general provisions of
the act are broad enough to confer upon the Commission the power to abrogate pre-existing contracts but
there is a limitation imposed upon that authority by the
provision of the act to the effect that
"Nothing in this act shall be construed * * *
to prevent the carrying out of contracts for free
or reduced-rate passenger transportation or other
public utility service heretofore made, founded
upon an adequate consideration and lawful when
made."
And we submit that that portion of the act just
quoted is a limitation upon the authority of the Commission and deprives it of any power to abrogate or
impair this contract, and operates as the interposition
of a legislative barrier between the power of the Commission and the secredness and inviolability of this
contract.
The contract between the Power Company and the
Consumer Company was certainly one "heretofore
made" within that provision of the act. That act did
not become effective until March 8, 1917, and the contract in question was made prior to the passage of
the act.

We will later discuss the import and the meaning of
the words "founded upon adequate consideration," and
for the time being will assume for the next succeeding
portion of this argument that any given contract was
"founded upon an adequate consideration," within the
meaning of that phrase as employed in the act.
It is equally clear that the contract was "lawful when
made." Its object and purposes were lawful and it
did not contravene any constitution or statutory pro-
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vision or any rules of common law. This is too plain
for argument. No one has ever claimed nor can anyone ever seriously claim that this contract was not
lawful when made.
It is therefore as clear as the noon-day sun, that
this contract falls within that provision of the statute,
and the protection thereof, whatever that protecion
may be, if it was "founded upon an adequate consideration."
The Power Company argues that this was not a
contract for "free service." That is true. The Power
Company argues that it was not a contract for "reduced
rate" service. In this respect the argument of the
Power Company proceeds along the following line of
thought:

"It is not enough that the contract shall have
been at a low rate, and valid when made. As
is held by all the authorities, the subject of public
utility service is one which may be freely contracted about until the legislature prescribes
rules governing the rendering of such service,
and contracts therefor, and any contract for
such service is valid when made. As free service
is not here involved, to bring this contract within
the excepted provision, it must have been, first.
for reduced rate service. Reduced rate service
is service at less than standard or schedule rate
for the same class of service. At the time that
this contract was made (Jan. 1, 1913), the Utah
Power & Light Company had no schedules available for power service in such quantities, and
under such conditions, as demanded by the consumer, and in fact had no standard power schedules, but conducted all its power business under
contract. The rate quoted to the consumer and
included in the contract, had no reference to any
schedule, and was not a reduction from any
schedule. The contract was a special contract,
but not in any sense a reduced rate contract.''
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That argument or suggestion is untenable upon its
face. There are three obvious answers, to it, to wit:
1. In the first place, the facts stated in it are not
true because it is a matter of common knowledge that
from its very inception in September, 1912, the Power
Company had schedules of rates.
2. In the second place, this act took effect on March
8, 1917, and at that time, as the Commission knows
from its own files, the Power Company had in effect
standard schedules of rates. In fact, schedules 42 and
43, the very schedules that are here involved, state upon
their face that they had been issued and made effective
on March 1, 1917, before the act became effective. If
this contract is for a "reduced rate" as compared with
those schedules, since they had been filed with the
Commission, it was equally one for a "reduced rate,"
as compared with those schedules before they were
filed with the Commission and before the passage of the
Act itself. It is the same contract and the same set
of schedules. If it is not a contract for a "reduced
rate," then that is an end of this matter and the Commission is no further concerned with it. If it is a
contract for a "reduced rate," as compared witlr those
schedules, then it was one for a "reduced rate" within
the meaning of that provision of the statute under
consideration.
3. In the third place, the statute in dealing with
schedules and tariffs of the utilities, in the very nature
of things was only dealing with the schedules and
tariffs thereby required to be thereafter filed by the
Utility Company. The words "reduced rate" in the
Act, necessarily mean a "reduced rate" as compared
with a schedule filed pursuant to the Act. It can mean
nothing else; hence, this contract was for a reduced
rate within the meaning of the statute.
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In this connection it would be interesting to note that
such an argument would absolutely destroy the Commission's attempted jurisdiction over this contract.
That argument of the Power Company asserts that the
Power Company "had no schedules available for power
service in such quantities and under such conditions, as
demanded by the Htak ·~t,Pt\c£ ije Q ny." They had
schedules 42 and 43. Hence, that is equivalent to the
assertion and admission that schedules 42 and 43 are
not applicable to the class of service furnished by the
Power Company to the consumer. This is exactly what
we contend for and is a thought that we shall hereafter
more fully develop. If it is sound, it ends these proceedings.
Let us pass, therefore, to a consideration of the effect
of that part of the act, providing that:

"Nothing in this act shall be construed" so as
"to prevent the carrying out of contracts for free
or reduced rate passenger transportation or other
public utility service heretofore made, founded
upon an adequate con.sideration and lawful when
made."
It was entirely competent for the legislature to make
the statute either retroactive, or prospective, or both,
in its operation. Likewise, it was entirely competent
for the legislature to insert in the act a provision
determining the construction to be placed upon the act.

25 R. C. L., 987-1047-1049;
University vs. Richards, 20 Utah 457;
Stockdale vs. In.s. Co., 87 U. S. 323, 22 L.
Ed. 348.
This provision of the act is itself an interpretation
clause. It furnishes the rule to govern the courts and
the Commission in the application of the act. Such
interpretation clauses are not uncommon. As is said in
25 R. C. L. 987:
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"Such clauses are often introduced from excessive caution and for the purpose of preventing
a possible misinterpretation of the act by including therein that which was not intended."
And
"Where, in an act, it is declared that it shall
receive a certain construction, the courts are
bound by that construction, though otherwise the
language would have been held to mean a different thing."
25 R. C. L. 1049.

In Stockdale vs. Insurance Co., 87 U.S. 323, 22 L. Ed.
348, the court says, at page 331 :
"Both in principle and authority it may be
taken to be established, that a legislative body
may by statute declare the construction of previous statutes so as to bind the courts in reference to all transactions occurring after the
passage of the law, and may in many cases thus
furnish the rule to govern the courts in transactions which are past, provided no constitutional
right of the party concerned is violated."
And the court further says at page 332:
"The paragraph we have been considering was
not in its essence an attempt to construe a
statute differently from what the courts had
construed it, for no construction on this subject
had been given by any court. Nor was it an
attempt by construing a statute to interfere with
or invade personal rights, which was beyond the
constitutional power of Congress."
The words in this part of the act are clear and unequivocal and, as said in Motion Picture Patents Co.
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vs. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 61 U. S. (L. Ed.) 416,
at 418:
"Their meaning would seem not to be doubtful if we can avoid reading into them that which
they really do not contain."
The act plainly and unequivocally says that nothing
contained in the entire act shall prevent the carrying
out of contracts of the kind named. That interpretation clause fixes the policy and purpose of the act and
distinctly states its design and intent. Its language
is mandatory that the act shall not be construed to
embrace the contracts enumerated or prevent their
being carried out. It was a plain recognition of the
existence and validity of pre-existing contracts. It
clearly contemplated that nothing contained in the act
should work any change in or supersede pre-existing
contracts of the class mentioned. It recognized the
continued binding force of such contracts as constituting bargains which in equity and good conscience the
Utility Company should not be permitted to break. It
recognized the injustice of interfering with those contracts. It distinctly excepted from its operation contracts which otherwise might have been held to have
been within the operation of the act. It was a specific
exemption of the contracts enumerated. Its language
on its face is plain. Its phraseology is simple and free
from ambiguity. We are not concerned with the wisdom
or policy of the plain provision of the act.

Harvester Co. vs. U. S., 234 U. S. 199;
Caminetti vs. U. S., 61 U. S. (L. Ed.) 192;
Brewer vs. Bougher, 14 Pet. (39 U. S.)
178, 198.
Is there anything in that language of the act which
would justify a court or this Commission to disregard
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its plain provisions? Is the language employed there
such as to lead to the conclusion that the framers of
the Act did not intend what they said?
To read into that section of the Act words of limitation and reservation would usurp the legislative prerogative and create and invent a command to these
consumers which the legislature never gave nor intended to give. The Act is plain on its face. The
exemption is absolutely in terms. It says that nothing
contained, not merely in that section but in the entire
act, should be construed to prevent the carrying out,
not of some contracts, but of any contract of any kind
or character, made before the passage of the act and
founded upon an adequate consideration and lawful
when made. Is a court or the Commission going to
engraft upon the generality of that language a reservation or exception as to some contracts not therein
contained? As said in Howard vs. Illinois Central Ry.,
217 U. S. 463, 52 L. Ed. 297:
"This would require us to write into the
statute words of limitation and restriction not
found in it."
Again:
"Where the legislative body makes no exception to a general and clear declaration of its will,
the conclusive presumption is that it intended
to make none, and it is not the province of the
courts to do so."
Mr. Sutherland, in his work on Statutory Construction, Sec. 236, uses the following language:
"If the legislature has expressed its intention
in the law itself with certainty, it is not admissible to depart from that intention on any
extraneous consideration or theory of construction."
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It must be assumed that the legislature knew that
many of these contracts had been made and were in
existence. It must be assumed that the legislature
knew that even a public service corporation may lawfully waive a full return on its investment. (In re N. J.
Gas Co., P. U. R. 1918-A, p. 20.) It must be assumed
that the legislature knew that the Power Company and
its predecessors in interest had made many such contracts with consumers, both parties acting in absolute
good faith. It must be assumed that the legislature
knew that many of those contracts were essentially only
experimental contracts for the purpose of reaching a
basis for future charges. Even though this might
ultimately result in giving for the term of the contract
a better rate to a few customers than was given to
other customers, it must be assumed that the legislature knew that many industries of the State had
sprung into existence on the faith of these contracts.
It must be assumed that the legislature knew that the
success of many industries of this State depended upon
the continuance of these contracts. One of the conditions of successful business,-one of the things which
induces new industries,-is the ability to provide an
advance for the certainty of future expenditures, including among them, the cost of power. It must be
assumed that the legislature knew that fact and that
the only way of securing such certainty was by making
contracts, and that such certainty had been insured, or
attempted to be insured, by the making of these definite
term contracts for definite rates, and that on the faith
thereof immense amounts of money had been invested
in industrial enterprises in this State.
Unquestionably, the intention and purpose of the
legislature was to protect and preserve the good faith
and integrity of those contracts which had helped develop the industrial resources of the State through the
investment of money made in reliance upon them.
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It must be assumed that the legislature knew that
by March, 1917, the Power Company had, through these
very contracts, elminated competitive industrial steam
plants, and obtained the money wherewith to gobble up
all the available water power sites in the community,
and thereby had acquired not only a virtual, but an
actual, monopoly on the generation and distribution
of electrical power in the State. It was the clear intent
of this portion of the act that the Utility Company should
not be given a strangle hold on the industries of this
State by reason of such industries having foregone their
privilege of generating their own power, in reliance upon
these contracts. It must also be assumed that the sacredness of contracts was known to the legislature to be one
of the fundamental notions of common justice inherent in
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence-so sacred, that that principle had been stowed away in the casket of the consituation for safe keeping; and that while it had the
power to evade that principle, the dictates of law,
justice and common honesty rendered it inexpedient
and undesirable to exercise that power.
It must also be assumed that the legislature knew
that although there was no constitutional inhibition
against retrospective legislation, nevertheless such laws
have always been looked upon as unjust and oppressive.
The legislature knew that ordinarily a statute should
be given only a prospective operation. It knew, however, that some courts had given statutes of this
character a retroactive operation. It knew that other
courts had ruled that legislation of this character should
in all justice not be given a retroactive operation to
invalidate pre-existing contracts.

Interurban Ry. vs. Commission, (Ohio),
120 N. E. 830;
Ra.ilway Co. vs. Coal Co., 79 Ill. 121;
Timber Co. vs. Railwa;y Co., 58 Wash. 604,
109 Pac. 320;
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Timber Co. vs. Railway Co., 58 Wash. 604,
109 Pac. 1020;
Lighting ·co. vs. N. Y., 162 N. Y. S. 581;
Superior vs. Telephone Co., 141 Wis. 383,
122 N. W. 1023.
In Public Service Elec. Co. vs. Board of Public Utility
Com'rs, 88 N. J. 603, 96 Atl. 1013, it is held that:
The provisions of the act concerning public utilities,
P. L. 1911, p. 380, Sec. 18: (a) that no public utility
"shall make" any unjust or unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential rate, or (d) give,
directly or indirectly, any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any person, corporation or locality,
are prospective, and not retroactive.
Statutes are to be given prospective and not retroactive effect, unless their language makes them retroactive
and admits of no other construction.
The agreement made in 1898 between the city of
Plainfield and the Plain field Gas & Electric Light Company, whereby the latter, in consideration of the passage
of a certain ordinance by the former, designating certain
streets and highways in that municipality through and
upon which posts or poles of the lighting company might
be placed and maintained, etc., contracted that it, its
successors and assigns, would at all times light by electricity free of charge the common council chamber and
certain buildings and offices occupied for city purposes,
is enforceable against the Public Service Electric Company, which subsequently took over the rights and
privileges and assumed the duties and obligations of the
Plainfield Gas & Electric Light Company, notwithstanding the provisions of P. L. 1911, p. 380, Sec. 18 (a)
and (d).
The legislature cannot impair the jurisdiction of a constitutional court by preventing its exercise or creating a
co-ordinate authority.
At pages 1014-1015 the court says:
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"The language of section 18 of the act concerning public utilities (P. L. 1911, p. 380), is that:
" 'No public utility as herein defined shall:
(a) Make, impose or exact any unjust or unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory or unduly
preferential * * * rate,' etc., or '(d) make
or give, directly or indirectly, any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any person
or corporation or to any locality,' etc.
"This language, it will be observed, is entirely
prospective and not at all retroactive.
"It has been decided over and over again that
statutes are to be given prospective and not retroactive effect, unless their language makes them
retroactive and admits of no other construction.
See Citizens' Gaslight Co. vs. Alden, 44 N. J. Law,
648; Williams vs. Brokaw, 74 N. J. Eq. 561, 70
Atl. 665; Frelinghuysen vs. Morristown, 77 N. J.
Law 493, 72 Atl. 2; Plahn vs. Givernaud, 96
Atl. 40.
"By the convention of the parties in 1898 the
city of Plainfield acquired the right to have free
lighting by electricity of certain of its buildings,
offices, etc., from the Plainfield Gas & Electric
Company, whose successor, the Public Service
Electric Company, afterwards took over its property and franchises subject to its burdens. Thus
arose, and has continued, the obligation of the
lighting company to the city under a purely contractual relationship. The language of the statute
against unjust discrimination and unreasonable
preference is that they 'shall' not be made or
given, and there is no language indicative of an
intent on the part of the legislature to make provision that contracts already in existence shall
come under the ban of this prohibition. The word
'shall' is an irregular auxiliary verb, and used
with the verb 'make' is a verb phrase, which in
this statute is used to prohibit a contingent
future event. See State vs. Griffin, 85 N. J. Law
613, 616, 90 Atl. 259. It is perfectly clear that
the statute is without retroactive effect, and that
it cannot operate upon the contract of 1898,
which, concededly, was lawful when made. There
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is therefore no question in the case as to the
State's power to impair or abrogate a contract to
which a municipality or the public are parties.
"The legislature cannot impair the jurisdiction
of a constitutional court, either by preventing its
exercise or creating a co-ordinate authority. Flanigan vs. Guggenheim Smelting Co., 63 N. J. Law
647, 650, 44 Atl. 762; Smith vs. Livesey, 67 N. J.
Law 269, 51 Atl. 453; Ex parte Thompson, 96
Atl. 102, 106."
The legislature could not know wha,t construction our
courts might put upon the act as respects this retroactive operation upon pre-existing contracts. And to
remove any doubt whatsoever as to what the legislative
intent was, there was inserted this provision, that
nothing contained in the act and all of its should be
construed to prevent the carrying out of these preexisting contracts founded upon an adequate consideration and lawful when made.
In opposition to these views it will proba:bly be contended on the basis of the decision in the case of Salt
Lake City vs. Utah Light & Traction Co., (Utah), 173
Pac. 556, that:
1. That decision emasculated this provision
of the act and read it out of the statute; and
2. This provision of the act was a mere permission to the utility and not a limitation on the
power of the Commission ; and
3. That this provision of the act should be
limited in its effect to the preceding provisions in
that one section of the act; and
4. That the only contracts excepted are those
made upon special considerations of a similar
nature to that involved in the Motley case therein
referred to.

Let us therefore examine that decision and analyze it.
In analyzing that case we must remember that a de-
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cision is only an authority for the actual point decided.
The law of stare decisis is well settled.
In Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 83, it is said:
"All judgments, however, are supposed to
apply the existing law to the facts of the case; and
the reasons which are sufficient to influence the
court to a particular conclusion in one case ought
to be sufficient to bring it or any other court to
the same conclusion in all other like cases where
no modification of the law has intervened. There
would thus be uniform rules for the administration of justice, and the same measure that is meted
out to one would be received by all others. And
even if the same or any other court, in a subsequent case, should be in doubt concerning the correctness of the decision which has been made,
there are consequences of a very grave character
to be contemplated and weighed before the experiment of disregarding it should be ventured upon.
That state of things when judicial decisions conflict, so that a citizen is always at a loss in regard
to his rights and his duties, is a very serious evil;
and the alternative of accepting adjudged cases
as precedents in future controversies resting upon
analogous facts, and brought within the same reasons, is obviously preferable. Precedents, therefore, become important, and counsel are allowed
and expected to call the attention of the court to
them, not as concluding controversies, but as
guides to the judicial mind. Chancellor Kent says:
'A solemn decision upon a point of law arising in
any given case becomes an authority in a like
case, because it is the highest evidence which we
can have of the law applicable to the subject, and
the judges are bound to fellow that decision so
long as its stands unreversed, unless it can be
shown that the law was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular case. If a decision had
been made upon solemn argument and mature
deliberation, the presumption is in favor of its
correctness, and the community have a right to
regard it as a just declaration or exposition of
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the law, and to regulate their actions and contracts by it. It would, therefore, be extremely
inconvenient to the public if precedents were not
duly regarded, and implicitly followed. It is by the
notoriety and stability of such rules that professional men can give such advice to those who consult them, and people in general can venture to
buy and trust, and to deal with each other. If
judicial decisions were to be lightly disregarded,
we should disturb and unsettle the great landmarks of property. When .a rule has once been
deliberately adopted and declared, it ought not
to be disturbed unless by a court of appeal or
review, and never by the same court, except for
very urgent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error; and if the practice were otherwise,
it would be leaving us in a perplexing uncertainty
as to the law.' "
In 26 A. & E. Encyc. Law (2 Ed.) 169, it is said:
"The language used in the opinions of the court
must be construed in the light of the circumstances connected with each case. Its. influence
and weight as a precedent are also largely dependent upon them. The language in argument or
findings may have a restricted or enlarged inter~
pretation by reason of its connection with a specific statements of facts. Also the opinion and
decision of a court must be read and examined as
a whole in the light of the facts upon which it is
based, and not applied by picking out particular
parts or sentences. The facts are the foundation
of the entire structure, which cannot with safety
be used without reference to the facts. The decision is only an a;uthority for what it actually
decides and cannot be quoted for a proposition
which may seem to follow logically from it."
In 15 Cor. Jur., 939, it is said:
"Judicial precedents are valuable only in so far
as they state definite rules for guidance in future
similar cases. The authority of a former decision
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as a precedent must be limited to the points actually decided on the facts before the court."
In 15 Cor. Jur., 940, it is said:

"In determining whether or not an issue has
been previously adjudicated, the court will be
governed by the record in such previous trial, and
not by the assumption by counsel on argument
thereof that the issues therein embraced were the
issues which are raised in the subsequent action."
In 15 Cor. Jur., 941, it is said:
"Mere abstract questions of the law cannot be
made the subject of litigation, so that, when once
determined, the determination must be applied in
all subsequent litigation between other and different parties merely because the same question of
law is involved. The positive authority of a decision is co-extensive only on the facts on which it
is founded, and it can apply only in subsequent
cases in which the issues are similar. Accordingly, in applying the rule of stare decisis to a
former decision, the language of the opinion in
the earlier case must be construed with reference
to the particular facts presented in that case."
In Salt Lake City vs. Utah Light & Traction Co.,
(Utah), 173 Pac. 556, the facts were that Salt Lake
City was a municipal corporation. Section 8 of Article
XII of the State Constitution prohibited the construction and operation of a street railroad within the limits
of any city without the consent of the local authority
having control of the streets proposed to be occupied for
such purposes. The city had given the Traction Company its consent to the laying of tracks in the city by an
ordinance wherein the rates of fare to be charged by
the street railway company for commutation tickets
were fixed. That ordinance was passed prior to the
enactment of the Utilities Act and was accepted by the

121

Traction Company. On the application of the Traction
Company the Utilities Commission raised the rate for
such commutation tickets and the city sued out a writ
to review the action of the Commission, contending that
the franchise ordinance was a contract and that it
fell within the provision of the act above quoted protecting contracts made prior to the passage of the act,
founded upon adequate consideration and lawful when
made. The Traction Company, as shown by its brief in
that case, contended that (1) the franchise was not a
contract at all, and (2) that the power to prescribe
rates is governmental and not contractual, and hence,
that rate provisions of a franchise ordinance were not
contracts; and (3) that if they were contracts they were
contracts of a peculiar nature in that and because, while
they were contractual in form, they were in the last
analysis an exercise of a governmental power and not a
contractual power; and ( 4) that hence franchise ordinance contracts did not fall within the exemption of the
statute; and, lastly, ( 5) that the exemption in the
statute was a mere permission to the utility and not a
limitation upon the power of the Commission.
The Supreme Court held that the City had no constitutional power under Section 8 of Article XII of
the Constitution to enter into any contract respecting
the fixing of the rates of the railway company; and
further held that in giving its consent to the laying
of the tracks in the form of a franchise ordinance,
the city could do nothing that would deprive the legislature of the power to fix rates expressly given it by
Section 15 of Article XII of the Constitution; however,
the Supreme Court held that the franchise ordinances,
after acceptance by the Traction Company, possessed
the elements of a contract, and treated it as such.
Nevertheless, the court, upon the authority of Home
Telephone Co. vs. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265, 53 L. Ed.
176, and Brummit vs. Ogden Water Works Co., 33 Utah
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289, 93 Pac. 829, recognized that these so-called franchise contracts emanated from the sovereign power of
the State and were special privileges, and in the last
analysis are really governmental, rather than contractual, in their nature. And the Supreme Court continually kept this distinction in mind by constantly
limiting its language and ruling to "rates fixed in
franchise ordinances." At pages 561 and 562 the
court says:
"Plaintiffs, however, also insist that the commutation tickets are not within the purview of
the Utilities Act, but are excluded therefrom
by a certain exception found in subdivision 'c' of
Section 5 of Article III of that act. It is there
provided:
" 'Nothing in this act contained shall be
construed * * * to prevent the carrying out of contracts for free or reduced
rate passenger transportation or other public utility service heretofore made, founded
upon adequate consideration and lawful
when made.'
"The foregoing provisiOn is found among the
exceptions in favor of the employes and respecting agreements with other utilities. While the
language of the exception is not as clear as it
could have been made, yet it is manifest that
it was not intended to refer to the rates fixed in
franchise ordinances. In our opinion the manifest purpose of the legislature was to prevent
an injustice like that in the case of Louisville,
etc., Ry. Co. vs. Motley, 219 U. S. 467, 31 Sup.
Ct. 263, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 671, in which case
life passes were issued to Motley and his wife
upon a valuable consideration received by the
railroad company. In that case the Supreme
Court of the United States held that under the
act of Congress of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24
Stat. 379, as subsequently amended (U. S. Comp.
St. 1916, Sec. 8563, et seq.), common carriers
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were prohibited from transporting either freight
or passengers except at the regular rates, which
had to be paid in cash. Under that decision,
therefore, the Motleys were prohibited from
riding on their passes, although they had paid
for them before the congressional act had been
passed. Moreover, it sometimes happens that
passes are issued in payment for right of way
and other privileges granted by the owners of
land to common carriers.
Under the Motley
decision, however, all such passes would be void
regardless of the consideration that the owners
had paid to the common carriers. The legislature,
therefore, very properly, and, as we think, wisely,
excepted such cases from the operation of the
Utilities Act in so far as intrastate business is
concerned.· That is all that was attempted, and
all that was done, by the adoption of the exception aforesaid. This contention must therefore likewise fail."
It is clear, therefore, from that language that that
decision is not an authority for the suggestion that
it has emasculated the exemption provision of the act
and read it out of the statute. It recognized, in the
language of University vs. Richards, 20 Utah 457,
that:
"This clause is unusual and was evidently inserted for a purpose."

'

Clearly, the court had in mind a distinction between
a franchise ordinance contract under which the city
paid nothing to the railway company and where the
rates involved were not rates to be paid by one of
the contracting parties to the other, but were merely
rates applicable to the general public. There IS a
clear distinction between such franchise ordinance
contracts of a municipality and contracts made by
private individuals or corporations and even contracts
made by a municipality in its proprietary right as a
property owner.
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This distinction is clearly brought out by the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin.
The Wisconsin public utility law contained a provision that "the finishing by any public utility of any
product or service at the rates and upon the terms
and conditions provided for in any existing contract,"
was not inhibited. Under that statute it was held, in
City of Superior vs. Douglas County Telephone Co.,
141 Wis. 363, 122 N. W. 1023, that where there was
an offer by a telephone company operating in a city
to render service to the city which the city could
receive for the use of its officers in the public pusiness and for the convenience of the public, in exchange
for a privilege of value which the city could and did
grant subject to legitimate conditions, which were
accepted by the company, a valid contract between
the company and the city was made which was protected by that exemption in the act. And the court
said at page 1026:
"Such privilege may well have been considered
so specially valuable to the company as to be
a fair equivalent for the free service, so called,
that is free as regards appellant rendering any
direct pecuniary consideration therefor."
On the other hand, in City of Kenosha vs. Kenosha
Home Telephone Co., 149 Wis. 338, 135 N. W. 848,
it was held that where the state law authorized telephone corporations to use the streets of municipalities,
subject only to their police regulations, an ordinance,
which granted a telephone company the right to use
the streets in consideration of free telephone service
to the municipality, is not a contract, for the municipality could not barter the exercise of its police t;>ower
for free telephones. The court said :
"As a State agency it had no power to enter
into a contract not subject to amendment by
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the public utility law. City of Manitowoc vs.
Manitowac & NCYrthern Traction Co., 145 Wis.
13, 129 N. W. 925; City of La Crosse vs. La
Crosse Gas & Electric Co., 145 Wis. 408, 130
N. W. 530.
"Much reliance is placed by the plaintiff upon
the case of Superior vs. Douglas Telephone Co.,
141 Wis. 363, 122 N. W. 1023. That was a
case where the City of Superior in its proprietary character entered into a contract for free
telephones with an existing telephone company
operating under a charter from the State. No
attempt was made by the city to confer any
franchise, or right to operate any telephone
system, upon the telephone company. The city
and the telephone company, prior to the passage
of Chapter 499, Laws of 1907, entered into
a contract-nota part of any franchise granted
or attempted to be granted-whereby the telephone company, for a valuable consideration,
agreed to maintain a certain number of free
telephones in the City of Superior. The city
had paid the consideration by permitting alterations to be made in its city hall and buildings
as requested by the telephone company, and it
was held the passage of the public utility law
did not affect the contract, since Section
1797m-91 thereof expressly provided that 'the
furnishing by any public utility of any product
or service at the rtaes and upon the terms and
conditions provided for in any existing contract
executed prior to April 1, 1907, shall not constitute a discrimination within the meaning
specified.' It is obvious the case at bar does
not come within the principle applied or the
section referred to in the Superior case."
It is perfectly obvious that the decision in the Traction Company case did not touch or deal with the contention made that the exemption provision of the
act was a mere permission to the Utility and not a
limitation on the power of the Commission. That
question was not decided, discussed or passed upon.
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In support of that suggestion the Traction Co. cited,
and it may be presumed that the Power Company here
represented by the same counsel, will cite:

Denver Ry. vs. Englewood (Colo.), 161
Pac. 151;
Benwood vs. Commission, 75 W. Va. 127,
83 S. E. 295, L. R. A. 1915C 261;
Sewerage Co. vs. Collingwood (N. J.), 102
Atl. 901;
Winfield vs. Commission Co. (Ind.), 118
N. E. 531;
Pawhuska vs. Gas Co. (Okla.), 166 Pac.
1058.
But none of those cases are in point because the statutes of those states differed materially from ours.
The case of Denver Ry. vs. Englewood (Colo.) supra,
has absolutely nothing to do with this question because
the Colorado act did not contain any such provision
exempting pre-existing contracts at all.
In Winfield vs. Commission, supra, the Indiana statute simply provided that:
"Every public utility is required to furnish
reasonably adequate service and facilities. The
charge made by any public utility for any service
rendered or to be rendered either directly or in
connection therewith shall be reasonable and just,
and every unjust or unreasonable charge for such
service is probihited and declared unlawful ; provided, that nothing in this act contained shall,
authorize any public utility during the remainder
of the term of any grant or franchise under which
it may be a.cting a,t the time this act takes effect
to charge for any service, in such grant or franchise contracted, exceeding the maximum 'mte or
rates therefor, if a,ny, that may be fixed in such
grant or fra,nchise."
Clearly that provision of the act was directed expressly at the Utility. It did not authorize the Utility
to do anything and the court merely said, at page 537:
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"It is argued that the proviso in said section is
one of limitation of power, preventing the Commission from increasing rates above maximum
contract rates during the contract term. In support of this argument it is said that it would be
absurd to hold that the legislature had by this
proviso intended to prevent utilities companies
from charging more than the maximum fixed by
their contracts, because the contract is sufficient
limitation. With this supporting statement we
agree; but we cannot agree that this leads to a
conclusion that the limitation is upon the Commission. Utility companies cannot charge in excess of their contract rates unless the State consents. The first clause in section 7 suggests such
a consent in that it declares that for the required
service the charge of such companies shall be just
and reasonable, and that every unjust and unreasonable charge is unlawful. This might be
construed, though not with much force, as a consent of the State that such companies may charge
just and reasonable rates, though in excess of
contract rates, because a contract rate being unjust is unlawful. Lest such construction might
be attempted, the legislature added the proviso to
section 7 as a limitation on the utility companies.
The proviso was written into the law as a limitation upon the utility companies to prevent such
liberal construction being made by such companies."

The case of Sewerage Company vs. Collingwood, supra,
is not in point at all and has nothing to do with the
question under consideration.
In Pawhuska vs. Gas Co., supra, it appeared that in
1913 the City granted the Gas Company a franchise. But
that franchise was subject to an act approved March
25th, 1913, expressly empowering the Commission to
establish gas rates. So the Commission had the power
at the time of the granting of the franchise to establish
gas rates. In 1915 the Legislature passed another act
extending the jurisdiction the permission and it was
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merely held, that the provisiOn in the act of April
2nd, 1915 (Laws 1915, c. 200,' p. 407), "that this act
shall not abrogate any existing contract, or affect or
change the terms or conditions of any francihse granted
by any municipal corporation prior to and in effect
April 28, 1913," merely qualifies the direct legislative
mandate of that act to "all persons, firms or corporations furnishing gas in all municipalities having a
population over five hundred to do so through standard
meters at meter rates," and does not effect the power
of the Corporation Commission under the provisions of
the act of March 25, 1913 (Laws 1913, c. 93, p. 150), to
establish rates not inconsistent with such direct mandate.
The case of Benwood vs. Commission, supra, is not in
point because the West Virginia statute contained absolutely no provision saving contracts as does ours
It may be remarked in passing that the statutes of
New York, Ohio and Washington contained provisions
that nothing in the act should be construed to prevent
the carrying out of contracts, subject to an expressed
provsio, however, that the Commission shall have the
power in its discretion to direct by order that such
contracts be terminated.
The language of our statute is so broad and comprehensive that it must be a limitation on the power of the
Commission. It is not addressed to the Utility or the
consumer at all. It is addressed only to those tribunals
authorized to "construe the act," that is ,to the Commission and the courts.
And while it is true, as said in the Traction Company
case that:
"The foregoing provision is found among the
exceptions in favor of employees and respecting
agreements with other utilities;"
nevertheless it is well settled law, that:
"The construction of a statute can ordinarily be
in no wise affected by the fact that it is sub-
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divided into sections or titles. A statute is passed
as a whole and not in parts or sections and is
animated by one general purpose or intent. Consequently the several parts or sections of an act
are to be construed in connection with every
other part or section and all are to be considered
as parts of a connected whole and harmonized, if
possible, so as to aid in gaving effect to the intention of the lawmakers."
25 R. C. L., p. 1009.

The language of the exemption is not confined to the
section in which it is found, but expressly says that
nothing in the entire act shall be construed as stated.
It is plain in this respect, the language means nothing
less than that no part of the act, under wlwtever chapter
or section it may be found, shall be construed to prevent
the carrying out of contracts at the time stated. It excepts and excludes such contracts from the operation of
the entire act, and every part thereof. It was designed
to avoid the injustice and oppression consequent upon
interfering with vested property rights. It was intended
to point out that the abrogation of such contract was not
one of the duties imposed on the Public Utility under the
act. The language is general and all embracing in its
scope.
In the language of Arnett vs. Donohue, 168 Ind. 180,
80 N. E. 153:
"A further consideration, which is not without
importance here, is the fact that the opening
language of the proviso is specific, rather than
general. There is no mistaking the force of the
language used. But, not content with this, the
Legislature went farther, and provided that 'nothing herein slwll be construed as affecting the control or management of the police department in
any city or cities now or hereafter operating under
the laws establishing such board of police commissioners.' It was said by Frazer, C. J., in Smith
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vs. State, 28 Ind. 321, 325: 'Where z'n an act lt is
dee!ared that z't shalt receive a certain construeNon, the courts are bound by thmt con.struetion
though otherwise the language would have beer{
held to mean a different thing.' "
The saving clause embraces the entire act and every
part thereof. It is not in the form of a mere proviso,
but is affirmed by the Legislature as an independent
proposition applicable alike to every other part of the
act. The scope of the saving clause is so broad that it
must be held to extend beyond the section in which it is
found and to embrace the entire act. Its language is
such that it manifestly extends far beyond the section in
which it is found.
The Legislature delegated to the Commission power
only in cases where it did not impair the obligation of
the contracts saved from the operation of the act. The
language of the saving clause, or interpretation clause, is
plain.
As said in Caminetti vs. U. S., 61 U. S. (L. Ed.) 192,
at page 196:
"If the words are plain, they give meaning to
the act, and it is neither the duty nor the privilege
of the courts to enter speculative fields in search
of a different meaning."

So the rule has been stated as follows :
"If the language be clear, it is conclusive and
there can be no construction where there is nothing to construe."

United States vs. Hartwell, 6 Wall. (73 U.
U. S.) 385, 396.

And
"The intention of the Legislature is to be collected from the words they employ. Where there
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is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room
for construction."

United States vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (18
U. S.) 76, 95.
Effect must be given to every word of the statute.
Effect must be given to this provision of the statute and
to every word thereof. It is well settled law that when
one provision of a statute treats specially and particularly of a subject matter it over-rides general terms and
expressions found in other parts of the act.
36 Cyc., 1130, 1131;

United States vs. Jackson, 143 Fed. 783;
Sanford vs. King, 18 So. Dak. 334;
Mertens vs. Moore, 108 Md. 636, 71 Atl.
460;

Donnelly vs. Hobe, 106 Wis. 411, 82 N. W.
336;

King vs. Armstrong, 9 Cal. App, 368, 99
Pac. 527;

Prout vs. Notan, 71 Nebr. 136, 98 N. W.
657;

Miller vs. Donovan, 3 Cal. App. 325, 35
Pac. 159;
25 R. C. L., 1011;

County vs. Cornell, 53 Nebr. 556, 74 N. W.
59;

Bank vs. Parrott, 125 Gal. 472, 58 Pac. 164.
To state the proposition enumerated in those cases
in another form, it is that: Where there are in a statute
specific provisions relating to a particular subject, such
provisions govern as to that subject as against general
provisions in other parts of the statute, though the
latter, standing alone, are broad enough to include the
subject to which the more particular provisions relate.
Or, as stated in still another form, where a statute
includes both a particular and also a general enactment
which in its most comprehensive sense would include
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what is embraced in the particular one, the particular
enactment must be given effect, and the general enactment must be taken to embrace only such cases within
its general language as are not within the provisions of
the particular enactment.
In Bartlett vs. Trenton, 38 N. J. Law, 64, the court, in
construing a tax statute which provided that nothing in
said act contained shall be construed so as to destroy,
impair or take away any right or remedy acquired or
given by any act thereby repealed, says :
"That the general clause will not affect the
previous particular enactment, is supported by
Smith vs. Bell, 10 M. & W. 378; Pretty vs. Solly,
26 Beav. 611, and cases therein cited.
"When the intention of the lawgiver, which is to
be sought after in the interpretation of a statute,
is specifically declared in a prior section as to a
particular matter, it must prevail over a subsequent clause in general terms, which might, by
construction, conflict with it. The Legislature
must be presumed to have intended what it expressly stated, rather than that which might be
inferred from the use of general terms."
Another argument that the Power Company makes on
this question is that predicated upon the dictum of the
Supreme Court in the Traction Company case in reference to the Motley decision. And it will be argued that
the words "adequate consideration" mean a "special consideration." In short, it will be argued that to make the
contract one "upon an adequate consideration" it must
have been more than the mere obligation to take and
pay for the service and must have contained an additional special consideration of such a character that if
the contract were abrogated substantial injustice would
result.
There is absolutely not a word of that character in
the saving clause of the act. It says, an "adequate," not
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a "special" consideration. However, if that view were
taken, many of the contracts in question would fall
within it. In many of the contracts in question, there
was a special consideration for the contract in addition
to and independent of the rate agreed upon. In many
of them there were absolute conveyances of property,
such as water powers, steam plants, etc. In other words,
there were leases of property, such as steam plants, etc.,
to be used by the Power Company as emergency plants.
These were special features of special value to the Power
Company. Moreover, many of the consumers were required by the contract to incur an especially large expense in the construction of sub-stations and the
installation of electric apparatus to receive the current.
In some of the contracts, the consumers are required to
employ laborers, such as watchmen, at the plaints turned
over to or leased to the Power Company, without expense
to the Power Company. In many of the contracts the
consumer surrendered its right not only to generate
power itself, but also its right to take additional needed
power from other producers or sources. Many of the
contracts gave the Power Company valuable renewal
options. Clearly these special features of some of these
contracts take them without the jurisdiction of the
Commission or the court or anyone else to abrogate
such contracts or to interfere in any way with the
rates therein agreed upon.
Water Co. vs. Commission, 83 Wash. 130,
145 Pac. 215;
Timber Co. vs. Ry. Co., 58 Wash, 604, 109
Pac. 320;
Timber Co. vs. Ry. Co., 58 Wash. 604, 109
Pac. 1020;
Lighting Co. vs. New York, 162 N. Y. S.
581;
Middlesex vs. Ry. Co., (N. J.), P. U. R.
1918 A., 577;
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Electric Co. vs. Commission, 88 N. J. Law
603, 96 Atl. 1013.
The Power Company argued that this proviSIOn of
the act was a mere permission to the Commission to
exercise jurisdiction over the contract, and says this
must be so because otherwise the general policy or
purpose of the act would be defeated. That is not
true. That was a matter for the legislature to determine. The legislature determined the policy of the
act, and the reservation clause evidences this policy.
Suppose the legislature had said that the act should
not take effect until all pre-existing contracts with
utilities had expired. That would have been no concern of the courts or the Commission and they would
have had to give efficacy to such expression of the
legislative will. That, in substance, is exactly what
the act has done as to these contracts exempted from
its operation. As to them, it says that the act shall
not take effect until their expiration. Why was it
necessary for the legislature to give any such claimed
special permission to the Commission? It was not
doing a useless act and the other general provisions
of the statute, but for this clause, gave the Commission ample jurisdiction and power. This special clause
was not needed to give the Commission an added permiSSive power. The argument is out of place-it
cannot be. The last sentence of Section 4788 expressly
authorizes the Commission to permit departures from
schedules, and so forth. Then why was it necessary
to give it the same permissive power in another
clause? Does such an argument appeal to the trained,
judicial intelligence?
The act says that "nothing in the act shall be construed," etc. Is that the language of a permission or
the language of an inhibition? Logic and reason can
give but one answer to that question. The negative

•
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language was intended to and operates to confine
and limit the applicability of the act and the jurisdiction of the Commission. Such negative language cannot possibly be held to expand the act permissively.
The language is not appropriate or suitable for any
such purpose. That clause of the statute is a withholding of power and not a grant of power. It is a
recognition of the fundamental principles of the sacredness and inviolability of contractual obligation and is
a repudiation of the "scrap of paper" doctrine and
an acknowledgment that might does not make right.
That clause was inserted in the act to prevent any
possible misinterpretation of the balance of the act
by giving it a retroactive application. It furnished
a governing rule for the Commission and the courts,
and to them it says "hands off." It is a specific
exemption of the contracts enumerated from the operation of the act. What right has the Commission or the
court to engraft a reservation on the generality of the
all-embracing language of that exemption? Absolutely
none. It would be neither just, expedient or lawful.
We administer the law but do not make it. We must
respect it and not disregard it.
We come now to a discussion of the import and the
meaning of the words "founded upon adequate consideration," as employed in the act.
In so far as this question is one of fact, it can only
be discussed or determined upon the merits of a given
contract.
A question will arise as to the time with respect to
which the adequacy of the consideration is to be tested.
The Power Company urges that it must be tested
so as to afford it a return on its investment in these
abnormal times. On the other hand, the consumers
contend that this must be tested as of the time when
the contract was entered into. That is the language
and mandate of the statute which provides that the
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contract is exempted, if it was founded upon an adequate consideration "W'hen made."
There is no ambiguity about those words "when made." Moreover,
in the very nature of things, the issue of "adequate
consideration" must be tested by the condition existing
at the time the contract was made and if the rate
was adequate and fair, then in the light of the then
cost of the service and of the special economies attending that particular character and volume of service,
it cannot be said to be inadequate because at a later
period during the life of the contract increasing material and 1 or labor costs or changing conditions
had brought the cost of performing the contract up
to or beyond the prices realized therefor.
Elliott vs. Trust Company, 178 Ill. App. 439.
The adequacy of the consideration must necessarily
be tested as of the time and date when the contract
was made.
1 Page Con. (2 Ed.) Sec. 640;
Aldrich vs. Aldrich (Ill.), 122 N. E. 472;
Drefahl vs. Bank, 132 Ia. 563, 107 N. W.
179;
Horn vs. Beatty, 82 Miss. 504, 37 So.
833;
Campbell vs. McLaughlin (Mp.), ~05
s. w. 18.
Years of the life of this contract are still unexpired
and no one can guess what the relation between production cost and revenue under the contract may be
ih its after life, nor whether, if viewed in retrospect
after its completion, the entire charge would or would
not be adequate return for the entire service.
To test the question of adequacy at any period or
periods after the execution of the contract would be
to erect varying standards for varying intervals, with
the result that at some periods the contract would be

•

137
valid and at other periods deficient; at some periods
the consideration would be adequate, at other periods
inadequate; at some periods the charges subject to
change, at others protected against change. This will
not do. The power of the Commission either reaches
or does not reach the contract.
In Columbus Ry. Pow,er & Light Company vs. City
of Columbus, (U. S.), 63 L. Ed. 416, 'it is held:
Substantial Federal questions sufficient to sustain
the original jurisdiction of a Federal district court
are presented by a bill which seeks to enjoin the continued enforcement of street railway franchise ordinances fixing rates, on the ground that such rates, because of increased operating costs and decreased net
revenues, due to war conditions and an increased wage
scale fixed by the War Labor Board, are inadequate
and confiscatory, and that to compel street railway
operation at unremunerative rates is to take the property of the street railway company without due proces11
of law.
If a party charges himself with an obligation possible
to be performed, he must abide by it unless performance is rendered impossible by the act of God, the law,
or the other party. Unforeseen difficulties will not
excuse performance. Where the parties have made
no provision for a dispensation, the terms of the contract must prevail.
Increased street railway operating costs and decreased net revenues due to war conditions and to
an increased wage scale fixed by the National War
Labor Board, though rendering unremunerative the
street railway fares fixed by municipal franchise ordinances which, by acceptance, became valid contracts,
mutually binding for the twenty-five year term namea
therein, do not absolve the street railway company
from the obligations of its contract so as to justify
it in surrendering its franchises and excuse it from
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giving service at the rates so fixed-especially where
it cannot be said that, taking all the years of the term
together, the contract will prove unremunerative. The
court says at page 422 :
"It is undoubtedly true that the breaking out
of the World War was not contemplated, nor
was the subsequent action of the War Labor
Board within the purview of the parties when
the contract was made. That there might be
a rise in the cost of labor, and that the contract
might at some part of the period covered become unprofitable by reason of strikes or the
necessity for higher wages, might reasonably
have been within their contemplation when the
contract was made, and provisions made accordingly. There is no showing in the bill that
the War or the award of the War Labor Board
necessarily prevented the performance of the
contract. Indeed, as we have said, there is
no showing, as, in the nature of things, there
cannot be, that the performance of the contract,
taking all the years of the term together, will
prove unremunerative. We are unable to find
here the intervention of that superior force
which ends the obligation of a valid contract
by preventing its performance. It may be, and,
taking the allegations of the bill to be true, it
undoubtedly is, a case of a hard bargain. But
equity does not relieve from hard bargains simply because they are such."

The real controversy on this phase of the matter
will ultimately turn upon whether that expression in
the limiting clause of the act means merely such a
consideration as would support a contract and prevent its being held void for total lack of consideration, or
whether the words "adequate consideration" mean
something more than that and import the necessity
for a special consideration, and if so, a special consideration of what nature, or whether if it does not
require a special consideration, it at least requires

'
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a rate consideration representing an equivalent or an
approximate equivalent for mutual value received so
as to be deemed adequate, or whether the consideration should be held adequate unless it was such that
a court of equity might set aside the contract for
inadequacy of consideration.
On these questions, we will not, at this time, do
more than state the position which the consumers
will take, without citing detailed authorities, as this
brief has already been extended beyond what was
originally intended. The consumers will contend:
1. That all that is required is a good and valuable
consideration sufficient to support the contract in
law, and that a written contract carries with it a
presumption of the adequacy of the consideration and
that the burden of showing a want of such a consideration is on him who seeks to void the contract.

2. It will be further contended that these contracts
have elements of indeterminate value agreed upon
by the parties of a nature such that it is impossible
to say that the consideration was inadquate.

•

3. It will be further contended that that which
the parties acting in good faith believed and regarded
as adequate at the time the contract was entered into,
must be treated as adequate. Persons competent to
contract are free to make such terms as they choose.
If the parties to these contracts in good faith and
without any fraud or mistake, agreed upon a valuable
consideration which they at the time regarded as a
mutually valuable consideration and equivalent, it is
not for the Commission or the courts at this time to
inquire into the wisdom of such a consideration or
the profit or loss subsequently arising out of the
transaction.
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4. It will be further contended that any consideration is adequate which is not so disproportionate to
the relative values involved as to shock one's sense
of that morality and fair dealing that should always
characterize transactions between man and man.
5. It will be further contended that the adequacy
of the consideration must be tested by the inducements
which operated on the minds of the parties in making
the contract. It is a relative expression as to which
the parties acting in good faith and not as a mere
sham, were entitled to determine for themselves.
6. It will be contended that these contracts carry
considerations of such a special character as require
the exercise of judgment to determine their value and
that what the parties agreed upon as adequate, uninfluenced by fraud or deception, must be regarded as
adequate.
7. It will be further contended that many of these
contracts have a special consideration of a special
nature over and above the rate agreed to be paid for
the service.
8. It wilf be further contended that in any event
the statute contemplates that the consideration cannot
be declared inadequate unless it is such that a court
of equity would set aside the contract for inadequacy
of consideration.
It is obvious that each and every one of these contentions might be amplified at length, but as the purpose
of this discussion is not to secure a determination of
the questions, but only to suggest their imposibility as
bearing upon the undesirability or impropriety of their
determination at this time, we will not extend the
discussion further.
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The foregoing considerations show the gravity and magnitude
of the questions involved, which should not be passed
upon or foreclosed by this court until after a full hearing
by every contract consumer upon the facts of his individual
case; and they should not be passed upon at this time.

It would seem, therefore, that either the court should
summarily dismiss this writ at this time, or else the
other special contract holders, for their own protection,
must and should be allowed similar writs, and the whole
matter deferred and argued out by everyone, with no
decision by the court on the pending applications until
everyone interested has had a full opportunity to present
his own case, to the end that the court may be fully
advised as to every angle of every question involved, and
thereby, in deciding one case, avoid doing an injustice
to another contract-holder in another case.
The alternative writ should be quashed as having been
improvidently issued, and the application for a permanent writ should be denied, on the ground of the
adequacy of an other existing remedy, without any
determination of the jurisdiction of the Commission or
of the questions involved on the merits.

Respectfully submitted,

DICKSON, ELLIS, LUCAS & ADAMSON,
As Amicus Curiae .
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